The State Safety Oversight Program Annual Report for 2000 represents the cooperative efforts of many people.  For their guidance and technical direction, the authors give special thanks to Mr. Hiram J. Walker of the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) Office of Program Management, Mr. Harry Saporta, Mr. Jerry Fisher, Mr. Roy Field, and Mr. Frank McCarron of FTA's Office of Safety and Security; the State Safety Oversight Agencies, who implement the State Safety Oversight Program and provide the data, procedures, and policies upon which this report is largely based; the American Public Transportation Association, FTA's National Transit Database Program, the Transportation Research Board, and the National Transportation Safety Board, who all provided additional data to support state reports and analysis.  Finally, the authors wish to thank Mr. James Harrison, Mr. Robert Adduci, and Mr. Jerry Powers of the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center for their invaluable contributions of statistical data, insights, and suggestions.  Their combined efforts greatly improved the content of this report.

Table of Contents

Section

            Rule Requirements

            Addressing New Starts

            Fatalities

            Injuries

            Probable Cause

            Corrective Action Plans

List of Figures

Figure

1. SSO Program Development Process. 4

2. Current Map of States Affected by Part 659. 9

3. Ridership Growth - 1994-2000. 12

4. Fatalities per 100 Million Passenger Miles - 1991 through 2000 (including suicides) 26

5. Injuries per 10 Million Passenger Miles - 1991 through 2000. 26

6. Fatalities per 10 Million Passenger Trips - 1999 and 2000. 27

7. Fatalities per 100 Million Passenger Miles - 1999 and 2000. 27

8. Injuries per 100,000 Unlinked Passenger Trips - 1999 and 2000. 28

9. Injuries per 10 Million Passenger Miles - 1999 and 2000. 28

10. Total Reported Accidents - 1999 and 2000. 30

11. FTA Reportable Accidents by Type - 1999 and 2000. 31

12. CY 2000 Accidents by Mode/Type. 32

13. Accident Results by Rail Grade Crossing Characteristics. 33

14. FTA Reportable Fatalities - Excluding Suicides. 33

15. Reported Fatalities by Mode - Excluding Suicides. 34

16. FTA Reportable Fatalities by Type - 1999 and 2000. 34

17. Fatalities by Mode/Type - Excluding Suicides. 35

18. FTA Reportable Injuries - 1999 and 2000. 36

19. Total Injuries by Mode - 1999 and 2000. 37

20. CY 2000 Injuries by Mode/Type. 37

21. CY 1999 Injuries by Mode/Type. 38

22. Probable Cause for Reported Accidents - Excluding "Other"*. 39

23. Rail Fixed Guideway System Crimes by Type - 2000. 43

24. Violent Crimes by Mode per Million Passenger Miles. 44

25. Violent Crimes by Mode per 10 Million Passenger Trips. 44

26. Property Crimes by Mode per Million Passenger Miles. 45

27. Property Crimes by Mode per 10 Million Passenger Trips. 45

28. Crime Categories by Mode per 10 Million Passenger Trips. 46

29. Crime Categories by Mode per Million Passenger Miles. 46

30. Crimes per 10 Million Passenger Trips - 1999 and 2000 Heavy Rail 47

31. Crimes per Million Passenger Miles - 1999 and 2000 Heavy Rail 47

32. Crimes per 10 Million Passenger Trips - 1999 and 2000 Light Rail 48

33. Crimes per Million Passenger Miles - 1999 and 2000 Light Rail 48

34. SSO Audit Deficiency Findings by Category. 52

35. SSO Audit Area of Concern Findings by Category. 52

List of Tables

Table

1. States and RFGS Affected by Part 659 - by FTA Region. 6

2.Categorization of Designated Oversight Agencies. 7

3. Number of RFGS in Affected States. 7

4. Oversight Agency Resources Allocated to State Safety Oversight 7

5. Average Weekday Unlinked Passenger Trips, 2000 . 11

6. Average Weekday Public Transportation Ridership, Fiscal Year 2000. 12

7. Heavy Rail Service Profile - 2000. 14

8. Light Rail Service Profile - 2000. 15

9. 1999-2000 Comparison: Annual Passenger Unlinked Trips and Passenger Miles. 17

10. Rail Agencies Initiating New Service by Early 2001. 18

11. Rail Transit Projects On-line between 2000 and 2003. 19

12. Increase in rail Grade Crossings since 1997. 20

13. Grade Crossing Characteristics. 22

14. Transportation-related Fatalities, 1995 to 2000. 24

15. Reported 2000 Fatalities and Injuries by Rail Transit Mode. 25

16. FY 2000 Rates of Fatality and Injury by Rail Transit Mode. 25

17. Probable Cause Percentages by Accident Type and Mode. 40

18. NTD - FBI Crime Data Relationship. 42

19. Number of Crimes by Mode/by Category. 43

Preface

A primary objective of the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) State Safety Oversight Program has been to create a nationwide infrastructure to provide effective safety and security monitoring and evaluation for rail transit. Information presented in the State Safety Oversight Program Annual Report for 2000 demonstrates the success of this program in not only requiring and documenting the activities performed by rail transit agencies to address safety and security issues, but also in promoting an operating culture more attuned to safety and security concerns.

Safety requirements for FTA's State Safety Oversight Rule (49 CFR Part 659) went into effect January 1, 1997. Approaching the Rule's 5-year anniversary, rail transit safety oversight in the United States has been transformed.

In 1997, there were 6 designated state agencies overseeing the operations of 12 rail transit systems. By the end of 2000, there were 22 designated oversight agencies implementing Part 659 requirements for 35 rail transit systems.  In anticipation of "New Start" Systems initiating revenue service in the next 5 years, 6 additional states have designated oversight agencies, bringing the total as of this report to 28 State Safety Oversight Agencies (SOAs).

Accomplishments of the Program since its inception include the following:

• Development of system safety programs and system safety program plans (SSPPs) at 36 rail fixed guideway systems (RFGS) which meet minimum requirements specified by the SOAs and FTA, including operational provisions for hazard analysis, internal safety audit programs, and formal determination of probable cause resulting from accident investigations.

• Development of system security programs and system security program plans (Security Plans) at 35 RFGS which address the security of passengers and employees, and clearly identify transit agency responsibilities for security.

·         Development and approval of investigation procedures at 36 RFGS which ensure collection and evaluation of evidence sufficient to support probable cause determinations and the development of corrective actions.

·         Performance of over 500 investigations using these procedures.

·         Development, approval, and implementation of 396 corrective action plans to address determinations of probable cause resulting from these investigations.

• Implementation of hazard analysis programs at 35 RFGS sufficient to support identification, reporting, and resolution of unacceptable hazardous conditions during transit operations.

·         Investigation and resolution of more than 100 unacceptable hazardous conditions.

• SOAs conduct of more than 40 Three-Year Safety Reviews at the rail transit agencies within their jurisdiction to assess implementation of system safety and security program and to make determinations regarding the efficacy of the programs.

·         Development, approval, and implementation of over 700 corrective actions to address findings from State Three-Year Safety Reviews.

• Implementation of internal safety audit programs at 36 RFGS, resulting in almost 1,000 corrective action plans developed and implemented to address rail transit findings.

• For the first time, collection and analysis of probable cause data from rail transit agencies regarding accidents and unacceptable hazardous conditions.

The State Safety Oversight Program emphasizes use of a systems approach to address safety and security, promoting application of management and engineering principles to identify and resolve safety hazards and security vulnerabilities. Through ongoing implementation of system safety and security programs, monitored by SOAs, the rail transit industry is now performing formalized assessments to balance hazards and controls, which ultimately can ensure the maximum protection for passengers, employees, others, system property, and the environment within the limits of available resources.

Ultimately, establishing and evaluating baseline measures for safety and security performance supports oversight and industry activities to develop programs that:

• Establish and assure compliance with rail transit agency safety and security strategies, objectives, and standards.
• Foster early integration of safety, security, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance into rail transit operations.
• Improve methodologies for risk identification and assessment, and provide recommendations for risk mitigation and acceptance.
• Provide investigation, analysis, and recommendations for critical safety and security decisions.
• Sponsor the innovation and rapid transfer of safety, security, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance technologies, processes, and techniques to improve system performance.

Executive Summary

The Calendar Year (CY) 2000 was one of accomplishments and challenges for the State Safety Oversight Program. Analysis of data reported by rail transit agencies and State safety oversight agencies for 2000 indicates:

Service

• Combined, the rail transit agencies affected by 49 CFR Part 659 provide approximately 10 million daily unlinked passenger trips, accounting for 30 percent of all trips taken on public transportation.

• This level of ridership is the highest ever for rail transit, and marks a 5 percent increase from a decade ago.

• Further growth in ridership is expected throughout the decade as the substantial increases in Federal funding under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21^st Century are translated into operational service. Since January 1, 2000, 10 rail transit agencies have initiated major projects into revenue service.  By the end of 2003, 15 more agencies will bring projects online. By 2010, more than 40 major rail transit projects will have been initiated into revenue service. Combined, these projects will reflect a national investment in excess of $30 billion. 

• Since 1991, annual passenger miles have more than doubled for light rail service and the number of light rail operations has increased from 14 to 20.

• Prompted by major ridership gains in New York and Washington, D.C., heavy rail transit has experienced a 30 percent increase in passenger miles over the same 10-year period.

• Since 1997, 346 rail grade crossings have been introduced into revenue service on light rail extension and new start projects. The vast majority of these grade crossings are protected or traffic-controlled.

Safety

• In CY 2000, rail transit agencies reported 3,192 incidents that met the 49 CFR Part 659.5 definition of accident.  This total represents an increase of approximately 22 percent over CY 1999 totals (2,627).  These 3,192 incidents resulted in 102 fatalities and 3,371 injuries.

• Of the 102 reported fatalities, 61 were the result of suicides and trespassing incidents.  The remaining 41 fatalities represent a 5 percent increase when compared to 1999.

• The 3,371 injuries attributable to FTA reportable accidents in CY 2000 represent an increase of roughly 20 percent when compared to CY 1999 totals (2,839). When compared to 1999, injuries resulting from:

·         Collisions decreased by 47 percent.

·         Rail Grade Crossing incidents declined roughly 43 percent.

·         72 percent of injuries from Rail Grade Crossing incidents occurred at traffic-controlled crossings.

·         Fires decreased by 1/3.

·         Other reportable incidents rose by 22 percent (reflecting improved reporting of "single-person injuries" such as passenger slips, trips, and falls resulting from clarifications made during FTA's SSO Audit Program).

• In CY 2000, there was a reduction in reportable collisions and rail grade crossings, while reported fires, derailments, and single-person accidents all increased over CY 1999 totals.

• With only 41 fatalities and approximately 3,000 injuries requiring hospitalization attributed to operations that provide 2.89 billion unlinked passenger trips, rail transit remained the safest mode of transportation in 2000.

Causal Data

• For the total 3,192 reported incidents, the number of reported accidents for which the probable cause was determined to be an "other vehicle" rose from a 23 percent share of probable causes in CY 1999 to a 35 percent share in CY 2000.  Also of note, the category of cause "pedestrian" was determined as the probable cause in 11 percent of CY 2000 accidents, up from 2 percent in CY 1999.  However, accidents in which "rule violation" was determined as the cause decreased over the same period, from 22 percent in CY 1999 to 6 percent in CY 2000. Other key findings include:

·         82 percent of light rail collisions were caused by either pedestrians or other vehicles.

·         47 percent of the heavy rail collisions were caused by actions of a passenger.

·         Operating rule and procedure violations were identified as the probable cause in approximately 10 percent of the total number of collisions and derailments (all modes combined).

Other SSO Program Activity

·         In 2000, eight states conducted Three-Year Safety Reviews.  These reviews resulted in findings that required RFGS to submit a total of 310 corrective action plans (CAPs).   Of the 310 submitted CAPs, 308 were approved for implementation by the SOA. 

• In addition to the findings from the Three-Year Safety Reviews conducted at the RFGS, 10 RFGS submitted corrective actions for SOA approval as the result of internal safety audits.  These corrective actions numbered 497, with 330 being approved for implementation.  Of the 497 CAPs submitted, 151 remain open. 

Security

Rail transit agencies reported the following:

·         Violent crimes for 2000 decreased by 3 percent from 1999 totals.

• Property crimes increased 1 percent over the same period.

·         Quality of life crimes increased by 35 percent (reflecting improved consistency in reporting as a result of FTA's Transit Security Audit Program).

Introduction

The State Safety Oversight Program Annual Report for 2000 has been prepared by FTA's Office of Safety and Security to document the activities and performance of State Safety Oversight Agencies, and the rail fixed guideway systems within their jurisdictions, for the calendar year 2000. Results from this report assist these organizations in developing management structures and work programs to effectively plan, implement and evaluate safety and security-related programs for passenger service.

The State Safety Oversight Program Annual Report is an evolving document. Last year's inaugural edition followed an encyclopedic approach, providing a baseline of information on various aspects of the programs developed and implemented by FTA, State Safety Oversight Agencies, and rail transit systems to address both 49 CFR Part 659 requirements and basic safety and security performance levels. This second edition streamlines the initial approach, focusing exclusively on following State Safety Oversight Program elements:

• Overview of Requirements;
• State Safety Oversight Community;
• Rail Transit Industry Service and Safety Measures for 2000;
• Principal Safety Findings from 2000 Annual Reports; and
• Rail Transit Industry Security Measures for 2000.

Safety and Security Community

This report uses the following acronyms to refer to key participants in the State Safety Oversight Program:

• DOT - United States Department of Transportation
• FTA - Federal Transit Administration
• SOA - State Safety Oversight Agency designated to implement 49 CFR Part 659 requirements (also referred to as Oversight Agency)
• RFGS - Rail Fixed Guideway System as defined in 49 CFR Part 659.5 (also referred to as rail transit agency or rail agency)
• NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
• NTD - National Transit Database
• APTA - American Public Transportation Association

Information Sources

Information presented in this report comes from three sources:

• 2000 National Transit Database Safety and Security Reports. Over the last decade, rail transit systems reported first safety - then later security - data directly to FTA.  All rail transit agencies receiving direct federal financial assistance under FTA's formula grant program must report this data annually to retain eligibility for federal funds.  This information is collected on Form 405 of the National Transit Database Reporting System. Safety incidents that meet the following definition must be reported:

·         Involve property damage exceeding $1,000;

·         Require medical treatment of a passenger or an employee, either on-site or in a hospital; and

·         Result in a fatality within 30 days.

Security incidents are reported according definitions developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the Uniform Crime Reporting System. 

• 2000 Annual Reports. FTA's State Safety Oversight Rule (49 CFR Part 659.45) requires that, by March 15 of each year, SOAs must submit to FTA an annual report summarizing oversight activities for the preceding 12 months, including a description of the most common probable causal factors of accidents and unacceptable hazardous conditions. In 1999, in response to congressional concern and NTSB recommendations, FTA developed an Annual Reporting Template to facilitate the collection of causal data in a format that could be quantified at year's end. 1999 was the first year for collecting causal data in this format under the State Safety Oversight Program. (Prior to 1999, causal data collected in the annual report was descriptive in nature and not quantifiable.) FTA continued this approach in 2000: SOAs made Annual Report submissions using FTA's Annual Reporting Template for 2000 (see Appendix A).

• 2000 Audit Program. The State Safety Oversight Audit Program provides FTA with the opportunity to identify the requirements of Part 659 that have been most difficult for SOAs to implement.  Further, it supports communication with the states that results in the greater sharing of technical information, the solicitation of best practices, and the development of activities that promote an increased coordination between all stakeholders responsible for ensuring that system safety and security objectives are being identified and met each year. 

Use of Information Presented in this Report

The information contained in this report supports national and local efforts to monitor and continually improve transit safety and security. Application of NTD and Annual Report data enables FTA, SOAs, and RFGS to quantify the reasons for transit accidents, leading to the identification of safety and security deficiencies and their ultimate resolution. In this way, all involved parties can more effectively work toward the goal of eliminating transit-related deaths, injuries, and property damage.

The State Safety Oversight Rule affects many different types of rail transit operations, including heavy rail, light rail, trolleys, cable cars, inclined planes, and automated guideways. Every attempt has been made to standardize safety and security performance measures across a series of service indicators to support industry-based assessments of aggregate data. However, the range of operating requirements and the importance of local operating conditions limit the utility of individual agency comparisons to the industry baselines and averages contained in this report. SOAs and RFGS are advised to use caution in their application of these measures.

Chapter 1.

State Safety Oversight Overview

In response to congressional concern regarding the potential for catastrophic accidents and security incidents on rail transit systems, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330).  This section required FTA to issue a Rule creating the first state-managed oversight program for rail transit safety and security.

FTA published "Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety Oversight" on December 27, 1995 (codified at 49 CFR Part 659), subsequently referred to as the State Safety Oversight Rule or Part 659. This Rule sets forth FTA's requirements to improve the safety and security of RFGS. Only those states with RFGS meeting the following definition must comply with FTA's State Safety Oversight Rule:

"Any light, heavy or rapid rail system, monorail, inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles or receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas and is not regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)." (§659.5)

Rule Requirements

FTA's Final Rule for State Safety Oversight requires each state with an RFGS operating within its borders to designate an Oversight Agency with sufficient legal authority to comply with the minimum requirements established in Part 659.  Specifying the exact details of how the Oversight Agency operates is beyond the scope of Part 659, and is left for each Oversight Agency to determine. FTA does not require a single approach to establishing the legal, financial, or procedural mechanisms used to provide oversight.

FTA's State Safety Oversight Audit Program outlines seven distinct functions that must be performed for compliance:

·          Oversight Agency Designation and Authority (§659.21);

·          Oversight Agency Program Management (§659.47, §659.23, §659.31, and §659.45);

·          System Safety/Security Program Standard Preparation and Adoption and RFGS System Safety/Security Program Plan Review and Approval Process (§659.31 and §659.33);

·          Accident/Unacceptable Hazardous Conditions Investigations and Corrective Actions (§659.39, §659.41, and §659.43);

·          Three-Year Safety Reviews (§659.37);

·          Requiring and Reviewing RFGS Internal Safety Audit Process Reporting (§659.35); and

·          Oversight Agency Certification and Reporting to FTA (§659.45 and §659.49).

The requirements are further sub-divided into the following:

·         The obligation of the state to designate the Oversight Agency.

·         The authorities and responsibilities of the Oversight Agency in developing the requirements and programs necessary to comply with FTA's State Safety Oversight Program.

• The role of the rail transit system in complying with the program developed by the Oversight Agency.

The State

The primary responsibility of the state is to designate an Oversight Agency (or Agencies) to oversee the safety of the rail transit systems operating within its borders. When the rail system operates only within a single state, that entity must be an agency of the state; when it operates in more than one state, the affected states may designate a single entity to oversee that system.  In neither case may the state designate the rail transit system as the Oversight Agency.

The Oversight Agency

The designated State Oversight Agency is required by Part 659 to perform seven distinct functions.  These activities constitute the core of FTA's State Safety Oversight Rule.  The Oversight Agency must:

•         Develop a System Safety Program Standard (Program Standard).  This written document defines the relationship between the Oversight Agency and the rail transit system and guides the rail transit system in developing itsSystem Safety Program Plan (SSPP).

·         The Program Standard must, at a minimum, comply with APTA's Manual for the Development of Rail Transit System Safety Program Plans (APTA Manual) and include specific provisions addressing the personal security of passengers and employees.

•         Require, review and approve, and monitor the implementation of an SSPP that complies with the Oversight Agency's Program Standard at each rail transit system. By January 1, 1997, the Oversight Agency must review and approve, in writing, the rail transit system's SSPP.  The security provisions of the SSPP, however, do not have to be approved initially by the Oversight Agency until January 1, 1998.  After the initial approvals, the Oversight Agency must review, as necessary, the rail transit system's SSPP and determine whether it should be updated.

•         Require each rail transit system to report the occurrence of accidents and unacceptable hazardous conditions within a period of time specified by the Oversight Agency. The Oversight Agency must investigate such events in accordance with established procedures. The Oversight Agency may conduct its own investigation, use a contractor to conduct an investigation, or review and approve the investigation conducted by the rail transit system or the NTSB, or use a combination of these methods.

•         Require the rail transit system to implement a Corrective Action Plan.  The Oversight Agency must require the rail transit system to minimize, control, correct, or eliminate hazardous conditions identified during investigations, in accordance with a Corrective Action Plan drafted by the rail transit system and approved by the Oversight Agency. 

•         Conduct on-site visits at each rail transit system at a minimum of every 3 years to perform a formal Safety Review.  In a Safety Review, the Oversight Agency must assess whether the rail transit system's actual safety and security practices and procedures comply with its SSPP. Once this Review is completed, the Oversight Agency must prepare a report containing its findings and recommendations, an analysis of the efficacy of the rail transit system's SSPP, and a determination of whether the SSPP should be updated.

•         Require the rail transit system to conduct safety audits according to the Internal Safety Audit Process detailed in the APTA Manual (Checklist Number 9).  In addition, the Oversight Agency must require the rail transit system to compile and submit an Annual Audit Report for review.

•         Report to FTA.  The Oversight Agency must submit three kinds of reports to FTA: an Initial Submission, an Annual Submission, and a Periodic Submission.

The Rail Transit System

While the requirements in Part 659 are directed at the states and the Oversight Agencies, the rail transit agencies play an important role in the State Safety Oversight Program.

To comply with Part 659, the Oversight Agency must require each rail transit system within its jurisdiction to perform the following activities (at a minimum):

•         Develop an SSPP that complies with the Oversight Agency's Program Standard.

•         Classify hazardous conditions according to the APTA Manual Hazard Resolution Matrix. 

•         Report, within the time frame specified by the Oversight Agency, any accident or unacceptable hazardous condition. 

•         Obtain the Oversight Agency's approval of a Corrective Action Plan and then implement the Plan so as to minimize, control, correct, or eliminate the particular unacceptable hazardous condition.

•         Conduct safety audits that comply with the Internal Safety Audit Process, APTA Manual (Checklist Number 9).  

•         Draft and submit to the Oversight Agency a report summarizing the results of the safety audit process.

Graphical Representation

Figure 1 depicts the relationship between FTA, the state, and the RFGS as each element of Part 659 is implemented, and serves as a guide when documenting the procedures necessary to carry out rule requirements.

Figure 1. SSO Program Development Process

State Safety Oversight Community

In 2000, 22 SOAs had been designated to implement Part 659 requirements for a total of 35 RFGS (See Table 1).  Combined, these 35 rail transit agencies operated:

• 12 heavy rail systems; and
• 33 light rail systems (including automated guideways, inclined planes, trolleys, and cable cars).

Six of the Oversight Agencies had previous experience with the provision of safety oversight.  The remaining 16 Agencies were created to implement Part 659 requirements. 

Table 1. States and RFGS Affected by Part 659 - by FTA Region

SOAs have a variety of legal authorities, including safety responsibilities that exceed FTA minimum requirements. The majority of SOAs are divisions of state Departments of Transportation or Public Utilities Commissions, empowered by enabling legislation or gubernatorial order to implement Part 659 regulations (see Table 2).  Table 3 presents the states and the number of RFGS within their jurisdictions.

Ten states have designated at least 1 full-time equivalent to the implementation of 49 CFR Part 659 requirements; 12 states have designated less than .5 FTA.  The level of resources varies according to the number and operations of the RFGS overseen.

Table 4 presents the allocation of personnel to implement 49 CFR Part 659 requirements.

Table 2.Categorization of Designated Oversight Agencies

Table 3. Number of RFGS in Affected States

Table 4. Oversight Agency Resources Allocated to State Safety Oversight

Note: There were total of 12 States that designated less than .5 FTE

Between the publishing dates for FTA's Annual Report for 1999 and this report, there have been a number of changes to the SSO community.  Both the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail System and Kenosha Transit initiated revenue service in CY 2000, April and July respectively.  This increased the total number of SOAs by one with the addition of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation to provide safety oversight of Kenosha Transit (an existing SOA-New Jersey Department of Transportation-assumed safety oversight of the Hudson-Bergen line). 

In early 2001, the New Jersey Department of Transportation also assumed safety oversight responsibilities for the Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO), as the Delaware River Port Authority was no longer able to perform this function.  This change was coordinated with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. 

Further, with the initiation of revenue service for the Bi-State Development Agency's (BSDA) Metrolink Extension in the state of Illinois, the St. Clair County Transit District was officially designated in 2001 to provide oversight for BSDA's Illinois operations.

Finally, the Detroit Department of Transportation's Detroit Trolley service was recognized as an RFGS, increasing the total of RFGS overseen by the Michigan Department of Consumer & Industry Services to two.

With these changes, at the time of this report, there are 22 SOAs providing safety oversight for 36 RFGS.  Within the next 3-5 years, FTA expects that an additional seven New Start transit agencies will initiate revenue service requiring the designation of an additional six state oversight agencies.  Figure 2 depicts the recent changes, as well as the projected changes for the soon-to-be-affected states.

Figure 2. Current Map of States Affected by Part 659

Chapter 2.

Rail Transit in the United States

In 1991, rail transit provided 7.5 million daily passenger unlinked trips. One decade later, the nation's 36 major rail transit systems provide approximately 10 million daily unlinked passenger trips, a gain of 25 percent (see Table 5).

Table 5. Average Weekday Unlinked Passenger Trips, 2000

Rail transit now accounts for roughly 30 percent of all trips taken on public transportation. (See Table 6.)  While other land transportation modes are experiencing reductions in passenger miles, rail transit is posting an average annual increase of 4.1 percent.

Table 6. Average Weekday Public Transportation Ridership, Fiscal Year 2000

Since 1991, annual passenger miles have more than doubled for light rail and the number of systems providing service has increased from 14 to 20.  Prompted by major ridership gains in New York and Washington, D.C., heavy rail transit has experienced a 30 percent gain in passenger miles over the same period (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Ridership Growth - 1994-2000

Table 7 (Heavy Rail) and Table 8 (Light Rail) present general service data reported for 2000 by those RFGS affected by State Safety Oversight.   For both of these tables, automated guideway, cable car, and inclined plane systems have been incorporated in the Light Rail Service Profile.  The following service characteristics were compiled from 2000 NTD data:

• Annual Passenger Miles
• Annual Vehicle Revenue Miles
• Annual Passenger Unlinked Trips
• Average Weekday Unlinked Trips
• Average Length of Unlinked Passenger Trip
• Annual Vehicle Revenue Hours

Table 7. Heavy Rail Service Profile - 2000

Table 8. Light Rail Service Profile - 2000

Table 8. Light Rail Service Profile - 2000 (cont.)

When compared to 1999 service data (see Table 9), it is clear that both annual passenger trips and passenger miles have increased from 1999 totals, with light rail service seeing an increase of over 10 percent. 

Table 9. 1999-2000 Comparison: Annual Passenger Unlinked Trips and Passenger Miles

While almost all light rail systems nationwide are experiencing ridership growth, a large portion of the 10 percent increase in CY 2000 numbers can be attributed to the Utah Transit Authority's North/South Line, which initiated revenue service in late 1999, as well as the initiation of service on Hudson-Bergen's Light Rail Transit System.

Initiation of revenue service at Los Angeles County Metropolitan Authority's Red Line Extension helped contribute to the growth in heavy rail ridership numbers.  An increase of approximately 5 percent in New York City Transit's ridership totals (now nearly 5 million daily) also added to this year's rise.

Further growth in ridership is expected throughout the decade as the substantial increases in Federal funding under TEA-21 are translated into operational service. Since January 1, 2000, 10 rail transit agencies have initiated major projects into revenue service (see Table 10).  Between September 2000 and the end of 2003, 15 more agencies will bring projects online (see Table 11).  By 2010, more than 40 major rail transit projects will have been initiated into revenue service. Combined, these projects will reflect a national investment in excess of $30 billion.

Table 10. Rail Agencies Initiating New Service by Early 2001

Table 11. Rail Transit Projects Online between 2000 and 2003

 Rail Grade Crossings

Light rail is an attractive public transportation alternative for many reasons: its relatively low capital cost, its ability to operate both on and off streets, and its capacity to transport passengers with frequent stops in heavily congested areas. However, unlike heavy rail systems, which operate largely within exclusive right-of-way, the majority of light rail transit systems operate portions of their systems within unrestricted right-of-way on city streets, in mixed traffic, within median strips, and in pedestrian malls. This situation results in numerous, and sometimes continuous, roadway-light rail grade crossings. In some cases, light rail systems share grade crossings with mainline railroads.

Rail grade crossings and intermingling with street traffic create an operating environment for light rail transportation wrought with the potential for catastrophic occurrences. With at least 10 new light rail systems planned in the next decade, and an equal number of extensions under design and construction for existing light rail service, this vulnerability will only increase.

Table 12 highlights the rising number of rail grade crossings introduced into revenue service since 1997.

Table 13 provides additional information on the characteristics of these crossings.

Table 13. Grade Crossing Characteristics

Addressing New Starts

FTA's Office of Safety and Security is continuing its support of New Starts through provisions of technical assistance to aid states in their development of an SSO Program, as well as to the Transit agency to help in its preparations to meet safety and security requirements.  FTA's Compliance Guidelines for States with New Starts Projects help guide states, affected by Part 659, in the development of safety oversight programs that meet FTA requirements.

The Office of Safety and Security is also promoting system safety through its Safety Certification Initiative, for which it has established a System Safety Task Force with the American Public Transportation Association to draft a Safety Certification Handbook for the industry to support the application of system safety principles in the planning, design, and construction phases of major rail transit projects. 

The Handbook is intended as an introductory reference on safety certification for rail transit safety, project development, and project management personnel. It describes the main concepts and benefits of a safety certification program (SCP). It outlines the Task Force's safety certification guidance, and provides information, sample forms and text to support preparation of key SCP elements, including:

·         Safety Certification Management Plan

·         Safety Design Criteria

·         Hazard Management Policy and Plan

·         Verification & Conformance Checklists

·         Formal Certification

The Handbook is due to be released in early 2002.

Chapter 3.

Safety and Rail Transit

Deaths and injuries are a major cost in transportation. Transportation fatalities rank third as the cause of lost years of life in the United States (behind heart disease and cancer).  Historically, the rail transit industry provides the safest means of passenger transportation available in the United States.  Table 14 presents annual fatalities by mode of transportation between 1995 and 2000, as reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics in the Transportation Statistics Annual Report 2000 and the NTSB. For the six years between 1995 and 2000, the number of fatalities in rail transit has been a full order of magnitude less than other modes of transportation, or approximately .2 percent of the total.

Table 14. Transportation-related Fatalities, 1995 to 2000

FTA is committed to supporting the efforts of rail transit systems to further reduce the number of accidents, injuries and incidents. The highest priority of the DOT is to "promote the public health and safety by working toward the elimination of transportation-related deaths, injuries, and property damage."  FTA's Safety Brochure series outlines activities to promote this priority. 

Although great progress has been made over the last few decades, the potential for catastrophic occurrence remains. Effective integration of rail transit into city streets and major rail transportation corridors requires vigilance in the design, construction and operation of these systems.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, the nation's rail transit system reported 107 transit-related fatalities to the NTD, of which 47 were suicides. These agencies also reported 12,005 injuries, defined as

"Any physical damage or harm to a person requiring medical treatment, or any physical damage or harm to a person reported at the time and place of occurrence. For employees, an injury includes incidents resulting in time lost from duty or any definition consistent with a transit agency's current employee injury reporting practice."

Table 15 provides totals, by mode of service, for fatalities, injuries, and suicides, reported to NTD in 2000.

Table 15. Reported 2000 Fatalities and Injuries by Rail Transit Mode

NOTE: For Tables 15 and 16 and Figures 4 and 5, the modal category "Light Rail" includes automated guideways, cable cars, trolleys, and inclined planes.

Table 16 presents NTD fatality and injury statistics as rates for each mode, standardized across key indicators of service such as passenger trips and passenger miles.  Both fatality and injury rates for each mode of service over a 10-year period are discussed below.

Table 16. FY 2000 Rates of Fatality and Injury by Rail Transit Mode

Figure 4 presents 10-year trend information for fatalities reported to NTD by mode, standardized by passenger miles.  Figure 5 presents injuries, again using passenger miles for standardization and covering the period from 1991 through 2000.  Fatality and injury trends are pointed downward with the exception of fatalities for light rail modes. While the fatality rate has risen from 1.41 to 2.21 per 100 million passenger miles, it is important to note that over the same period, total passenger miles on light rail systems have increased 12.4 percent and unlinked passenger trips have increased approximately 10 percent.

Figure 4. Fatalities per 100 Million Passenger Miles - 1991 through 2000 (including suicides)

Figure 5. Injuries per 10 Million Passenger Miles - 1991 through 2000

Comparison between 1999 and 2000

As is clear from Figures 5 and 6, there was a decrease in the fatality rate per 10 million passenger trips for heavy rail of nearly 12 percent.  Light rail, however, experienced an increase of 61 percent in the fatality rate by passenger trips (see Figure 6).  However, when the fatality rate is standardized by passenger mile, the increase in the fatality rate is 5 percent less.  Heavy rail saw a decrease in the fatality rate for both standardizations (see Figure 7).

Figure 6. Fatalities per 10 Million Passenger Trips - 1999 and 2000

Figure 7. Fatalities per 100 Million Passenger Miles - 1999 and 2000

With the exception of a slight increase in the injury rates for heavy rail, overall injury rates were lower, with substantial decreases for "other" mode of service (automated guideway, cable car, trolleys, and inclined plane).  As Figure 8 indicates, the decrease for "other" service modes fell roughly 46 percent.  When standardized by passenger miles, the same trends follow (see Figure 9).

Figure 8. Injuries per 100,000 Unlinked Passenger Trips - 1999 and 2000

Figure 9. Injuries per 10 Million Passenger Miles - 1999 and 2000

Chapter 4.

Principal Findings from State Safety Oversight Annual Reporting

 This section contains principal findings for accidents and resulting injuries and fatalities reported to FTA for CY 2000.  Required by FTA's State Safety Oversight (SSO) Rule, SOAs report on annual activities, including accident data, for rail fixed guideway systems (RFGS) within their jurisdiction.  Findings for CY 2000 are based on the incidents reported that meet FTA's criteria for "accident" as defined in FTA's SSO Rule codified as 49 CFR Part 659.5.

Accidents

It should be noted that as a program like the SSO Program matures, reporting diligence matures as well.  Through FTA's ongoing SSO Audit Program, the Office of Safety and Security has made a concerted effort to clarify to States the accident data FTA expects to be collected and reported.  It is suspected that this clarification has brought with it an increase in the capturing of "single person events" - slips, trips, and falls - as well as more detailed causal information.

In CY 2000, RFGS reported 3,192 incidents that met FTA's definition of accident.  This total represents an increase of approximately 22 percent over CY 1999 totals (2,627).  Incidents on light rail service fell 28 percent (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Total Reported Accidents - 1999 and 2000

Figure 11 depicts the total number of reported incidents by type for both CY 1999 and 2000. Of note, there was a reduction in reportable collisions and rail grade crossings, while reported fires, derailments, and single-person accidents all increased over CY 1999 totals.

·         Collisions decreased 33 percent.

·         Light Rail collisions decreased 29 percent.

·         Derailments increased 250 percent.

·         Rail Grade Crossing Incidents decreased 16 percent.

·         Fires increased 140 percent.

·         "Other" (single person incidents) increased 24 percent.

 
Figure 11. FTA Reportable Accidents by Type - 1999 and 2000

As mentioned above, RFGS reported a total of 3,192 accidents to SOAs meeting FTA's definition.  As depicted in Figure 11, of this total, 3,036 reported incidents were single-person events, leaving 156 total reported incidents for collisions, derailments, rail grade crossing incidents, and fires.  Figure 12 depicts the categorization of reported accidents by mode and by accident type. 

Key findings:

When excluding single-person events:

• 79 percent of accidents were collisions and rail grade crossing incidents.
• In 1999, 94 percent of accidents were collisions and rail grade crossing incidents.
• Light rail accounted for 55 percent of all reported collisions.
• Incidents at rail grade crossings accounted for 36 percent of reported accidents.

Figure 12. CY 2000 Accidents by Mode/Type

As depicted in Figure 11, accidents at rail grade crossings decreased 16 percent from 1999 to 2000.  Figure 13 indicates that of the 56 rail grade crossing incidents, an overwhelming 72 percent of injuries resulting from those incidents occurred at traffic-controlled crossings.  Interestingly, the only fatalities occurred at the protected crossings.

Figure 13. Accident Results by Rail Grade Crossing Characteristics

Fatalities

In CY 2000, rail transit agencies reported 102 fatalities to the SOAs.  This represents a 9 percent decrease from the 112 fatalities reported in 1999.  Of the 102 reported fatalities, 61 were the result of suicides and trespassing incidents.  The remaining 41 fatalities represent a 5 percent increase when compared to 1999 (see Figure 14).

Figure 14. FTA Reportable Fatalities - Excluding Suicides

The heavy rail service mode accounted for 70 percent of the reported fatalities, more than triple (8 to 29) its 1999 reported totals. Light rail fatalities fell by over 50 percent (28 to 12) (see Figure 15).  For other modes of service, including cable car, incline plane, and automated guideway, there were no fatalities reported in CY 2000. 

Figure 15. Reported Fatalities by Mode - Excluding Suicides

Fatalities resulting from reported collisions from CY 1999 to CY 2000 declined, from a total of 21 to 16, a decrease of 24 percent.   There were a total of 3 fatalities from rail grade crossing incidents reported in CY 2000, 83 percent lower relative to 1999 (see Figure 16).  For the second straight year, there were no reported fatalities from fires or derailments.

Figure 16. FTA Reportable Fatalities by Type - 1999 and 2000

Finally, in CY 2000, there were 22 fatalities in the "other" category that were not reported as suicides or trespassing incidents.  Roughly half of these fatalities were attributed to passenger falls from trains or platforms, while an additional 25 percent were incidents in which persons were struck by trains while on platforms or near stations.  This categorization differs from "other" fatalities reported in 1999 (see Figure 17).

Figure 17. Fatalities by Mode/Type - Excluding Suicides

Key findings:

·         Light rail transit experienced 92 percent of its fatalities resulting from collisions and rail grade crossing accidents.

·         Heavy rail fatalities due to collisions remained constant since 1999.

Injuries

A total of 3,371 injuries from FTA reportable accidents were reported in CY 2000.  This represents an increase of roughly 20 percent when compared to CY 1999 totals (2,839) (see Figure 18). When compared to 1999, injuries resulting from:

• Collisions decreased by 47 percent.

·         Derailments rose from 1 to 119.

• Rail Grade Crossing incidents declined roughly 43 percent.
• Fires decreased by 1/3.
• Other reportable incidents rose by 22 percent.

Figure 18. FTA Reportable Injuries - 1999 and 2000

While there was an increase in reported injuries for heavy rail accidents from CY 1999 to CY 2000-due in large part to an increase in slips, trips, and falls at heavy rail stations, injuries resulting from light rail incidents decreased by approximately 26 percent.  There was only a slight decrease in the number of injuries for other modes of service, 23 down to 21 (see Figure 19).

Figure 19. Total Injuries by Mode - 1999 and 2000

Figure 20 and Figure 21 portray the number of injuries reported in CY 2000 and 1999, respectively, by incident type for each mode of service. 

Figure 20. CY 2000 Injuries by Mode/Type

Figure 21. CY 1999 Injuries by Mode/Type

Key Findings:

In CY 2000:

·         Light rail transit accounted for 66 percent of the injuries resulting from collisions - up 2 percent from 1999.

·         Light rail experienced 57 percent of the injuries from collisions, grade crossing accidents, derailments, and fires - down 5 percent from 1999.

·         Injuries resulting from collisions on heavy rail fell 31 percent.

·         As the number of reported derailments for both heavy and light rail increased, so did the number of resulting injuries.

Probable Cause

For the second straight year under FTA's State Safety Oversight Program, causal data for accidents meeting FTA's definition were reported.  For the total 3,192 reported incidents, Figure 22 depicts the reported causal information.

Figure 22. Probable Cause for Reported Accidents - Excluding "Other"*

*Only those incidents totaling more than 2 percent of the total reported causes are shown above.

The number of reported accidents for which the probable cause was determined to be an "other vehicle" rose from a 23 percent share of probable causes in CY 1999 to a 35 percent share in CY 2000.  Also of note, the category of cause "pedestrian" was determined as the probable cause in 11 percent of CY 2000 accidents, up from 2 percent in CY 1999.  However, accidents in which "rule violation" was determined as the cause decreased over the same period, from 22 percent in CY 1999 to 6 percent in CY 2000.

Table 17 depicts probable cause percentages by accident type and mode.

Table 17. Probable Cause Percentages by Accident Type and Mode

Key Findings:

·         "Pedestrians" or "other vehicles" represented 82 percent of the reported probable causes for light rail collisions.

·         The actions of passengers contributed to 47 percent of the reported probable causes for heavy rail collisions.

·         Operating rule and procedure violations continue to contribute to accident causes.

Corrective Action Plans

In addition to Part 659's requirement that corrective action plans (CAPs) be developed for all accidents and unacceptable hazardous conditions that meet FTA's SSO definitions, SOAs are required to review and approve corrective actions that result from the Internal Safety Audit Process and the Three-Year Review, that meet FTA's threshold for reporting.

In 2000, eight states conducted Three-Year Safety Reviews.  These reviews resulted in findings that required RFGS to submit a total of 310 CAPs.  Of the 310 submitted CAPs, 308 were approved for implementation by the SOA. 

In addition to the findings from the Three-Year Safety Reviews conducted at the RFGS, 10 RFGS submitted corrective actions for SOA approval as the result of internal safety audits.  These corrective actions numbered 497, with 330 being approved for implementation.  Of the entire 497 CAPs submitted, 151 remain open. 

It should be noted that not all of the corrective actions that resulted from internal safety audits and Three-Year Safety Reviews met FTA's threshold for reporting, thus SOAs were not required to track their implementation and resolution.  States and transit agencies, however, recognize the benefit of coordinating corrective action tracking activities to ensure their successful implementation.

Chapter 5.

Security Data

Many of the SOAs are beginning to collect security information from transit agencies.  Often, this information is related to security breaches or incidents in which a predetermined threshold has been broached.  However, currently there is not an SSO requirement to collect or compile security data.  The data presented in this chapter crime data from RFGS Form 405 submissions were reviewed and analyzed.  NTD Form 405 uses a system of classification (Part I and Part II crimes) based on definitions used by the FBI.  The relationship between the FBI definitions and the three sub-groupings used in this report is illustrated in Table 18.

Table 18. NTD - FBI Crime Data Relationship

In all, affected RFGS reported a total of 103,357 crimes (see Figure 23).  This total is up from the 93,623 crimes reported for 1999. 

Table 19 divides total crimes by the aforementioned sub-groups for the purpose of analysis. 

Figure 23. Rail Fixed Guideway System Crimes by Type - 2000

Table 19. Number of Crimes by Mode/by Category