Standardization of Availability Location, and Use of Safety Equipment on Urban Transit Buses

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FTA-MA-26-0011-96-1
DOT-VNTSC-FTA-95-12

Standardization of Availability Location, and Use of Safety Equipment on Urban Transit Buses

U.S. Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs Administration
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
Cambridge, MA 02142

Final Report
May 1996

Notice

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.

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The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report.

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)
PB96-166346

2. REPORT DATE
May 1996

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Final Report
April 1991 - April 1996

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Standardization of Availability, Location and Use of Safety Equipment on Urban Transit Buses

5. FUNDING NUMBERS
TT631-U6114

6. AUTHOR(S)
John N. Balog, R. Benjamin Gribbon

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation*
350 Technology Drive
Malvern, PA 19355

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

DOT-VNTSC-FTA-95-12

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10.SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

FTA-MA-26-0011-96-1

Office of Safety (URT-6)
Federal Transit Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation
400 Seventh St., SW
Washington, DC 15902

U.S. Department of
Transportation Volpe
National Transportation
Systems Center Safety &
Security Division
Kendall Square
Cambridge, MA 02142-1093

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

*Under Contract to:

Mr. William Gasior, General Manager
Cambria County Transit Authority
726 Central Ave.
Johnstown, PA 15902

U.S. Department of Transportation
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
Kendall Square
Cambridge, MA 02142-1093

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

This document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

FTA Home Page Address:

http://www.fta.dot.gov

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This document represents the conclusion of a project undertaken to identify guidelines which will correct the problems encountered by rescue forces while attempting to gain entry to, shut down, and evacuate urban transit buses involved in an emergency or accident. This Final Report presents (1) the availability, location, and use of eleven key safety components on six urban transit bus models; (2) the process used in the development of standardization guidelines; and (3) proposed guidelines for the potential standardization of eight key safety components on urban transit buses.

This project, funded by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) through a grant to the Cambria County Transit Authority (CCTA), and by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, was based on previous work by the KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation. The FTA had previously funded, through CCTA in response to a specific accident, the development of emergency and accident procedures training materials for several popular urban transit bus models. A wide disparity among bus models with regard to key safety components was discovered. Under a new contract with CCTA, KETRON documented aspects of eleven components on six popular urban transit bus models. An inter-industry Guidelines Development Committee, representing vehicle manufacturers, engine suppliers, the American Public Transit Association (APTA), FTA, the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, maintenance managers, transit authorities, emergency response forces, bus window suppliers, and other vendors, met periodically to discuss how to best standardize the safety components on urban transit buses. The guidelines developed herein are the result of original research and development efforts by KETRON in concert with input from the Guidelines Committee and Members of the APTA Bus Safety Committee.

The last section presents guidelines which detail potential specifications for standardization of the availability, location, identification, use, and function of eight safety components, including: 1) master run switch; 2) driver's side window; 3) emergency engine shutdown switch in engine compartment; 4) front side door release control; 5) rear side door release control; 6) electrical (batteries) switch; 7) roof-mounted emergency ingress and escape hatches; and 8) passenger side windows. The guidelines also present a new Universal Access Symbol to identify key entry points and emergency devices to rescue forces.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
Transit, bus, safety, equipment, standardization, guideline(s), emergency, evacuation, rescue, specification(s), vehicle(s), window(s), door(s), battery, switch(es), engine, fire, police

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
278

16. PRICE CODE A14

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
298-102

METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS
ENGLISH TO METRIC METRIC TO ENGLISH

LENGTH (approximate)

1 inch (in) = 2.5 centimeters (cm)

1 foot (ft) = 30 centimeters (cm)

1 yard (yd) = 0.9 meter (m)

1 mile (mi) = 1.6 kilometers (km)

LENGTH (approximate)

1 millimeter (mm) = 0.04 inch (in)

1 centimeter (cm) = 0.4 inch (in)

1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet (ft)

1 meter (m) = 1.1 yards (yd)

1 kilometer (km) = 0.6 mile (mi)

AREA (approximate)

1 square inch (sq in, in2) = 6.5 square centimeters (cm2)

1 square foot (sq ft, ft2) = 0.09 square meter (m2)

1 square yard (sq yd, yd2) = 0.8 square meter (m2)

1 square mile (sq mi, mi2) = 2.6 square kilometers (km2)

1 acre = 0.4 hectare (ha) = 4,000 square meters (m2)

AREA (approximate)

1 square centimeter (cm2) = 0.16 square inch (sq in, in2)

1 square meter (m2) = 1.2 square yards (sq yd, yd2)

1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.4 square mile (sq mi, mi2)

10,000 square meters (m2) = 1 hectare (ha) = 2.5 acres

MASS - WEIGHT (approximate)

1 ounce (oz) = 28 grams (gm)

1 pound (lb) = .45 kilogram (kg)

1 short ton = 2,000 pounds (lb) = 0.9 tonne (t)

MASS - WEIGHT (approximate)

1 gram (gm) = 0.036 ounce (oz)

1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds (lb)

1 tonne (t) = 1,000 kilograms (kg) = 1.1 short tons

VOLUME (approximate)

1 teaspoon (tsp) = 5 milliliters (ml)

1 tablespoon (tbsp) = 15 milliliters (ml)

1 fluid ounce (fl oz) = 30 milliliters (ml)

1 cup (c) = 0.24 liter (I)

1 pint (pt) = 0.47 liter (I)

1 quart (qt) = 0.96 liter (I)

1 gallon (gal) = 3.8 liters (I)

1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft3) = 0.03 cubic meter (m3)

1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd3) = 0.76 cubic meter (m3)

VOLUME (approximate)

1 milliliter (ml) = 0.03 fluid ounce (fl oz)

1 liter (I) = 2.1 pints (pt)

1 liter (I) = 1.06 Quarts (qt)

1 liter (I) = 0.26 gallon (gal)

1 cubic meter (m3) = 36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft3)

1 cubic meter (m3) = 1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd3)

TEMPERATURE (exact)

°C=5/9(°F - 32)

TEMPERATURE (exact)

°F=9/5(°C) + 32

QUICK INCH-CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION:

INCHES


CENTIMETERS


QUICK FAHRENHEIT-CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSION


For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and Measures. Price $2.50. SD Catalog No. C13 10286.

Updated 8/1/96

PREFACE

The FTA has identified a critical need to cause the safety equipment on Urban Transit Buses to be standardized so that in the event of an accident or emergency situation, rescue forces will be able to efficiently gain access to the interior, to shut down appropriate systems, and to evacuate passengers after providing immediate life support. This report provides the guidelines for the potential standardization of eight key safety components.

The author of this report is John N. Balog, Vice President, Transportation Research, Planning and Operations, KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation.

The KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation would like to extend its full appreciation to the Cambria County Transit Authority (CCTA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC), and those individuals who were instrumental in initiating this project and for bringing it to its currently successful status: Franz K. Gimmler, Former Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety, FTA; Judy Z. Meade, FTA; Ronald Kangas, Emergency Preparedness Engineer, FTA; Carole Ferguson, FTA; William T. Hathaway, VNTSC; Mary Anderson, FTA; William J. Gasior, General Manager, CCTA; Harold Jenkins, Former General Manager, CCTA; and Michael Quinn, Former Planner, CCTA.

KETRON would also like to thank the following individuals and organizations for their valuable contributions to the guidelines and their generous and informed participation through two Guidelines Development Committees: Mary Anderson, FTA; Chief Jonathan Best, National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians; Peter Bigwood, Ontario Bus Industries; Captain Ben E. Blankenship, National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians; James G. Bolton, Flxible Corporation; Carlton K. Brown, Vapor Mark IV Industries; Stephen C. Cunningham, Culver City Municipal Bus Lines; Captain Joseph Deal, Philadelphia Fire Department; Daniel A. DiSantis, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority; Richard G. Duser, Lehigh & Northampton Transportation Authority; Commander Craig Edwards, Pittsburgh Police Department; Eric A. Garzon, Greyhound Canada, Inc.; Douglas E. Greenwood, CCTA; William Hathaway, VNTSC, U.S. Department of Transportation; Craig O. Henrikson, Detroit Diesel Corporation; James Higgins, Philadelphia Fire Department; Rich Himes, Ikarus USA, Inc.; Harold Jenkins, Formerly with CCTA; Ronald C. Lamparter, Transpec, Inc.; Paul Lennon, American Public Transit Association; John C. Martin, Port Authority of Allegheny County; James McDowell, Transportation Manufacturing Corporation; Lt. David D. Smith, Philadelphia Fire Department; Darrell Sykes, Neoplan USA Corporation; Professor James C. Wambold, Altoona Bus Testing Facility; and David West, Transportation Manufacturing Corp.

KETRON would also like to thank the following individuals and organizations for their valuable contributions to the Guidelines through their participation on the Guidelines Development Window Subcommittees: Mark A. Clinton, J.T. Nelson Company, Inc.; Tim Commons, G.E. Plastics; Tim Costello, Ellcon National, Inc.; Michael H. Hurtekant, Excel Industries, Inc.; Kurt Koberstein, Storm-Tite, Inc.; Keith Kroll, Hehr International, Inc.; Peter McGevna, Ellcon National, Inc.; John McKenna, Beclawat Division of Autosystems Manufacturing, Inc.; Arthur D. Rohl, R.E. Jackson Company, Inc.; and Robert J. Watters, Commercial Plastics & Supply Corp.

For their enthusiasm in spreading the word and coordinating meetings, KETRON acknowledges with great appreciation: Stephen C. Cunningham, APTA Bus Safety Committee Chairman; Dennis Costello, Fomer APTA Bus Safety Committee Chairman; Paul J. Lennon, American Public Transit Association; and Jerome T. Fair, American Public Transit Association.

To the following APTA Safety Committee Members who took the time to review Draft Guidelines and to provide comments, an appreciative thank you: Oliver Bellard, Metropolitan Transit Authority; Frank A. Cecere, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority; Stephen C. Cunningham, Culver City Municipal Bus Lines; Homer Clemmons, MARTA; Joseph Dorsey, Regional Transit Authority; Peter G. Drake, South Coast Area Transit; Rufus Francis, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority; Jim Gigantino, New Jersey Transit, Inc.; Fred Griffith, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority; Theodore V. Janysek, VIA Metropolitan Transit; Dave Kirby, Central Contra Costa Transit Authority; Kenneth Kohagen, City of Yakima; Elias Mosqueda, SamTrans; Andres E. Morales, VIA Metropolitan Transit; Adrian Moy, Tri-Met; Howard Perry, Birmingham Transit Authority; Homer G. Phillips, Gary Public Transportation Corporation; Sharon Porter, Central Contra Costa Transit Authority; Bill Rueschaw, PACE; Donald L. Toney, City of Yakima; and Guy Wright, San Francisco Municipal Railway;

For their generous contributions of staff, time, and vehicles for the research behind the initial Technical Discussion, KETRON extends thanks to: Colin J. Holmes and Dave Sklareski, County of Lackawanna Transit System; Armando Greco and Bruce L. Sokol, Lehigh and Northampton Transportation Authority; and John C. Martin, Port Authority of Allegheny County.

For generous input of ideas and information for specific components, KETRON extends thanks to: Russel C. Brewer, Letter-Rite, Inc., Franklin Park, IL; Dan Forester, Mutual Industries, Inc., Philadelphia, PA; James A. Haigh, Transpec, Inc., Troy, MI; Albert O. Hughs, FMC Corp., Santa Clara, CA; Ronald C. Lamparter, Transpec, Inc., Troy, MI; Frank Reo, Naudain Associates, Inc., Marlton, NJ; Ed Shannon, Quality Components Incorporated, Southeastern, PA; and Daniel Sikora, Sikora Sign Co., Crosby, TX.

KETRON would also like to acknowledge years of support and hours of contribution to bus safety standardization by: James Parks, Director of Safety, CCTA; R. Benjamin Gribbon, Paratransit/Transit Specialist; Mark M. Hood, Paratransit/Transit Specialist, KETRON; Anne N. Schwarz, Senior Paratransit/Transit Specialist, KETRON; John B. Morrison, Senior Paratransit/Transit Specialist, KETRON; and Jennifer E. Rimmer, Paratransit/Transit Specialist, KETRON.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

DOCUMENTATION OF AVAILABILITY, LOCATION, AND USE OF KEY SAFETY ITEMS

GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

THE GUIDELINES

SAFETY ITEMS FOR STANDARDIZATION

APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES

SECTION 1 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE MASTER RUN SWITCH

SECTION 2 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE DRIVER'S SIDE WINDOW(S)

SECTION 3 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT

SECTION 4 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE FRONT DOOR RELEASE CONTROL

SECTION 5 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE REAR DOOR RELEASE CONTROL

SECTION 6 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE ELECTRICAL (BATTERIES) SWITCH

SECTION 7 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR ROOF-MOUNTED EMERGENCY INGRESS AND ESCAPE HATCHES

SECTION 8 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR PASSENGER WINDOWS

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - RESOURCES

APPENDIX B - BIBLIOGRAPHY

LIST OF FIGURES

1-1 SAFETY DEVICES TARGETED FOR STANDARDIZATION

1-1 MASTER RUN SWITCH

1-2 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

2-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

3-1 LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOOR IN THE CLOSED POSITION

3-2 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

3-3 LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF ACCESS DOOR TO EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT

3-4 LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOOR IN THE OPEN POSITION

3-5 EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AND LABELING

4-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

5-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

6-1 BATTERIES SWITCH AND LEGEND

6-2 LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF BATTERIES SWITCH ACCESS DOOR

6-3 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

7-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

8-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL


1. INTRODUCTION

Urban bus transit is extremely safe in the United States. However, this achieved level of success causes significant problems for emergency preparedness forces including fire services, police, ambulance, etc., when they arrive on the scene of an accident or emergency. They have had extremely limited experience dealing with urban transit buses and the various kinds of safety equipment and devices on board. Compounding the problem is widespread inconsistency among the various safety components across the studied bus models.

Under a grant from the Federal Transit Administration to the Cambria County Transit Authority (CCTA), and with the financial help of the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, the KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation documented the availability, location, and use of eleven key safety components on six representative urban transit buses. Based on this documentation and with the significant help of the American Public Transit Association (APTA) Safety Committee, the Guidelines Development Committee, the Window Subcommittee, and various suppliers, KETRON has developed guidelines for the potential standardization of eight key safety components. This final report documents the safety components on urban transit buses, describes the guidelines development process, and presents the resulting proposed guidelines in full.

1.1 BACKGROUND

In the early 1980s, the Cambria County Transit Authority experienced a severe accident involving one of its buses. The bus, out of control, was wedged, at speed, between a utility pole and a store front. The forces of impact caused its transmission to slip into reverse while the throttle was fully open. The bus literally tore itself in half and set itself on fire. Arriving emergency forces did not know how to gain access to the interior of the bus or how to turn off the engine.

This accident experience served as the basis for an Urban Mass Transportation Administration grant to develop a set of emergency and accident procedures materials for use as training documents1 for emergency preparedness forces responding to accidents involving public transit buses. The comprehensive courses were developed by KETRON, while under contract with CCTA, and have since been distributed and used to train emergency preparedness forces associated with many transit systems.

During the development of that Emergency and Accident Procedures Program, CCTA and KETRON had to carefully identify all relevant safety components and their correct operation for each of the three advanced design bus models encompassed within the program: the Neoplan USA, the General Motors RTS, and the Grumman Flxible. One problem which became quite apparent was the lack of standardization of the type, location, and operation of each of the safety components. This lack of standardization causes potentially significant problems for emergency forces arriving on the scene of an accident.

KETRON also conducted a number of simulated emergencies and accidents involving urban transit buses in a number of states including Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and West Virginia. It was clear from the simulation exercises that emergency response personnel are very interested in learning how to gain entry, how to shut down engines, and other rescue information regarding buses. Without specific knowledge their approach tends to be quick-actioned, which often results in significant damage to the coach. Once presented information on the safety components and their operation, they generally perform well in gaining entry and disengaging systems without any damage. This experience testified to the need for transit authorities and others providing transit services to interact on a regular basis with the emergency preparedness forces in their service area so that knowledge can be shared and safety effectiveness can be maximized.

It is clear that standardization of safety equipment needs to be adopted by urban transit bus manufacturers and authorities as a goal so that emergency response personnel will be more effective in performing their life saving duties. Consequently, this project, sponsored by CCTA and funded by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, was undertaken to assist the industry in reaching this laudable goal.


1Balog, John N. Introduction to Urban Transit Bus Accident Experience: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training, slides and manual, 13 pages, June, 1988; Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual for the Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus, video tape, slides, and manual, 110 pages, March, 1988; Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual for the General Motors Corporation RTS Urban Transit Bus, slides, videotape, and manual, 130 pages, March, 1988; Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual for the Neoplan USA Corporation Urban Transit Bus, slides, videotape, and manual, 120 pages, March, 1988; and Instructor's Manual: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training for: the Neoplan, GMC/RTS, and Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus, 14 pages, January 1989. The KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation, 350 Technology Drive, Malvern, PA 19355.


1.2 CANDIDATE SAFETY ITEMS FOR STANDARDIZATION

In correspondence with CCTA and representatives of FTA, KETRON initially identified eleven safety items as strong potential candidates for standardization, based on priorities in evacuation and rescue and previous experience. The following eleven items were originally selected for standardization with respect to location, use, and function:

Each is indicated generically in Figure 1-1 and described in the following section, which documents various aspects of each component on six urban transit bus models.

Section 3 of this document describes the Development Process for Standard Emergency Safety Components which was undertaken after the aspects of current equipment had been documented.

The result of this process is an Application Approach which includes specific guidelines describing each component as they should be standardized. These guidelines are presented in Section 4.

A list of the study set of urban transit bus models investigated as background, a list of resources for interested researchers, and a bibliography are presented in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.

FIGURE 1-1. SAFETY DEVICES TARGETED FOR STANDARDIZATION

2. DOCUMENTATION OF AVAILABILITY, LOCATION, AND USE OF SAFETY ITEMS

One of the key realizations of the original study for CCTA was that there tended to be a lack of standardization for the location and function of the various safety devices among the three most common models of urban transit buses the Flxible Corporation, General Motors Corporation (Transportation Manufacturing Corporation) RTS, and Neoplan USA Corporation. In the Summer of 1991 this was broadened by the study of Ikarus USA articulated, Gillig, and Bus Industries of America Orion urban transit bus models. Safety components were also found to vary among these vehicles. The vehicles of these six manufacturers comprised over 80% of the urban transit buses operating in the United States at the time of this review.

In July of 1991, each of the eleven candidate safety components on models by each of these manufacturers were documented.2 This information is partially represented in the following pages and includes brief discussions of each of the safety components. Following the discussion of each component, tables summarize, for each of the six models: the location; accessibility of the device from outside the coach; the use of the device; its function; and any vehicle-specific safety problem(s). Photographs of all of the actual devices are included following each table, in alphabetical order by bus model manufacturer: Flxible, GMC/TMC, Gillig, Ikarus, Neoplan, and Orion.

This study is based on the vehicle models available for inspection and additional information provided at the time of compilation; vehicles actually vary, of course, among models, model years, and transit agencies. A list of the actual vehicles used for documentation is included in Appendix A. Each safety component is considered as it relates to emergency response handling and evacuation, in light of a (potentially) incapacitated driver. The discussions, tables, and photographs presented here served as the basis of discussion at the first meeting of the Guidelines Development Committee in August, 1991.

2.1 MASTER RUN SWITCH

A summary of the Master Run Switch data for the six bus models studied is shown in Table 2-1. The Master Run Switch and its location in each of the six bus models are shown in Photographs 2-1 through 2-6.

On five of the six coach models, the Master Run Switch is located in the operator's compartment on the side wall control panel directly to the rear of the door control handle. As the exception, the Master Run Switch in the Gillig Phantom is located immediately forward of the door control handle, as can be seen in Photograph 2-3. Although proximity to the door control handle varies slightly among vehicles, the Master Run Switch is consistently the largest knob on the driver's left side control panel. In each case it is accessible to emergency preparedness forces from outside of the coach. In each case its use is consistent: reaching through the signal window and rotating the switch counterclockwise to the engine stop or off position. For each bus, this shuts down the engine (as long as the device and its related circuits have not been damaged by the accident or emergency).

Despite some general consistencies, there are specific inherent safety problems associated with each of the buses for this device. Use of the Master Run Switch can be limited on any vehicle by locking driver's side windows. At many transit systems this switch remains easily accessible from outside only because locking mechanisms have been removed. Furthermore, some vehicles may not shut down if the transmission is in gear. In general, once the engine is shut down, there is a lack of consistency with respect to what electrical functions have actually been terminated and prevented. Indeed, the variety of electrical functions still available is dramatically different among the six buses. On a Neoplan model, for example, only the hazard warning system might still operate, while in the Ikarus the hazards, horn, interior lights, and stop request signs are still operable.

In addition, there is a particular concern which could seriously impact the performance and safety of emergency preparedness forces and passengers. If one or both of the side doors are open when someone shuts down the engine with the Master Run Switch, the side doors may then close in some cases. This is a particularly serious problem if someone is standing in or moving through the doorwell area or someone is on a stretcher or backboard being carried out through the doors. At a minimum this will hinder any evacuation efforts underway, and could potentially instigate passenger panic.

TABLE 2-1. SAFETY DEVICE: MASTER RUN SWITCH
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

Directly to rear of door control handle

Yes

Reach in through sliding driver signal window and rotate counterclockwise to Engine Stop position

Shuts down engine

Only some electrical functions still operate

GMC (TMC) RTS

To rear of door control handle, near front of panel and directly adjacent to driver's signal window

Yes

Reach in through sliding half of driver signal window and rotate counterclockwise to Engine Stop position

Shuts down engine

Only some electrical functions still operate; if doors previously opened, they may close

Gillig Phantom

Directly forward of door control handle

Yes

Reach in through driver window and rotate counter-clockwise to Off position

Shuts down engine

May not shut down engine if transmission is in gear; only some electrical functions still operate, rear doors will lock

Ikarus USA Articulated

Directly to rear of door control handle

Yes

Reach in through forward/ sliding half of driver window and rotate counter-clockwise to Off position

Shuts down engine

Indicator is not obvious, making it difficult to tell position of switch; only some electrical functions still operate; if rear doors previously opened, they may close

Neoplan USA

Directly to rear of door control handle

Yes

Reach in through driver window and rotate counter-clockwise to Stop position

Shuts down engine

Only hazard warning system will operate; if doors previously opened, they may close

Orion

Directly to rear of door control handle

Yes

Reach in through sliding half of driver window and rotate counterclockwise to Engine Stop position

Shuts down engine

Only some electrical functions still operate; located below the window so difficult to see from outside

Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.

PHOTOGRAPH 2-1
FLXIBLE MODEL:
USING THE MASTER RUN SWITCH TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGINE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-2

GMC RTS MODEL:
LOCATION OF MASTER RUN SWITCH ON LEFT SIDEWALL INSTRUMENT PANEL


PHOTOGRAPH 2-3

GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
LOCATION OF MASTER RUN SWITCH ON LEFT SIDEWALL INSTRUMENT PANEL


PHOTOGRAPH 2-4
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
LOCATION OF MASTER RUN SWITCH ON LEFT SIDEWALL INSTRUMENT PANEL


PHOTOGRAPH 2-5
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
LOCATION OF MASTER RUN SWITCH ON LEFT SIDEWALL INSTRUMENT PANEL


PHOTOGRAPH 2-6
ORION MODEL:
LOCATION OF MASTER RUN SWITCH ON LEFT SIDEWALL INSTRUMENT PANEL


2Balog, J.N., Gribbon, R.B., and Schwarz, A.N., KETRON Technical Discussion: Availability. Location, and Use of Safety Items for Standardization on Urban Transit Buses. KETRON, August 13, 1991, 124 pages.


2.2 EMERGENCY STOP SWITCH

With respect to the driver's area Emergency Stop Switch, the Flxible, the GMC RTS, and Orion model coaches had similar devices which operate in a similar manner. They had no inherent safety problem other than the fact that most firemen wear gloves along with their normal bunker coats, helmets, pants, and boots, and such gloves are quite bulky and may cause difficulties in lifting the guard and pulling the Emergency Stop Switch lever (or pushing the switch rearward in the Orion model) until the engine stops. This information is summarized for each of the six buses in Table 2-2, followed by photographs for each of the three coaches equipped (Photographs 2-7, 2-8, 2-9) with a driver's area Emergency Stop Switch.

The Emergency Stop Switch generally works by releasing the cam on the air choke valve. Vehicles equipped with an electronic engine control system generally do not have this safety feature. In August, 1991 the Guidelines Development Committee determined that both devices are therefore essentially obsolete. The Emergency Stop Switch was not pursued any further

TABLE 2-2. SAFETY DEVICE: EMERGENCY STOP SWITCH
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

Immediately forward of master run switch

Yes

Reach in through signal window, raise guard, pull lever toward you and hold until engine stops

Shuts down engine by releasing cam on air choke valve

Not available on all models; Switch must be held in position

GMC (TMC) RTS

Immediately forward of master run switch

Yes

Reach in through sliding half of driver signal window, lift protective cover, pull lever toward you and hold until engine stops

Shuts down engine by releasing cam on air choke valve

Switch must be held in position

Gillig Phantom

None

NA

NA

NA

No alternate means to shut down engine from driver's compartment

Ikarus USA Articulated

None

NA

NA

NA

No alternate means to shut down engine from driver's compartment

Neoplan USA

None

NA

NA

NA

No alternate means to shut down engine from driver's compartment

Orion

Rearward of master run switch near rear of driver's side control panel

Yes

Reach in through sliding half of driver window, raise protective cover, push switch rearward

Shuts down engine by releasing cam on air choke valve

Not available on all models; location may vary slightly among models; difficult to see and reach if rear half of driver window does not open; located next to identical looking switch (Emergency Brake Override switch which overrides rear door brake interlock and does not shut down engine)

*: Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.

PHOTOGRAPH 2-7
FLXIBLE MODEL:
USING THE EMERGENCY ENGINE STOP SWITCH
IN THE OPERATOR'S COMPARTMENT


PHOTOGRAPH 2-8
GMC RTS MODEL:
FIRST STEP IN USE OF EMERGENCY ENGINE STOP SWITCH
IN THE OPERATOR'S COMPARTMENT


PHOTOGRAPH 2-9
ORION MODEL:
EMERGENCY STOP SWITCH ON OPERATOR'S LEFT SIDEWALL
INSTRUMENT PANEL

2.3 ENGINE COMPARTMENT STOP SWITCH

Each of the six coaches contains a Stop Switch located in the Engine Compartment. The summary information for the Engine Compartment Stop Switch for the six bus models is shown in Table 2-3, and each is shown in Photographs 2-10 through 2-15.

Normally used for maintenance, there is a great deal of inconsistency with regard to location, orientation, and use of the switch. In one, the switch box is located in the upper left corner of the engine compartment, in three others, it is located in the upper right corner, in another it is on the right side, and in another it is located in the upper right of center. Two switch panels often face to the right (Flxible and Neoplan) and four face the user (GMC RTS, Gillig, Ikarus, and Orion). In three cases the middle switch on the switch box is used to shut down the engine and in two others it is the right-most switch. Three require a rescuer to push the switch down to a horizontal position while two require the rescuer to push the switch up to a horizontal position. Furthermore, the labeling for this device is often confusing and inconsistent among vehicles. The Engine Compartment Stop Switch on the Gillig was found to be completely non-functional as an emergency item, as the Ignition/Off switch will only shut down the engine if it was started from the engine compartment controls a condition which is unlikely at a post-accident scene.

With some Flxible coaches the box faces to the right which causes a rescuer to get rather close to the engine in order to see the location of the lever switch and to activate it. This is also the case with Neoplan models, however, the Neoplan Engine Compartment Stop Switch is located in a box very close to and facing the right wall of the coach. This position makes it extremely difficult to find the location of the switch and to activate it. In addition, on the Neoplan model, there is an exposure potential to the various belts, pulleys, and hot surfaces that is not existent with the other coaches.

TABLE 2-3. SAFETY DEVICE: ENGINE COMPARTMENT STOP SWITCH
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

Left upper corner of engine compartment faces to right; or upper center of engine compartment, faces user

Yes

Lift engine access door, move middle switch down to horizontal position

Shuts down engine

If faces to right, individual must get close to engine, hard to see

GMC (TMC) RTS

Upper right of center of engine compartment, faces user

Yes

Lift engine access door, move middle switch down to horizontal position

Shuts down engine

None

Gillig Phantom

Right upper corner of engine compartment, faces user

Yes

Not useful

Not functional

Engine cannot be shut down from engine compartment if started by driver

Ikarus USA Articulated

Right side of engine compartment, faces user

Yes

Lift engine access door, move rightmost switch up to stop position and hold

Shuts down engine

Engine Stop switch may be confused with Engine Run Off switch, must be held in position until engine stops; switch appears to be in Engine Stop position when in Run due to position of switch label

Neoplan USA

Right upper corner or upper center of engine compartment, faces to right

Yes

Lift engine access door, move middle switch up to horizontal position

Shuts down engine

Faces to right, individual must get close to engine, very hard to see between engine control box and right wall, exposure to belts and pulleys

Orion

Right upper corner of engine compartment, faces user

Yes

Lift engine access door, move lower right switch down to horizontal position

Shuts down engine

None

*: Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.

PHOTOGRAPH 2-10
FLXIBLE MODEL:
ENGINE COMPARTMENT CONTROL BOX CONTAINING ENGINE STOP SWITCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-11
GMC RTS MODEL:
CLOSE-UP OF CONTROL BOX IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT
CONTAINING ENGINE STOP SWITCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-12
GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
ENGINE COMPARTMENT CONTROL BOX CONTAINING
ENGINE REAR RUN SWITCHES


PHOTOGRAPH 2-13
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
ENGINE COMPARTMENT CONTROL BOX
CONTAINING ENGINE STOP SWITCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-14
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
CLOSE-UP OF CONTROL BOX IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT
CONTAINING ENGINE STOP SWITCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-15
ORION MODEL:
ENGINE COMPARTMENT CONTROL BOX
CONTAINING ENGINE STOP SWITCH

2.4 ENGINE STOP SOLENOID PLUNGER

Four of the bus models were equipped with an emergency Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger, located on the engine itself, which shuts down the engine by depriving the engine of air. In the case of the Flxible, GMC RTS, and Orion model coaches, it is accessible to rescuers. In contrast, with the Neoplan, it is virtually inaccessible. Indeed, with the Neoplan, it is advisable to not even show rescuers the location of the device in training since reaching to activate the device exposes them to moving belts, pulleys, hot surfaces, and other extreme hazards even if the rescuer tries to use a probe device. Except on the Orion, there is no label or color indicator, or any other device which would help a rescuer to find the solenoid. Summary information for the Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger for each bus model is shown in Table 2-4, followed by photographs of each of the four vehicles equipped with this device (Photographs 2-16 to 2-19). As most electronically controlled engines do not need this device, it was later determined to be obsolete and inappropriate for standardization. The Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger was not pursued any further.

TABLE 2-4. SAFETY DEVICE: EMERGENCY STOP SOLENOID PLUNGER
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH

EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

Center of engine compartment on engine

Yes

Lift engine access door, push down and right on choke cam tab

Shuts down engine by depriving engine of air

No label or color indicator, individual must get close to engine; not available on all engines

GMC (TMC) RTS

Center of engine compartment on engine

Yes

Lift engine access door, push down and right on choke cam tab

Shuts down engine by depriving engine of air

No label or color indicator, individual must get close to engine

Gillig Phantom

None

NA

NA

NA

No mechanical means to shut down computer-controlled engine

Ikarus USA Articulated

None

NA

NA

NA

No mechanical means to shut down engine

Neoplan USA

At top and rear of engine, if so equipped

Yes, but with great difficulty and danger

Lift engine access door, use long probe to push down on choke cam tab

Shuts down engine by depriving engine of air

Exposes individual to belts and pulleys, hot surfaces; impossible to use hand; very difficult to use probe, user must get close to engine

Orion

Center of engine compartment on engine

Yes

Lift engine access door, push down and right on choke cam tab

Shuts down engine by depriving engine of air

No label, individual must reach around hot surfaces

*: Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.

PHOTOGRAPH 2-16
FLXIBLE MODEL:
CLOSE-UP OF EMERGENCY STOP SOLENOID PLUNGER
IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT IN STOP POSITION


PHOTOGRAPH 2-17
GMC RTS MODEL:
CLOSE-UP OF EMERGENCY STOP SOLENOID PLUNGER
IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT IN RUN POSITION


PHOTOGRAPH 2-18
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
ENGINE COMPARTMENT: NOTE LIMITATIONS OF
ACCESS TO EMERGENCY STOP SOLENOID PLUNGER


PHOTOGRAPH 2-19
ORION MODEL:
EMERGENCY STOP SOLENOID PLUNGER IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT
IN RESET POSITION

2.5 ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH

A summary of information concerning the Roof Escape (Ingress) Hatch is shown in Table 2-5.

In each of the six coach models the Transpec roof escape (ingress) hatch is installed. In many cases, there may only be one hatch present, as seen in Photograph 2-20. In some cases, the GMC RTS model for example (Photographs 2-21, 2-22), a separate non-Transpec hatch may also be present. Many of these additional hatches are typically very difficult if not impossible to open from outside the coach. On other models the second hatch may only provide a ventilator function.

In order for rescuers to use the Transpec hatch as an emergency ingress point, they must be taught how to pull the hatch up to its full ventilation position along with how to reach under the hatch and how to release it by pulling the black tab to the side and pushing upwards on the white handle surrounding the black tab (Photograph 2-23). The whole procedure can often, with practice, be done in less than a minute and without any damage to the hatch or the coach. The Transpec hatches are felt to be reasonably inexpensive compared to the value of their function. Other model hatches have an entirely different release mechanism. Without labeling, practice, or knowledge of the hatch release mechanisms, opening the hatch from outside can be a difficult and time-consuming task.

One of the problems experienced in working with a variety of coaches is that the placement of the hatch's release mechanism (for example, oriented to the rear of the coach) is not consistent. It is not uncommon for vehicles to have the release mechanism on the street side (as seen in Photograph 2-24), the curb side, or on the forward side of the hatch itself. A trained fireman may be able to lift the hatch to the full ventilation position and often release it in less than a minute, as long as the latch is consistently located. However, if it is not where the rescuer expects it to be, valuable time could be lost while the rescuer struggles (with bulky gloves on) with the device, without being able to see to the latch mechanism. It was apparent that, in each vehicle, the orientation of the hatch should be consistent and oriented as indicated by the manufacturer.

Views of the standard Transpec roof escape (ingress) hatches are shown in Photographs 2-25 and 2-26. Transpec has more recently introduced a significantly different release mechanism for the vent emergency exit. This new version is somewhat simpler to use; however, this slight variation significantly increases the knowledge required of emergency response personnel. New models also have an optional exterior release. The new release mechanism enables one to imagine the potential complications of multiple manufacturers with various models.

TABLE 2-5. SAFETY DEVICE: ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH: TRANSPEC
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE** FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

In roof near rear of coach, may have second near front

Yes

Pull hatch upward to full ventilation position, release black tab by pulling to side of hatch, push upwards on white handle surrounding black tab, or break supports

To gain entry to interior, to remove passengers

Not always installed in correct orientation, may only be one hatch, method of use will vary on newer Transpec models

GMC (TMC) RTS

In roof near rear of coach, may have second near front or a second non-Transpec hatch

Transpec Yes Other Hatch often No

Pull hatch upward to full ventilation position, release black tab by pulling to side of hatch, push upwards on white handle surrounding black tab; or break supports

To gain entry to interior, to remove passengers

Not always installed in correct orientation, may only be one hatch, second hatch may not open from outside, method of use will vary on newer Transpec models

Gillig Phantom

In roof near rear of coach, second near front

Yes

Pull hatch upward to full ventilation position, release black tab by pulling to side of hatch, push upwards on white handle surrounding black tab; or break supports

To gain entry to interior, to remove passengers

Not always installed in correct orientation, method of use will vary on newer Transpec models

Ikarus USA Articulated

In roof near rear of coach, second near front; also in center on articulated models

Yes

Pull hatch upward to full ventilation position, release black tab by pulling to side of hatch, push upwards on white handle surrounding black tab; or break supports

To gain entry to interior, to remove passengers

May not be installed in correct orientation; method of use will vary on newer Transpec models


TABLE 2-5. SAFETY DEVICE: ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH: TRANSPEC (CONTINUED)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE** FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Neoplan USA

In roof near rear of coach, may have second near front

Yes

Pull hatch upward to full ventilation position, release black tab by pulling to side of hatch, push upwards on white handle surrounding black tab; or break supports

To gain entry to interior, to remove passengers

Not always installed in correct orientation, may only be one hatch, method of use will vary on newer Transpec models

Orion

In roof near rear of coach (rearward of rear door), second near front (just rearward of standee line)

Yes

Pull hatch upward to full ventilation position, release black tab by pulling to side of hatch, push upwards on white handle surrounding black tab; or break supports

To gain entry to interior, to remove passengers

Not always installed in correct orientation, method of use will vary on newer Transpec models

NOTES:

* Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.

** Method of use will vary on new Transpec models, pull hatch upward to full ventilation position, from outside turn red knob counterclockwise to unlock, pull knob up; or reach inside and release red knob by turning counterclockwise (clockwise from inside), push red knob up

On newer Transpec models outside release is optional, instructions may wear off

PHOTOGRAPH 2-20
FLXIBLE MODEL:
EXTERIOR VIEW OF SINGLE ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-21
GMC RTS MODEL:
INTERIOR VIEW OF ALTERNATIVE VENTILATION HATCH
IN CLOSED POSITION


PHOTOGRAPH 2-22
GMC RTS MODEL:
INTERIOR VIEW OF ALTERNATIVE ROOF ESCAPE HATCH
IN CLOSED POSITION


PHOTOGRAPH 2-23
GMC RTS MODEL:
RELEASE OF TRANSPEC ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH FROM OUTSIDE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-24
GMC RTS MODEL:
INTERIOR VIEW OF ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH
WITH STREET SIDE ORIENTATION


PHOTOGRAPH 2-25
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
INTERIOR VIEW OF TRANSPEC ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-26
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
FULLY OPENED TRANSPEC ROOF ESCAPE (INGRESS) HATCH

2.6 DRIVER WINDOW AS INGRESS

Since the door control handle, the Master Run Switch, the Emergency Stop Switch, and in some cases the Driver's Area Door Dump Valve or Switch are all located in the operator's area, it is important that the driver's side window be useful as an ingress point.

In the case of the GMC RTS model, the full side window does not open and there is no way for a rescuer to move through this window, if necessary, to gain access to the interior of the bus. The driver's window on the Flxible and Orion models does open easily, allowing significant access to all the controls and the ability for the rescuer to climb in. The window, however, does not stay open by itself during such maneuvers and attempts. Either another rescuer has to hold the window open or a pike pole or other device must be used as a support.

One half of the Gillig Phantom, Ikarus, and Neoplan models driver's windows slide open and because the design is a sliding window, they do not require a rescuer to prop them open. However, the window openings are actually rather small. In simulation exercises with a Neoplan coach and fire service personnel in full regalia, rescuers have been able to put their right leg and the right part of their body through the window without significant difficulty. However, in some cases as they tried to move their helmets and heads through the window, its width was insufficient to allow the rescuer's helmet to clear. This makes it very difficult for the rescuer since he/she is trying very hard not to step on, or otherwise disturb the operator who would, in such a case, most likely be incapacitated as a result of the accident. While balancing themselves with one foot on the dashboard or side control panel and the other outside the window, a rescuer has to remove his/her helmet in order to get through the window.

Although some Guidelines Development Committee members and some APTA Safety Committee members believed it was clear that the driver's side window needs to be openable and large enough to facilitate entry by rescuers, the concensus of the Guidelines Development Committee was to not require the driver side window to be available as an ingress location for emergency personnel. An information summary of the driver window as an ingress location for the six coaches is shown in Table 2-6. Photographs 2-27 through 2-32 show the driver's windows for each coach model.

TABLE 2-6. SAFETY DEVICE: DRIVER WINDOW AS INGRESS
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

Adjacent to driver, above split side window, hinged at top

Yes

Insert hand in open half of sliding window, push up on release latch in middle of lower sill, lift window outward from bottom

Allows ingress to interior

Window will not stay open by itself, requires manual intervention; split side window may be locked

GMC (TMC) RTS

Adjacent to driver

NA

Not useful

Not functional

Window is too small to use as ingress point

Gillig Phantom

Adjacent to driver

Yes

Slide front half of window rearward, or rear half of window forward

Allows limited ingress to interior

Insufficient size to easily climb through, impossible for larger person, or person with large helmet; may be locked

Ikarus USA Articulated

Adjacent to driver, forward half

Yes

Slide front half of window rearward

Allows limited ingress to interior

Insufficient in size to easily climb through, may be impossible for large person, or person with large helmet

Neoplan USA

Adjacent to driver, front half of upper portion

Yes

Slide front half of window rearward

Allows limited ingress to interior

Insufficient in size to easily climb through, impossible for large person, or person with large helmet


TABLE 2-6. SAFETY DEVICE: DRIVER WINDOW AS INGRESS (CONTINUED)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Orion

Adjacent to driver, hooked to the frame at top

Yes

Slide front half of window rearward, move red handle down to horizontal position, lift window outward from bottom

Allows ingress to interior

Window will not stay open by itself, requires manual intervention. Window is hooked to the frame at top and can be unhooked by raising the window slightly above honzon-tal position windows can fall if rescuers assume they are hinged, significant injuries could result Windows require lubri-cation and cycling to remain openable, drains must be appropriate to prevent cold weather freezing of window assembly and/or corrosion

*: Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.


PHOTOGRAPH 2-27
FLXIBLE MODEL:
CLOSE-UP OF DRIVER'S SIGNAL WINDOW AS VIEWED FROM FRONT
CORNER OF BUS ACCESS TO EMERGENCY WINDOW RELEASE LATCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-28
GMC RTS MODEL:
CLOSE-UP OF DRIVER'S WINDOW
LACK OF INGRESS POINT


PHOTOGRAPH 2-29
GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
FORWARD SLIDING DRIVER'S WINDOW PARTIALLY OPENED
LIMITED INGRESS


PHOTOGRAPH 2-30
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
DRIVER'S SIDE WINDOW LIMITED INGRESS


PHOTOGRAPH 2-31
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
DRIVER'S SIDE AND SIGNALWINDOWS - LIMITED INGRESS


PHOTOGRAPH 2-32
ORION MODEL:
DRIVER'S WINDOWS AS INGRESS

2.7 DOOR DUMP VALVE OR RELEASE (DRIVER'S AREA)

In the event rescuers cannot use the door control handle for whatever reason, the door dump valve or release in the driver's area is a critical safety device which can allow easy access through the right side door(s). Summary information on the Door Dump Valve or Release in the Driver's Area for the six bus models studied is shown in Table 2-7.

The Flxible coach's door dump valve is located on the side wall below the driver's seat and cannot be reached by a rescuer through the driver's signal window (Photograph 2-33). In contrast, the Door Dump Valve on the GMC RTS model coach is located immediately inside the driver's signal window, seen and reached with ease (Photograph 2-34). On the Ikarus coach, the valve is located just inside the driver's window immediately rearward of the Master Run Switch, also easily seen and reached. The driver's area door dump valve on the Gillig Phantom model is inset on the driver's side wall, slightly below and forward of the level of the seat (Photograph 2-35). While it can be reached and operated from outside the driver's window, it cannot be seen, and can be difficult to find, especially when compared to the Ikarus switch (Photograph 2-36). Similarly, the Neoplan model's door dump valve is located halfway between the bottom of the window and the floor on the driver's side wall (Photograph 2-37). It too is not visually available to rescuers standing at the signal window, but may only be reached with considerable difficulty by a rescuer with a long arm due to the height of the driver's window. The Orion coach's door dump valve is located on the front wall below the front windshield about 2 feet from the floor. It is accessible from either the driver's area or the front door stepwell but is not accessible from outside the coach; it is generally partially hidden by the farebox and stanchions (Photograph 2-38).

On many coaches, if the side door is already open and a rescuer dumps the door valve or activates the switch, the door may close causing injury to a rescuer or an injured passenger who is moving or being moved through the door opening.

The six devices are operated in different manners. The valve on the Flxible model requires the individual to turn it counterclockwise. The GMC coach's door dump valve is pulled to release the door. The Gillig either has a valve that is turned or, like the Ikarus, a lever that is moved forward. The Neoplan and Orion model valves must be turned clockwise. Bus models with electronically controlled doors have similar controls which perform these same functions without the valve and without actually dumping air.

The Driver's Area Door Dump Valve or Release demonstrates a useful safety device inconsistently located and inconsistently operated to achieve the goal of releasing the door.

The concensus of the Guidelines Development Committee was that this device is redundant to others in this location and should not be standardized or promoted as a safety component.

TABLE 2-7. SAFETY DEVICE: DOOR DUMP VALVE (DRIVER'S AREA)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

On left side wall below driver's seat

No

Rotate lever counterclockwise

Releases front door only

If door is open, and valve is used, may cause door to close; cannot be reached from outside; no label or instructions

GMC (TMC) RTS

On left side wall panel between driver's side window and panel

Yes

Pull knob

Releases front door only

If door is open and valve is used, may cause door to close; no label or instructions

Gillig Phantom

Inset on left side wall below driver's side control panel

Yes

Move lever forward or turn valve to Off position

Releases front door only

Method of use not consistent in all models; not visible from exterior, if door is open and valve is used, may cause doors to close, may not be labeled

Ikarus USA Articulated

On driver's left control panel, directly rearward of master run switch

Yes

Move lever forward to Off position

Releases front door only

If door is open and valve is used, may cause door to close, not sufficiently labeled

Neoplan USA

Forward of and below driver's side window, midway to floor

Only with considerable difficulty

Rotate lever or knob clockwise

Opens both front and rear doors

If doors are open and valve is used, may cause doors to close, very difficult to reach from outside; may not be labeled

Orion

To right of driver compartment on front wall of vehicle, approximately 2' above vehicle floor

No

Turn knob clockwise from vertical to horizontal position

Opens both front and rear doors

Cannot be reached from outside; hidden from view; if doors are open and valve is used, may cause doors to close

* Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.

PHOTOGRAPH 2-33
FLXIBLE MODEL:
CLOSE-UP OF DRIVER'S AREA DOOR DUMP VALVE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-34
GMC RTS MODEL:
USE OF DOOR DUMP VALVE AT OPERATOR'S SIGNAL WINDOW


PHOTOGRAPH 2-35
GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
LOCATION OF DRIVER'S AREA DOOR DUMP VALVE (IN ON /CLOSED POSITION)


PHOTOGRAPH 2-36
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
USE OF DRIVER'S AREA DOOR DUMP VALVE (IN ON /CLOSED POSITION)


PHOTOGRAPH 2-37
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
LOCATION OF DRIVER'S AREA DOOR DUMP VALVE
BELOW DOOR CONTROL HANDLE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-38
ORION MODEL:
LOCATION OF DRIVER'S AREA DOOR DUMP VALVE
(IN ON /CLOSED POSITION) TO RIGHT OF STANCHION

2.8 DOOR DUMP VALVE OR RELEASE (FRONT SIDE DOOR)

Once inside a vehicle, after moving through the escape hatch, or front windshield, a rescuer may (try to) open the Front Side Door using the Door Dump Valve or Release mounted on the wall. To gain access to the device, the Flxible, GMC RTS, Ikarus, and Neoplan models all require the user to break a glass or clear plastic plate. The Gillig model, if equipped with a passenger side front door release, requires the user to unlatch the access panel door, raise and hold the door, and correctly identify the unmarked handle without benefit of instructions. On some Neoplan models the valve handle is located in an enclosed but lidded plastic box. The Orion model does not have a passenger side Front Door Dump Valve, but rather requires the rescuer to use the Master Door Dump Valve located on the front wall behind the farebox.

Operation of the devices varies greatly. The Flxible model requires the rescuer to pull a red handle downward while the GMC RTS model requires the rescuer to pull the valve lever toward him/her and down. The Gillig, Ikarus, and some Neoplan models (if such a device is available, and not all Neoplan coaches have them near the front door) require the rescuer to rotate the lever clockwise. Other Neoplan models require the rescuer to rotate a handle counterclockwise.

These inconsistencies can cause confusion to rescuers, particularly if a smoke condition exists or the vehicle is, for example, turned over on its left side. In five buses, the device opens only the front door. This is a reasonable expectation and should probably be maintained. However, if a rescuer already has the front side door open and wants to open the rear door and activates the right front side door dump valve or release, the front door may close on anyone in the doorwell area.

Summary information on the Front Side Door Dump Valve or Release is shown in Table 2-8, and pictures of each device are shown in Photographs 2-39 through 2-43.

TABLE 2-8. SAFETY DEVICE: DOOR DUMP VALVE (FRONT SIDE DOOR)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

On right side wall to upper right of front door in glass-fronted metal box

No

Break glass, pull red handle down

Releases front door only

If door is open, and valve is used, may cause door to close

GMC (TMC) RTS

On right side wall to upper right of front door in glass-fronted metal compartment

No

Break glass, pull valve lever toward you and down

Releases front door only

If door is open, and valve is used, may cause door to close

Gillig Phantom

Above front door to right, behind horizontal access panel

No

Turn access panel door knobs counterclockwise, lift panel door, rotate lever clockwise to vertical position

Releases front door only

Not available on all coaches, may not be marked, no instructions, not accessible if access panel cannot be opened; if door is open and valve is used, may cause door to close

Ikarus USA Articulated

Above front door to left, behind clear plastic window in horizontal access panel

No

Break plastic, or turn access panel door knobs counterclockwise and raise access panel; rotate red lever rearward (clockwise)

Releases front door only

If door is open, and valve is used, may cause door to close, lever not easily seen through plastic window; no instructions once cover is broken

Neoplan USA

Not available on all coaches; above front door on right side in glass-fronted metal box; or on front wall above right front windshield in enclosed but lidded plastic box

No

Break glass, rotate lever clockwise; or lift cover and rotate handle counterclock-wise

If equipped, opens front door only

Not available on all coaches; if door is open and valve is used, may cause door to close

Orion

None

NA

NA

NA

NA

* Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A

PHOTOGRAPH 2-39
FLXIBLE MODEL:
FRONT DOOR DUMP HANDLE LOCATED TO UPPER RIGHT OF THE FRONT DOOR


PHOTOGRAPH 2-40
GMC RTS MODEL:
FRONT DOOR DUMP LEVEL LOCATED TO UPPER RIGHT OF FRONT DOOR


PHOTOGRAPH 2-41
GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
FRONT DOOR DUMP VALVE LEVER LOCATED ABOVE TO RIGHT OF
FRONT DOOR BEHIND ACCESS PANEL


PHOTOGRAPH 2-42
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
USE OF FRONT DOOR DUMP LEVER LOCATED ABOVE DOORS BEHIND
CLEAR PLASTIC COVER


PHOTOGRAPH 2-43
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
LOCATION OF FRONT DOOR DUMP CONTROL BOX ON FRONT WALL

2.9 DOOR DUMP VALVE OR RELEASE (REAR SIDE DOOR)

The Rear Side Door Dump Valve or Release was found on all six coaches. Five of them required the rescuer to first break a glass or clear plastic coverwhile a sixth, on some models, requires the rescuer to simply lift a front cover.

Once access is gained to the valve, however, one model coach requires the rescuer to pull the red handle down, one requires the rescuer to pull the valve lever toward him/her and down, one requires the rescuer to pull the handle toward him/her or rotate the valve lever to a horizontal position, and another requires the rescuer to rotate the lever counterclockwise, while in yet two others the rescuer is required to rotate the lever clockwise. The Rear Side Door Dump Valve control or Release, in its doors open/off position, is oriented down, horizontal, diagonal, or vertical depending on the coach. On the Gillig Phantom and Neoplan model coaches, the location and use of the release mechanism depends on the type of rear doors.

In the case of the Neoplan model, some coaches have a valve only in this rear side door position and not near the front door; consequently only the right rear side door can be released using a door dump valve mounted on the right side wall of the coach. The Orion model actually has two door switches located above the rear side doors, only one of which is the door dump valve. This could cause confusion even for trained rescuers.

In all six model coaches, if for whatever reason a door is already open and the door valve is dumped or the switch activated, the door may close and could cause injuries. The summary of information and pictures of this safety device on the six bus models are shown in Table 2-9 and Photographs 2-44 through 2-50.

TABLE 2-9. SAFETY DEVICE: DOOR DUMP VALVE (REAR SIDE DOOR)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

On right side wall to left top of rear door in glass-fronted metal box

No

Break glass, pull red handle down

Releases rear door only

If door is open, and valve is used, may cause door to close

GMC (TMC) RTS

On right side wall to left top of rear door in glass-fronted metal box

No

Break glass, pull valve lever toward you and down

Releases rear door only

If door is open, and valve is used, may cause door to close

Gillig Phantom

Above rear door behind plastic window, to left in horizontal compartment

No

Break plastic with hammer or hand; or turn both knobs counterclockwise and pull access door down. Rotate valve handle to horizontal position, or pull handle toward you, push door down and out

Releases or opens rear door only

Release mechanism different for different door types; if door is open and valve is used, may cause door to close

Ikarus USA Articulated

Above rear door behind clear plastic window, in center left of horizontal compartment

No

Break plastic or turn both knobs counterclockwise and raise access door. Rotate red lever rearward (clockwise)

Releases rear doors; activates brake interlock if power is available

If door is open, and valve is used, may cause door to close; no instructions once cover is broken

Neoplan USA

Behind an enclosed but lidded box at left top of rear door; or above rear door

No

Lift cover, rotate handle counterclockwise; or lift access panel, rotate red lever; or break glass, pull handle toward you and down

Opens rear door only

Does not open front door on coaches without front side door dump valve release mechanism different for different door types; if door is open and valve is used, may cause door to close

Orion

Above rear door behind glass window, in center of horizontal compartment

No

Break glass or turn both knobs counterclockwise and pull access door down. Turn red handle clockwise from horizontal to vertical position

Releases rear door only

A door master switch is located on the left of the compartment, but does not release door, which rescuers may assume; if door is open and valve is used, may cause door to close

**: Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.

PHOTOGRAPH 2-44
FLXIBLE MODEL:
USING THE EMERGENCY REAR DOOR DUMP VALVE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-45
GMC RTS MODEL:
USING THE EMERGENCY REAR DOOR DUMP VALVE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-46
GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
EMERGENCY REAR DOOR RELEASE HANDLE IN COMPARTMENT
OVER REAR DOORS SHOWN WITH PLASTIC WINDOW AND HAMMER


PHOTOGRAPH 2-47
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
LOCATION OF REAR DOOR DUMP VALVE OVER REAR DOORS


PHOTOGRAPH 2-48
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
REAR DOOR BOX CONTAINING EMERGENCY DUMP VALVE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-49
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
EMERGENCY REAR DOOR DUMP VALVE


PHOTOGRAPH 2-50
ORION MODEL:
EMERGENCY REAR DOOR DUMP VALVE

2.10 ELECTRICAL (BATTERY SWITCHES)

After a serious accident it is wise for a rescuer to try to minimize the chance of electrical fire initiation or propagation. Each of the six coaches studied has a bank of batteries located on the street side of the coach behind a service door. In each case, there are one or more switches available to kill the electrical power. Rescuers currently have to be taught that killing the electrical power will not necessarily cause the diesel engine to stop running. The engine must be shut down separately or electrical power will still be available to most circuits.

Table 2-10 shows summary information on the Electrical (Battery) Switches for the six bus models. Photographs of the disconnect switches are shown in Photographs 2-51 through 2-57.

The Flxible model bus has a small side door with a grommeted hole which allows the rescuer to open the door, reach in and rotate a single switch or knob counterclockwise to the stop position (Photograph 2-51). On the other models, the service door covering the battery bank has to be unlocked with a door control handle, a "T" handle (supplied with the GMC RTS coach) or a large screwdriver; or released by disengaging rubber handle straps by pulling them toward oneself and then downward; or opened by simply grasping handles and pulling the service door outward and upward.

Once the service doors are opened, in the case of the Gillig coach (Photograph 2-54), there is a single switch lever on the front sidewall of the battery compartment (except in 30' models where the switch is located in the engine compartment on the curb side). In the cases of the GMC RTS, Ikarus, Neoplan, and Orion models there are two switches, one for the 24-volt system and one for the 12-volt system. On the Ikarus coach both switches are stacked vertically on a plate in the center of the battery compartment (Photograph 2-55). The GMC RTS coach has the 24-volt disconnect switch attached to the right side wall in the lower position (Photograph 2-52) and the 12-volt disconnect switch attached to the right side wall right above it (Photograph 2-53). On the Neoplan coach the switches are attached to the front side wall of the battery compartment. The 24-volt disconnect switch is in the lower position and the 12-volt disconnect switch is either in the upper position (Photograph 2-56) or hidden behind the 24-volt switch levers. On some Neoplans there is a single switch on the right rear side wall of the battery box. On the Orion model the two switches are side by side, attached to the top left corner of the battery compartment (Photograph 2-57).

The single switch on the Gillig model is moved downward to kill the battery power. To kill the electricity from the 24-volt switch on the GMC RTS model the rescuer has to move the switch downward to the off position. In contrast, on the Neoplan coach, a rescuer has to move the switch up to the off position. In both cases, the 12-volt switch is rotated counterclockwise to the off position. On the Ikarus and Orion models, both 12- and 24-volt switches must be rotated counterclockwise to the off position.

Some inherent problems obviously relate to the inconsistency of the location and use of the devices, and the fact that on buses with two switches a rescuer might only trip one of them. Certain switch levers tend to become stiff or even stuck with age and weathering. Four models were supplied with a rotating switch by the Cole Hersey Company; the handles of these switches are easy to use but rescuers can mistakenly assume the handles are the on/off position indicators, which would reverse the apparent positions of the switch (causing Off to appear as On, etc.). On all models, if a side door has been previously opened, activation of the electrical disconnect switch may cause the doors to close on anyone in the doorwell area.

TABLE 2-10. SAFETY DEVICE: ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) SWITCHES
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

On street side behind service panel directly in front of rear wheels

Yes

Place fingers in grommeted hole in door and pull outward, rotate switch handle or knob counter-clockwise to stop position; or disengage rubber handle straps by pulling toward you and then downward, raise access door, use door prop rod on each end, rotate switch handle or knob counter-clockwise to stop position

Try to minimize electrical fire initiation or propagation

Electrical power may still be available to some circuits, doors may close if open and switches are turned

GMC (TMC) RTS

On street side behind service door directly in front of rear wheels; 24-volt disconnect switch attached to right side wall in lower position; 12-volt disconnect switch attached to right side wall in upper position

Yes

Unlock service door with "T" handle wrench or large screw-driver by rotating, or disengage rubber handle straps by pulling toward you and then downward; raise access door and use left side door prop to lock door; move 24-volt switch downward to off position; rotate 12-volt switch counterclockwise to off position

Try to minimize electrical fire initiation or propagation

Electrical power may still be available to some circuits, doors may close if open and switches are thrown/turned; rescuers may only trip one switch

Gillig Phantom

On street side behind service panel located at midpoint of coach to immediate right of center post, on 35' and 40' models only; on 30' model located in engine compartment at curb side

Yes

Disengage rubber handle straps by pulling toward you and then downward, raise access door, move large switch downward

Try to minimize electrical fire initiation or propagation

Electrical power may still be available to some circuits, doors may close if open and switch is thrown


TABLE 2-10. SAFETY DEVICE: ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) SWITCHES (CONTINUED)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Ikarus USA Articulated

On street side behind service panel directly forward of rearmost wheels; center of compartment

Yes

Grasp handles with fingers and pull outward and upward raising access door; rotate both switch handles counterclockwise to off position

Try to minimize electrical fire initiation or propagation

Electrical power may still be available to some circuits; doors may close if open and switches are turned; interior, door, and hazard lights may be extinguished; rescuers may mistake switch handle for indicator

Neoplan USA

On street side behind second service door to rear of front wheel; 24-volt disconnect switch attached to front side wall of battery compartment in lower position; 12-volt disconnect switch on some models above 24-volt switch on front sidewall; some models have a single switch on right rear sidewall of battery box

Yes

Unlock service door with door control handle by rotating counterclockwise or disengage rubber handle straps by pulling toward you and then downward; raise access door until door props lock; move 24-volt switch up to off position; rotate 12-volt switch counterclockwise to off position; for single switch coaches move master switch down to off position

Try to minimize electrical fire initiation or propagation

Electrical power may still be available to some circuits, doors may close if open and switches are turned; rescuers may only trip one switch; rescuers may mistake switch handle for indicator

Orion

On street side in most forward of three compartments located forward of rear wheels. Two switches in upper left corner of compartment facing outward

Yes

Unlock service door by disengaging rubber handle straps by pulling down. Raise access door, remains open itself. Rotate both switch handles counterclockwise to off position

Try to minimize electrical fire initiation or propagation

Electrical power may still be available to some circuits; position of indicator switches is unclear, doors may close if open and switches are turned, rescuers may mistake switch handle for indicator

* Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A.


PHOTOGRAPH 2-51
FLXIBLE MODEL:
ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) MASTER SWITCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-52
GMC RTS MODEL:
USE OF 24-VOLT ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) SWITCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-53
GMC RTS MODEL:
USE OF 12-VOLT ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) SWITCH


PHOTOGRAPH 2-54
GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
LOCATION OF ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) MASTER SWITCH ON FRONT WALL
OF BATTERY COMPARTMENT


PHOTOGRAPH 2-55
KARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) SWITCHES LOCATED IN CENTER
OF BATTERY COMPARTMENT


PHOTOGRAPH 2-56
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
12-VOLT AND 24-VOLT ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) SWITCHES


PHOTOGRAPH 2-57
ORION MODEL:
LOCATION OF ELECTRICAL (BATTERY) SWITCHES

2.11 PASSENGER SIDE WINDOWS

In the event of an emergency or accident which causes both of the right side doors to be unavailable for ingress or egress, it is particularly important for rescuers to be able to use the windows. In all six coaches, it is extremely difficult to open the windows from outside the vehicle without breaking the glazing or damaging the window assembly. Rescuers can be taught where to place pry bars to maximize the potential to pop the latches but these methods can achieve only inconsistent success without damaging the bus.

Interior use of passenger side windows is somewhat easier. Two of the coaches use sill latches and four use a lever lock at the side of the window. One of the sill locks requires a user to place both of his/her hands in a particular position in order to release the lock. In contrast, the lever release can be achieved by using only one hand. Further, the side lever release is not blocked on those windows where aisle-facing seats are placed.

The Flxible model is equipped with two types of passenger side windows a full window or sliding passenger windows. The full windows are opened by lifting a handle which runs the length of the sill and pushing out at the bottom (Photograph 2-58). The sliding windows require the user to depress an emergency release latch in the sill while sliding the rear half of the window forward (Photograph 2-59). Sometimes these sliding windows are difficult to open. The GMC RTS coach also has a sill that is lifted to open the emergency windows but the pair of release latches are located at particular points along the sill (Photograph 2-60). The GMC RTS model window is also hinged at the top and opened by pushing outward at the bottom.

The Gillig, Ikarus, and Orion models have a red release handle on the side of the window which releases the window latches in the sill when the handle is pulled down toward the center of the window (Photographs 2-61 through 2-67). While this handle is held down the window can be pushed outward at the bottom. Because the release handles are on the side and the locks are actually in the bottom sill, a mechanical arrangement of cable and springs allows the handle to release the latches (Photograph 2-63) only if they are lubricated, regularly cycled and maintained to prevent rusting and breakage. There is some variation as to whether the handle is located on the forward or rear side of the glazing and how many windows are so equipped. The Orion model coach has only one emergency exit passenger window.

Once the windows are opened it is very difficult to keep them in place without the use of a pike pole or other device. With the Flxible and GMC RTS model coaches, the windows can be held with such a device. However, the Ikarus, Neoplan, and Orion model coaches' window design (Photograph 2-65) will cause it to drop from the coach if it is raised above a horizontal position. Some could argue that this type of window is a better design since it can be removed and does not have to be held open. Removing these windows (without damaging them) is very difficult. The Neoplan model, for example, requires a rescuer on each side of the window on a ladder and a fair amount of rocking back and forth of the window to cause the window to be released. The weight of typical passenger side windows makes this a dangerous undertaking. It seems reasonable that a window design with hinges at the top and with an automatic prop to hold it open would be a better design.

The design and function of the rear side door also has an impact on the usability of the windows adjacent to it. On the Neoplan model, if the windows are pulled up above the door, the door can be opened and the bifolds can be used to hold the windows open (Photograph 2-66). However, if the door is already opened then neither adjacent window can be opened. On the GMC RTS coach, opening the rear side door also prevents opening the adjacent side windows, however, the design is such that the windows cannot be held open by letting them rest on the bifold doors.

Summary information on passenger side windows is shown in Table 2-11.

TABLE 2-11. SAFETY DEVICE: PASSENGER SIDE WINDOWS
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Flxible

Along both sides of coach

  1. Split/sliding window - accessible if unlocked; split windows very diffi-cult to pry open from outside without breaking at least rear half of window
  2. Solid windows very difficult to pry open from outside without breaking
  1. Slide split window open or break glazing full width of rear half; reach into coach, depress emergency release latch located near the center of window sill and slide the rear glazing and frame forward
  2. Insert pry bar midway up side of glazing, try to pop sill lock and raise window; or break glazing, reach into coach and release locking device by lifting the sill channel upward and manually pulling the entire window assembly outward

Allow emergency forces to gain access to interior, allow ambulatory passengers to escape, allow emergency forces to remove injured passengers on stretchers and backboards

Windows cannot be opened easily from outside; glazing breakage very probable with potential injury to passengers, windows require lubrication and cycling to remain openable, drains must be appropriate to prevent cold weather freezing of window assembly and/or corrosion; windows will not automatically stay open, sliding windows are difficult to open in warm weather

GMC (TMC) RTS

Along both sides of coach

Solid windows and split windows very difficult to pry open from outside without breaking

Insert pry bar midway up side of glazing, and try to pop sill lock, or slide split windows open or break glazing, then reach into coach and release locking device by pulling the panel using both hands positioned at black latches up and toward the center of the coach and manually pull entire window assembly outward

Allow emergency forces to gain access to interior, allow ambulatory passengers to escape, allow emergency forces to remove injured passengers on stretchers and backboards

Windows cannot be opened from outside; glazing breakage very probable with potential injury to passengers; windows require lubrication and cycling to remain openable; drains must be appropriate to prevent cold weather freezing of window assembly and/or corrosion; windows will not automatically stay open; windows adjacent to side doors cannot be used (blocked) if side doors are open


TABLE 2-11. SAFETY DEVICE: PASSENGER SIDE WINDOWS (CONTINUED)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Gillig Phantom

Along both sides of coach

Yes if window is unlocked; may be difficult to pry open without breaking

Insert pry bar midway up side of glazing and try to pop sill locks; or slide window open or break glazing, then reach into coach and release locking device by pulling red emergency open handle downward and manually pulling window assembly outward

Allow emergency forces to gain access to interior, allow ambulatory passengers to escape, allow emergency forces to remove injured passengers on stretchers and backboards

Windows cannot be opened easily from outside, glazing breakage very probable with age with potential injury to passengers; windows require lubrication and cycling to remain openable; drains must be appropriate to prevent cold weather freezing of window assembly and/or corrosion, windows will not automatically stay open

Ikarus USA Articulated

Large windows along both sides of coach

Lower windows very difficult to pry open from outside without breaking

Insert pry bar midway up side of glazing and try to pop sill locks; or break glazing, reach into coach and release locking device by pull-ing red emergency handle down-ward and manually pulling window assembly outward

Allow emergency forces to gain access to interior, allow ambulatory passengers to escape, allow emergency forces to remove injured passengers on stretchers and backboards

Windows cannot be opened easily from outside; glazing breakage very probable with potential injury to passengers; windows require lubrication and cycling to remain openable; drains must be appropriate to prevent cold weather freezing of window assembly and/or corrosion; windows will not automatically stay open; lower/larger windows are hooked to their frame at top and may come unhooked if forced above horizontal position, windows can fall if rescuers assume they are hinged, significant injuries could result


TABLE 2-11. SAFETY DEVICE: PASSENGER SIDE WINDOWS (CONTINUED)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Neoplan USA

Along both sides of coach except for first window behind front door and first window behind opera-tor's position

Very difficult to pry open from outside without breaking

Insert pry bar between window and frame midway up side of glazing and try to pop lock; or break glazing, then reach into coach and release locking device by pulling red emergency open handle downward and manually pulling window assembly outward

Allow emergency forces to gain access to interior, allow ambulatory passengers to escape, allow emergency forces to remove injured passengers on stretchers and backboards

Windows cannot be opened easily from outside; glazing breakage very probable with potential injury to passengers, windows require lubrication and cycling to remain openable, drains must be appropriate to prevent cold weather freezing of window assembly and/or corrosion; windows will not automatically stay open; windows adjacent to side doors cannot be used (blocked) if side doors are open; rear side doors can be used to hold open previously opened adjacent windows but actions causing doors to close could result in windows falling on rescuers or passengers, windows are hooked to their frame at top and can be unhooked by raising the window slightly above horizontal position windows can fall if rescuers assume they are hinged, significant injuries could result

TABLE 2-11. SAFETY DEVICE: PASSENGER SIDE WINDOWS (CONTINUED)
URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODEL* LOCATION ACCESSIBLE FROM OUTSIDE OF COACH EMERGENCY USE FUNCTION VEHICLE SPECIFIC SAFETY PROBLEM

Orion

Fourth window from front on left side of coach

Window very difficult to pry open from outside without breaking. Block inserted in top of frame & held with screw prevents fully sliding window open, which would be wide enough for entry through any passenger window

Insert pry bar midway up side of glazing and try to pop sill locks; or break glazing, then reach into coach and release locking device by pulling red emergency open handle downward and manually pulling window assembly outward

Allow emergency forces to gain access to interior, allow ambulatory passengers to escape, allow emergency forces to remove injured passengers on stretchers and backboards

Window cannot be opened easily from outside, glazing breakage very probable with potential injury to passengers; windows require lubrication and cycling to remain openable; drains must be appropriate to prevent cold weather freezing of window assembly and/or corro-sion; window will not automati-cally stay open; window is hooked to its frame at top and can be unhooked by raising the window slightly above hori-zontal position windows can fall if rescuers assume they are hinged, significant injuries could result, only one window on left side of coach is emergency access, no windows on right open

* Specific bus models tested are detailed in Appendix A

PHOTOGRAPH 2-58
FLXIBLE MODEL:
EMERGENCY RELEASE FOR FULL PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW (INTERIOR)


PHOTOGRAPH 2-59
FLXIBLE MODEL:
EMERGENCY RELEASE FOR SLIDING PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW (INTERIOR)


PHOTOGRAPH 2-60
GMC RTS MODEL:
USE OF EMERGENCY PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW


PHOTOGRAPH 2-61
GILLIG PHANTOM MODEL:
USE OF EMERGENCY RELEASE FOR EMERGENCY PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW


HOTOGRAPH 2-62
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
USE OF EMERGENCY RELEASE FOR EMERGENCY PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW


PHOTOGRAPH 2-63
IKARUS USA ARTICULATED MODEL:
EXTERIOR VIEW OF EMERGENCY PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW AND
RELEASE RETURN MECHANISM


PHOTOGRAPH 2-64
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
USE OF EMERGENCY PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW


PHOTOGRAPH 2-65
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
HOOK ASSEMBLY ON PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW AND FRAME


PHOTOGRAPH 2-66
NEOPLAN USA MODEL:
USE OF REAR DOOR TO HOLD OPEN PASSENGER SIDE WINDOWS


PHOTOGRAPH 2-67
ORION MODEL:
SINGLE EMERGENCY PASSENGER SIDE WINDOW

3. STANDARD EMERGENCY SAFETY COMPONENTS: DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

3.1 THE GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

In the Summer of 1991, the availability, location, and use of the original 11 key safety components were documented in the KETRON Technical Discussion. At the same time, the Cambria County Transit Authority and KETRON organized an inter-industry Guidelines Development Committee to assist in assessing the currently available components. By contributing expertise and experience the Committee developed suggestions on how the key safety components might be standardized. By design, the comprehensive Committee represented vehicle manufacturers, engine suppliers, maintenance managers, transit authorities, emergency response forces, parts suppliers, advocates, and government. Major representation on the Committee is shown in Figure 3-1.

Vehicle manufacturers were represented by Flxible Corporation, Greyhound Canada, Ikarus USA, Neoplan USA, Ontario Bus Industries, and Transportation Manufacturing Corporation. The Detroit Diesel Corporation represented engine suppliers. The American Public Transit Association (APTA) represented advocates. Maintenance management professionals were included from CCTA, the Port Authority of Allegheny County (PAT), and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). End-users included the Altoona Bus Testing Facility, CCTA, the National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians, the Philadelphia Fire Department, and the Pittsburgh Police Department. Representation from the government included members from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center.

A Window Subcommittee was later formed which included representation from Beclawat, Commercial Plastics & Supply, Ellcon-National, Excel Industries, G.E. Plastics, Hehr International, J.T. Nelson, R.E. Jackson, and Storm-Tite.

The specific membership of the Original Guidelines Development Committee is summarized in Table 3-1. In addition, Gillig Corporation, New Flyer Industries, Cummins Engine Corporation, various transit authorities, assorted suppliers, and a number of other significant organizations were made aware of the project and were involved indirectly. These associate members and interested parties are shown in Table 3-2. Many other companies were contacted during research phases.

FIGURE 3-1. GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

TABLE 3-1. ORIGINAL GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE MEMBERS

BUS MANUFACTURERS

  • Flxible Corporation
  • Neoplan USA Corporation
  • Greyhound Canada, Inc.
  • Ontario Bus Industries
  • Ikarus USA, Inc.
  • Transportation Manufacturing Corp.

ENGINE SUPPLIERS

  • Detroit Diesel Corporation

ADVOCATES

  • American Public Transit Association
  • KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation

MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS

  • Cambria County Transit Authority
  • Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
  • Port Authority of Allegheny County

END-USERS

  • Altoona Bus Testing Facility
  • Philadelphia Fire Department
  • Cambria County Transit Authority
  • Pittsburgh Police Department
  • National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians

GOVERNMENT

  • Federal Transit Administration
  • Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

WINDOW SUBCOMMITTEE

  • Beclawat Division of Autosystems Manufacturing, Inc.
  • G.E. Plastics
  • Hehr International, Inc.
  • Commercial Plastics & Supply Corp.
  • R.E. Jackson Company, Inc.
  • Ellcon - National, Inc.
  • J.T. Nelson Company, Inc.
  • Excel Industries, Inc.
  • Storm-Tite, Inc.
TABLE 3-2. ASSOCIATE MEMBERS AND INTERESTED PARTIES

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS AND INTERESTED PARTIES

  • APTA Bus Safety Committee Members
  • Lehigh & Northampton Transportation Authority
  • Cummins Engine Company, Inc.
  • Fire Protection Publications
  • Letter-Rite, Inc.
  • Fire Safety Displays Co.
  • Mutual Industries, Inc.
  • FMC Corporation
  • Naudain Associates, Inc.
  • Gillig Corporation
  • New Flyer Industries Limited
  • Jackson-Hirish, Inc.
  • Sikora Sign Company
  • County of Lackawanna Transit
  • Transpec, Inc.

3.2 PROCESS

On August 21 and 22, 1991, the inter-industry Guidelines Development Committee met at APTA headquarters to introduce the project to the APTA Bus Safety Committee and to discuss the eleven safety components with the goal of standardizing their location, accessibility, labeling, use, and function. The text, tables, and photographs represented in the previous section served as the basis of discussion at those meetings, along with two slideshow presentations.3

Participation at the August meetings was enthusiastic. The Guidelines Development Committee immediately recognized a number of areas where components were well designed and fairly close to being standardized. The Committee discerned that other components required specific improvements before they could be standardized. The consultant, KETRON, was charged with the tasks of solidifying the Committee's recommendations for standardization and improvement, further researching possibilities for necessary design improvements, and drafting guidelines for each of the components to be standardized.

Based on the results of the August meeting, KETRON began, in September, the task of researching options and writing the recommended detailed guidelines. By December, over a hundred organizations and sources had been consulted for detailed information on components.

On January 7, 1992, several emergency response members of the Guidelines Development Committee that were unable to participate in the August meeting met with KETRON professionals in Malvern, Pennsylvania. The then current guidelines for each component were supplemented with the very practical concerns of rescue forces on the scene of an accident. This meeting was essential to ensure an adequate level of input from the emergency response industry.

The Guidelines Development Committee had determined in August that developing an acceptable, significantly improved, standard for emergency windows was probably beyond the scope of this effort, yet current concerns needed to be addressed. Consequently a Window Subcommittee was formed. This group, made up of the major transit window and frame manufacturers, met on January 9th in KETRON's Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office, to discuss possible improvements for emergency window standards. A number of possibilities were discussed and the most necessary and feasible were incorporated into the guidelines. The Subcommittee also concluded that significant additional research and development was required.

During January and February, 1992, KETRON finished draft guidelines synthesized from the results of all three meetings and information from additional research. On March 26, 1992 a meeting was conducted with members of the Guidelines Development Committee and Window Subcommittee in Philadelphia to discuss the draft guidelines.

KETRON then revised the guidelines by addressing the comments made by Committee members. These finalized guidelines were presented on May 18th at the 1992 APTA Bus Safety and Technology Conference in Charlotte, NC,4 which several members of the Guidelines Development Committee attended. On September 11, 1992 KETRON and representatives from the Committee met with FTA in Washington, DC to discuss the project itself. It was concluded that the project had made significant advances toward improved and standardized urban transit bus safety equipment. KETRON was pleased to have candid and cooperative input from all members of the Guidelines Development Committee, Window Subcommittee, and the participating industries; their assistance directly contributed to urban transit bus safety.

One of the conclusions from this meeting was that the research work should continue. In the fall of 1993, contractual arrangements were put in place between CCTA and KETRON and between VNTSC and KETRON.

In the subsequent activities a new Guidelines Development Committee was created. All original Members along with additional relevant professionals were invited to participate using the letter shown in Exhibit 3-1, dated May 23, 1994. It was also decided that the current Members of the APTA Bus Safety Committee should be invited to review the Guidelines. On May 19, 1994, a letter was sent to APTA Bus Safety Committee members inviting them to review the Guidelines (Exhibit 3-3), followed by a second letter dated August 1, 1994. (Exhibit 3-4).

Twenty-one Members responded using KETRON's Evaluation Form. The results were tabulated.5 In summary, for all 10 safety components at least 12 of 21 APTA Safety Committee respondents agreed with the specific Guidelines as written. For the driver's side window, 18 members agreed with the Guidelines as written. For the master door release control and roof-mounted emergency ingress and escape hatches, 17 agreed. For the master run switch 16 agreed. The Guidelines for the front side door release control and the passenger side windows had 14 agrees. For the electrical (batteries) switch 13 agreed. Lastly, for the emergency engine stop switch, the rear side door release control, and the universal emergency shut-down switch, 12 agreed.

In several cases, those who disagreed with the specific Guidelines offered comments which were considered by KETRON and discussed by the Guidelines Development Committee during a meeting on October 12, 1994 in Philadelphia. The Committee generated some changes to the Guidelines and decided to delete some safety components from further consideration. Use of the driver's side window for ingress and egress was considered redundant to other locations on the buses. The master door release control in or near the operator's area was also considered to be redundant in location. Lastly, the universal emergency shut down switch conceptually identified by the original Guidelines Development Committee was deleted from further consideration. With the depression of one mushroom switch, its functionality was to shut down the engine, remove electrical power supplied by the batteries, release (but not open the doors), and place the transmission in park. Although considered to be an excellent idea, it would require the reversing of some of the current design logic on the buses. In addition, development of a detailed set of Guidelines was considered beyond the monetary and technical scope of the current contract.

KETRON consequently revised the remaining eight Guidelines6 to reflect the direction of the Guidelines Development Committee and distributed them to the APTA Safety Committee members for evaluation on November 11, 1994 (Exhibit 3.5). Fourteen members responded. At least 8 of the 14 respondents agreed with all of the then current Guidelines as written. For the Roof-mounted Emergency Ingress and Escape Hatches, 11 Members agreed with the Guidelines as written. For the Master Run Switch and the Electrical (Batteries) Switch, 10 agreed. For the Emergency Engine Shutdown Switch in the Engine Compartment, 9 agreed. Lastly, 8 agreed on the Driver's Side Window, the Front Side Door Release Control, the Rear Side Door Release Control, and the Passenger Side Windows.

A combination of 28 APTA Safety Committee Members reviewed and responded with evaluations of the first and second set of draft guidelines.

One basic philosophical issue developed during this iterative process which makes it difficult to standardize the Guidelines. One of the major tenets of this research effort was to develop Guidelines which when adopted, will maximize accessibility of emergency response forces to all safety components without the need to seriously damage or destroy any parts of urban transit buses. Some APTA safety professionals believe that this approach will lead to vandalism and as such, suggests that key lock approaches are more appropriate.

This issue, along with the evaluations of the APTA Safety Committee Members, was addressed on December 14, 1994 in Philadelphia at a meeting of the Guidelines Development Committee membership. The Committee used two documents in its deliberations: the APTA Bus Safety Committee Comments7 and the revised proposed guidelines8. The Guidelines presented in Section 4 of this Final Report clearly reflect the understanding, comments, discussions, and evaluations of the Guidelines Development Committee, the APTA Safety Committee, and KETRON professionals.


3Balog, J. N, and Gribbon, R. B Presentation Bus Safety Standardization. KETRON, August 21, 1991, and Balog, J.N., Gribbon, R. B., and Schwarz, A. N. Bus Safety Standardization Guidelines Development Committee Meeting slideshow. KETRON, August 21-22, 1991.

4Balog J.N. and Gribbon R. B., Minimizing Your Risks and Reducing Accident Cost: Proposed FTA Guidelines for Bus Safety Equipment Standardization, KETRON/APTA Information Center, May 18, 1992.

5Balog, John N., "Bus Safety Standardization Program: APTA Safety Committee Evaluation Summary of Guidelines," KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation, Malvern, PA, BSP-JNB-94-234, August 30, 1994.

6Balog, John N., "Proposed Guidelines for Bus Safety Equipment Standardization," KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation, Malvern, PA, BSP-JNB-94-255, November 11, 1994.

7Balog, John N., "Bus Safety Standardization Program: APTA Safety Committee Evaluation Summary of Revised Guidelines," KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation, Malvern, PA, BSP-JNB-94-356, Decembers, 1994.

8Balog, John N., "Proposed Guidelines for Bus Safety Equipment Standardization," KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation, Malve


rn. PA. BSP-JNB-94-255, November 11, 1994.

3.3 THE GUIDELINES

In the development of guidelines, a number of important concerns had to be integrated in order to form comprehensive requirements. The following paragraphs describe these concerns.

The guidelines for urban transit bus components were developed with one overriding concern: safety. Of similar importance was the component's ease of use by untrained emergency response personnel. A number of additional goals were nearly equally important. The Guidelines were ultimately written with the following priorities.

Identifying Features

In recognition of the first four priorities, significant space is devoted to describing the identifying features of each component. In general, emergency controls are described so as to be clearly distinguishable from normal controls. Each is a clearly distinguishable shape, standardly located, and red, with red on white emergency instructions. Also, a newly designed universal access symbol was developed by KETRON to identify each component which is accessible from the outside for arriving emergency forces. One significant problem discovered early in the project during field inspections was that good identification and instruction labeling was often found in a deteriorated condition. Consequently, guidelines for the durability of markings are also included.

Accessibility

Significant efforts were made to make each component operable from outside the vehicle by emergency personnel, and from inside as appropriate. This was essential to the goals of the project.

Use

In descriptions of the actual use of each component, existing reasonable methods generally prevailed, with standardization of the main thrust. Where a clear standard did not exist, the usage most often employed (if reasonable) was selected as standard. The use of up for on and down for off, and similar generally accepted standards were incorporated as much as possible. In addition, consideration was given to the need to be able to operate the devices with typical rescue equipment worn.

Existing Versus Improved Components

Many of the paragraphs herein describe, in detail, the aspects of existing, common reasonable components so that standardization may be achieved and maintained. In other cases, however, wholly acceptable standards did not exist for the component or certain aspects of the component. In these cases, an improved standard was developed based on the priorities described above, discussions on feasibility with vehicle manufacturers, and research with component suppliers.

3.4 APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES

An issue that did not become apparent until the Committee had met a second time was that the specificity and degree of improvement of the Guidelines suggested for implementation would be influenced by how they were to be applied. Very few details could be included if the standards were to be suggested for retrofitting all U.S. vehicles. Conversely, significant and detailed improvements in safety components to meet all the needs of evacuation and emergency response would require significant research and development efforts which are beyond the scope of this project.

It was determined that significant standardization through retrofits was financially prohibitive and, even if possible, could leave the industry with standard yet less than perfect equipment. The aim of these guidelines is to standardize urban transit buses to be acquired. Fleet managers may, however, carefully select specific guidelines to apply to existing vehicles to increase overall safety in emergency situations.

It was also necessary to determine whether guidelines should be immediately implementable or would be a standard that involved significant improvements to existing designs and components. Ultimately this was determined by the needs of each component. The safety problems associated with emergency windows require significant amounts of research and development. The Master Run Switch concept, on the other hand, has few safety problems and is nearly standard with regard to some aspects; in order to both provide a usable device for emergency rescue forces and standardize the component, outside accessibility and a change in its size was required. Concepts that would require significant research and development but would contribute only slight improvements to the industry were generally omitted.

3.5 COMPONENTS ADDRESSED

At the project start, eleven components were targeted for standardization. Two of these, discussed below, were determined to be obsolete by the first Guidelines Development Committee, and guidelines for a standard were not pursued for these components. It was also determined by the first Guidelines Development Committee that a new component which combined the features of others should be added. This new component, the Universal Emergency Shut Down Switch, is also discussed below.

Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger

Four of the bus models studied were equipped with an emergency Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger. This feature, located on the engine itself, was designed for emergency use to stop runaway diesel engines by releasing the cam on the air choke valve and depriving the engine of air. The feature had some inherent safety problems, but most newer, electronically controlled engines do not need this device, as any interruption of power supply should shut down the engine. The plunger was determined to be obsolete and inappropriate for standardization.

Emergency Stop Switch

This switch, located in the driver's compartment, remotely activates the Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger on the engine, releasing the cam on the air choke valve and shutting down the engine. As electronically controlled engines make the Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger essentially obsolete, this remote device was also considered to be inappropriate for standardization and was not pursued any further.

Universal Emergency Shut-Down Switch

At the first meeting of the Guidelines Development Committee and at the introduction of the project to the APTA Bus Safety Committee at APTA headquarters on August 21st and 22nd (1992), there was significant discussion in favor of a single device that would accomplish the necessary functions relating to all emergency safety components. Functions associated with shutting the bus down seemed to be especially suited to this potential purpose. Releasing the doors would also be an important feature, but evacuation emergency features such as windows and roof hatches would perhaps be more difficult to control remotely. Although a number of locations were discussed, it seemed that the shut-down switch should be located with other engine controls in the engine compartment, but should be unique from other engine controls so as to not interfere with the normal maintenance functions. It was determined that the consultant (KETRON) should investigate the possibility of such a device, but that it could not replace standard emergency equipment. Standards for the other emergency components would need to be developed first and as well. The remaining discussion at that time focused on each of the individual components.

The auxiliary meeting of the Guidelines Development Committee in January, 1992, involving the emergency response forces as end-users, revisited this feature. It was seen that a standard and universal device for shutting down the vehicle could clearly enhance the effectiveness of responding emergency forces, reduce the risk to passengers and rescuers after an accident, and decrease the amount of training necessary to provide the emergency response forces the level of proficiency in transit bus components otherwise necessary. KETRON continued to work primarily on the individual components, while incorporating their features into a universal shut-down switch.

In March 1992 the Committee discussed the universal shut-down switch itself and suggested that the most appropriate location for the switch would be in the battery compartment. The details of this discussion were incorporated into the final guidelines approach suggested for a Universal Emergency Shut-Down Switch. The Guidelines were further discussed during meetings of the second Guidelines Development Committee and evaluated by the members of the APTA Safety Committee.

Other Deletions

As mentioned earlier, the Second Guidelines Development Committee decided that the driver's side window for ingress and egress was redundant to other locations on the bus, and that the master door release control in or near the operator's area was redundant in location.

Other Key Emergency Safety Components

The remaining eight components originally studied were felt to be highly appropriate for standardization. KETRON, the Guidelines Development Committee and the APTA Safety Committee devoted significant energies in developing guidelines which may be used for improved, standard components.

The following section presents the detailed suggested guidelines for the standardization of eight key safety components on urban transit buses.

EXHIBIT 3-1. INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE ON GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

BSP-JNB-94-«1»

May 23, 1994

MAILED

« 2»« 3»

« 4»

RE: STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

Dear Mr.« 3»:

In recent years the KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation has provided consulting services to the Cambria County Transit Authority utilizing funding from the Federal Transit Administration and the VOLPE National Transportation Systems Center. The focus of the most recent activities evolve around the development of guidelines for standardization of urban transit bus safety equipment. As a result of previous research and analysis work, it has been determined that it is difficult for emergency preparedness forces arriving on the scene of an urban transit bus accident or emergency to fully understand and utilize the safety components in an efficient and cost effective manner. This is primarily a result of the lack of consistency on how the components operate in addition to a lack of certain functional capabilities. The effect of this inconsistency and unavailability of safety components is intensified because the urban transit bus industry is demonstrably very safe. Since there are relatively few urban transit bus accidents and emergencies in contrast to other highway type vehicles, such as automobiles, to which emergency preparedness forces have to respond, emergency preparedness forces have little opportunity to familiarize themselves with the safety components and characteristics of urban transit buses.

In order to remedy this difficulty, KETRON previously worked with a Guidelines Development Committee made up of individuals representing bus manufacturers, engine suppliers, advocate organizations, maintenance manager professionals, and end-users (including emergency preparedness forces), government officials, window vendors, and numerous other interested parties. The result was a document of draft guidelines entitled, "Standardization of Safety Components on Urban Transit Buses." This document was designed based on the consensus of opinion generated by the active members of the original Guidelines Development Committee. The Federal Transit Administration and the VOLPE National Transportation Systems Center is interested in further pursuing the development and evaluation of the guidelines as a basis to determine what if any steps should be taken.

« 2»« 3»

May 23, 1994

Page 2

As such, we are reconstituting and expanding the Guidelines Development Committee membership. I invite you to become a member of the committee and to participate actively in two meetings expected to occur in Philadelphia to discuss the guidelines. If you would like to become a member of the new Guidelines Development Committee, please fill out Attachment A and return it to me as soon as possible, but no later than June 15, 1994. In the near future, I will provide all active members of the committee a copy of the current version of the guidelines. A meeting date will also be established and made apparent. I encourage you to become a member of the committee and to participate actively. Your views and comments are considered to be extremely important with respect to the approach being taken with the guidelines. If you have any questions regarding the project, feel free to call me or to submit written correspondence.

Thank you very much for taking the time to assist us in this very important process. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

KETRON Division of
The Bionetics Corporation

John N. Balog
Vice President,
Transportation Research, Planning and Operations

JNB/jas

cc: Anne N. Schwarz

Mark Hood
John A. Morrison

Attachment A

BSP-JNB-94-123

ATTACHMENT A
ACCEPTANCE OF MEMBERSHIP ON NEW GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION OF SAFETY COMPONENTS ON URBAN TRANSIT BUSES

Attn: John N. Balog

Vice President
Transportation Research, Planning, and Operations
KETRON, Division of The Bionetics Corporation
350 Technology Drive
Malvern, PA 19355-1370

I understand that it is the intent of the Cambria County Transit Authority and KETRON to further pursue the development of guidelines for the standardization of the type, location, and operation of safety devices on urban transit buses. To these ends, a new Guidelines Development Committee is being established.

In recognition of the importance of such an undertaking, and in the interest of safety and cooperation, I accept a position on the Guidelines Development Committee as a representative of _______________________________________(company). I agree to attend two meetings to contribute to the development of standardization, and am providing you with the following contact information below.

Name

Title

Company

Address

Phone

FAX

Signature Date

CONSULTANT STUDY FUNDED BY FTA & VOLPE TSC

074

Mr. James G. Bolton
Assistant General Manager
Flexible Corporation
970 Pittsburgh Drive
Delaware, OH 43015

075
Mr. Darrell Sykes
Manager, Customer Serv. Div.
Neoplan USA Corporation
700 Auwaerter Drive
Lamar, CO 81052-2298

076
Mr. Eric A Garzon
Sales Engineer
The MCI Classic
Transportation Manufacturing Corp.
C/O Greyhound Canada, Inc. (GCI)
1000 Industrial Blvd.
St. Eustache
Quebec, CANADA J74-5A5

077
Mr. James A. Machesnen
Vice President - Sales & Marketing
Bus Component Suppliers
VAPOR Divison
Mark IV Transportation Products Corp.
6420 West Howard Street
Niles, IL 60714

078
Mr. Carl Brown
Manager
Central Transit Sales
VAPOR Corporation
P.O. Box 98
Glencoe, MO 63038

079
Mr. Rich Himes
Sales & Administration
American Ikarus, Inc.
9430 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Ste. 203
Chatsworth, CA 91311

080
Mr. Peter Bigwood
Vice President, Engineering
Ontario Bus Industries
5395 Maingate Drive
Mississauga, Ontario
CANADA L4W 1G6

081
Mr. Harold Zuschlag
Executive Vice President
Product Integration
Transportation Manufacturing Corp.
P. O. Box 5670, R.I.A.C.
Roswell, NM 88201-5670

082
Mr. D. K. Sheardown
President
Bus Industries of America, Inc.
Base Road, R.D. #1
Oriskany, NY 13424-0449

083
Mr. Craig O. Henriksen
Manager, Application Engineering
Detroit Diesel Corporation

13400 Outer Drive, West
Detroit, MI 81052-2298

084
Mr. Paul J. Lennon
Bus Safety/Bus Operations
American Public Transit Association

1201 New York Ave, NW, Ste. 400
Washington, DC 20005

085
Mr. Dennis Costello
Asst. General Manager-Transportation
APTA Bus Safety Committee
C/O Long Beach Transit Authority
P.O. Box 731
1300 Gardenia Avenue
Long Beach, CA 97801

086
Mr. Douglas E. Greenwood
Director of Maintenance
Cambria County Transit Authority
726 Central Avenue
Johnstown, PA 15902

087
Mr. Daniel A. DiSantis
Maintenance Superintendent
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporatation Authority
Germantown Facility
6725 Germantown Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19140-1597

088
Mr. John C. Martin
Asst. General Superintendent
Port Authority of Allegheny County
2235 Beaver Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 152233

089
Dr. James C. Wambold
Altoona Bus Testing Facility
C/O Penn State University
Research Office Building
University Park, PA 16802

090
Mr. Jonathan Best, Chief
Management Consultant
National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians
C/O 2625 Park Ave., Suite 12N
Bridgeport, CT 06604

091
Mr. Joseph Deal, Captain
Assistant Safety Officer
Philadelphia Fire Department
5200 Pennypack Stret
Philadelphia, PA 19136

092
Mr. William Gasior
General Manager
Cambria County Transit Authority
726 Central Avenue
Johnstown, PA 15902

093
Mr. Ben E. Blankenship, Captain
National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians
723 North Maple Street
North Little Rock, AR 72114

094
Mr. Craig Edwards, Commander
Pittsburgh Police Department
1600 W. Carson Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

095
Ms. Mary Louise Anderson
Project Manager
Federal Transit Administration
Office of Safety, URT-6
400 Seventh Street, SW
Washington, DC 10590

096
Mr. William Hathaway
Transportation Systems Center
Office of Systems Assessment
Safety & Security Division, DTS-65
U.S. Department of Transportation
Kendall Square
Cambridge, MA 02142

097
Mr. John McKenna
Product Manager - Transit Systems
Beclawat Division of Autosystems Manufacturing, Inc.
P. O. Box 1027, 345 University Avenue
Belleville, Ontario
CANADA K8N 5B6

098
Mr. Pete McGevna
Manager, Transit Sales
Ellcon - National, Inc.
50 Beechtree Blvd.
P. O. Box 9377
Greenville, SC 29605

099
Mr. Tim Commons
Marketing Specialist
Security Construction Programs
G. E. Plastics
1 Plastics Avenue
Pittsfield, MA 01201

100
Mr. Robert Watters
Vice President
Commercial Plastics & Supply Corp.

1620 Woodhaven Drive
Bensalem, PA 19020

101
Mr. Michael H. Hurtekant
Sales Manager
Excel Industries, Inc.

1120 North Main Street
P.O. Box 3118 Elkhart, IN 56515-3118

102
Mr. Keith Kroll
Vice President
Product Development - Sales & Marketing
Hehr International, Inc.
3333 Casitas Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90039

103
Mr. Mark A. Clinton
Manager Engineering/Quality Assurance
J. T. Nelson Company, Inc.
4003 Collins Lane
Louisville, KY 40245

104
Mr. Arthur D. Rohl
Vice President, Sales
R. E. Jackson Company, Inc.
53217 Marina Drive
Elkhart, IN 46514-9586

105
Mr. Kurt Koberstein
President Storm-Tite, Inc.
404 Egesz Street
Winnipeg, Manitoba
CANADA R2R 1X5

106
Mr. Christian Hammerskjold
Vice President
USSC Group, Inc.
20 Union Hill Road
West Conshohocken, PA 19428

107
Mr. James J. Farrar
Vice President
Cummins Engine Company, Inc.
Mail Code 60621, Box 3005
Columbus, IN 47202-3005

108
Mr. Brian Macleod
Vice President, Marketing
Gillig Corporation
25800 Clawiter Road
Box 3008
Hayward, CA 94540-3008

109
Mr. David Stanbury
Manager, Engineering
New Flyer Industries Limited
600 Pandora Avenue, W
P.O. Box 245, Transcona Post Office
Winnipeg, Manitoba
CANADA R2C 3T4

110
Mr. Robert Dejaifee
Manager
Altoona Bus Testing Facility
6th Avenue & 45th Street
Altoona, PA 16602

111
Mr. Ronald Lamparton
President
Transpec, Inc.
575 Robbins Drive
Troy, MI 48083-4554

112
Mr. James Parks
Safety & Training Officer
Cambria County Transit Authority
726 Central Avenue
Johnstown, PA 15902

113
Mr. Albert O. Hughes
FMC Corporation
1205 Coleman Avenue
Box 580
Santa Clara, CA 95052

114
Mr. Armando Greco
Lehigh & Northampton Transportation Authority
12th & Cumberland Streets
Allentown, PA 18103-3989

115
Mr. Dan Forester
Mutual Industries, Inc.
707 West Grange Street
Philadelphia, PA 19120

116
Mr. Colin Holmes
Assistant Executive Director
County of Lackawanna Transit Services
North South Road
Scranton, PA 18504

117
Mr. David Cox
Fire Safety Displays Company
20422 Van Born Road
Dearborn Heights, MI 48125

118
Mr. Transportation Supervisor
Jackson-Hirsh, Inc.
700 Anthony Trail
Northbrook, IL 60062-2542

119
Mr. Russel C. Brewer
President Letter-Rite, Inc.
9000 West King Street
Franklin Park, IL 60131

120
Mr. Daniel Sikora
Sikora Sign Company
1038 Clara Road
Crosby, TX 77532

121
Mr. Jack Soppelsa
President
Sun Art Decals, Inc.
6837 Pearl Road
Cleveland, OH 44130

122
Mr. O. Calavincenzo
Manager, Vehicle Tech Office
Admin. of Trans.
1201 Wilson Blvd.
3rd Floor
Central Office
Downs View, Ontario
CANADA M3M 1J8

EXHIBIT 3-2. INVITATION TO APTA BUS SAFETY COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

BSP-JNB-94-«1»

May 19, 1994

« 2»« 3»« 4»

« 5»

RE: GUIDELINES FOR BUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION

Dear Mr.« 3»:

In recent years, the KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation has provided consulting resources to the Cambria County Transit Authority. The focus of the most recent activity evolves around the development of Guidelines for Standardization of Urban Transit Bus Safety Equipment. The current project is based on the fact that it is difficult for emergency preparedness forces arriving on the scene of an urban transit bus accident or emergency to fully understand and utilize the safety components in an efficient and cost-effective manner. This results from a lack of consistency on how the components operate and a lack of certain functional capabilities. The effect of this inconsistency and unavailability of safety components is intensified because the urban transit bus industry is demonstrably very safe. Since there are relatively few urban transit bus accidents and emergencies in contrast to other highway type vehicles, such as, automobiles, to which emergency preparedness forces have to respond, emergency preparedness forces have little opportunity to familiarize themselves with the safety components and characteristics of urban transit buses.

In order to remedy this difficulty, KETRON established a Guidelines Development Committee made up of individuals representing bus manufacturers, engine suppliers, advocate organizations, maintenance management professionals, end-users (including emergency preparedness forces), government officials, window vendors, and numerous other interested parties.

An interim meeting was conducted on August 21 and 22, 1991 at APTA Headquarters to introduce the project to the APTA Bus Safety Committee. Additional meetings were conducted with the Guidelines Development Committee to discuss the proposed guidelines and to revise them to reflect the consensus of the various participating professionals.

« 2»« 3»

May 19, 1994

Page 2

As a current member of APTA's Bus Safety Committee, KETRON is interested in learning of your views and reactions to the current guidelines. Consequently, please find enclosed a summary copy of the guidelines. Please review them as soon as possible and fill out the attached Evaluation Form and return to me no later than June 20, 1994. Your comments will be utilized to determine what, if any, modifications should be made to the guidelines prior to convening a follow-up meeting with the Guidelines Development Committee in Philadelphia. Your views and comments are considered to be extremely important with respect to the approach being taken with the guidelines. The results of the guidelines development process will be provided to the Federal Transit Administration for their consideration. It is our understanding that FTA is interested in the consensus of opinion developed and presented by the APTA Safety Committee.

If you would like to become a member of the Guidelines Development Committee, you are certainly welcome and need only to advise me of your interest.

If you have any questions regarding the project, or the current version of the guidelines, feel free to call me or to submit additional written correspondence. Thank you very much for taking the time to assist us in this process. As a member of the APTA Bus Safety Committee, your expertise and opinions are valued. I will keep you informed of the results of the study.

Sincerely,

KETRON Division of
The Bionetics Corporation

John N. Balog
Vice President
Transportation Research, Planning and Operations

JNB/ns

cc: Paul Lennon, APTA

Dennis Costello, Chairman

BSP-JNB-94-070

May 19, 1994

EVALUATION FORM [sample]

COMMENTS ON BUS SAFETY STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES

COMMENTOR:

TITLE:

ORGANIZATION:

ADDRESS:

TELEPHONE: (__)

(__)

FAX: (__)

(__)

Safety Components Agree With As Written Disagree With As Written Suggested Revisions

1. Master Run Switch

2. Driver's Side Window

3. Emergency Engine Stop Switch in Engine Compartment

4. Master Door Release Control

5. Front Side Door Release Control

6. Rear Side Door Release Control

7. Electrical (Batteries) Switch

8. Roof-Mounted Emergency Ingress and Escape Hatches

9. Passenger Side Windows

10. Universal Emergency Shut Down Switch

PLEASE FORWARD YOUR RESPONSE TO:

John N. Balog, Vice President

Transportation Research, Planning & Operations

KETRON Division of

The Bionetics Corporation

350 Technology Drive

Malvern, PA 19355-137

125

Mr. Dennis M. Costello, Chairman

APTA Bus Safety Steering Committee

Assistant General Manager,

Transportation

Long Beach Transit

1300 Gardenia Avenue

P.O. Box 731

Long Beach, CA 90801

126

Mr. Paul J. Lennon, Staff Advisor

Chief Safety Officer and Administrator -

Safety Audit Programs

American Public Transit Association

1201 New York Avenue, NY

Washington, DC 20005

127

Ms. Barbara Y. Anderson

Director, Risk Management Operations

Los Angeles County Metropolitan

Transportation Authority

425 S. Main Street, Annex E

Los Angeles, CA 90013

128

Mr. Gordon A. Aoyagi

Chief, Division of Transit Services

Montgomery County Transit Services

110 North Washington St.- Suite 200

Rockville, MD 20850

129

Mr. Vernon Clarke

General Superintendent of Transportation

(Metrobus)

Metro-Dade Transit Agency

3300 N.W. 32nd Avenue, 2nd Floor

Miami, FL 33152-0887

130

Mr. Marvin Compton, V.P.

National Safety Manager

ATE Management & Service Company, Inc.

Dixie Terminal Building

49 East Fourth St., Suite 700

Cincinnati, OH 45202

131

Mr. William J. Gasior, General Manager

Cambria County Transit Authority

726 Central Avenue

Johnstown, PA 15902-2996

132

Mr. Jim Gigantino

Assistant General Manager for

Safety and Training

NJ Transit Bus Operations Inc.

180 Boyden Avenue

Maplewood, NJ 07040

133

Mr. Napoleon Jones

Safety and Training Supervisor

Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority

2251 26th Street, N.E.

Washington, DC 20001

134

Mr. Paul E. Kaufmann

Manager of Technical Support

New Jersey Transit Corporation

(NJ Transit)

One Penn Plaza East

Newark, NJ 07105-2246

135

Mr. Robert D. Lorah, General Manager

Connecticut Transit

100 Leibert Road

P. O. Box 66

Hartford, CT 06141-0066

136

Mr. Daniel D. Morrill, President

Midwest Bus Corporation

1940 West Stewart Street

P.O. Box 787

Owosso, MI 48867-0787

137

Mr. Frank E. O'Dowd, General Manager

System Safety & Environmental Affairs

Chicago Transit Authority

Apparel Center, Room S2-111

350 North Orleans

Chicago, IL 60654-0555

138

Mr. John Shoemaker

Maintenance Analyst, Quality Assurance

Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority

2250 26th Street, NE

Washington, DC 20018

139

Ms. Sandra Surretsky

Performance Analyst

New Jersey Transit Corporation

(NJ Transit)

One Penn Plaza East

Newark, NJ 07105-2246

140

Mr. Stephen J. Walsh

Section Manager, Field Operations

Orange County Transportation Authority

Orange County Transit District

550 South Main Street

P.O. Box 14184

Orange, CA 92613-1584

141

Mr. Vern Barela, Director

Sun Tran of Albuquerque

601 Yale Boulevard, S.E.

Albuquerque, NM 87106-5199

142

Mr. Adrian Gaines

Purchasing Agent

Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit

Authority d.b.a. Metro Area Express (MAX)

P. O. Box 10212

Birmingham, AL 35202-0212

143

Mr. James W. Holland, General Manager

Gary Public Transportation Corporation

Administrative Office

100 West 4th Avenue

P. 0. Box M 857

Gary, IN 46401-0857

144

Mr. Theo Janysek

Chief Dispatcher

VIA Metropolitan Transit

800 West Myrtle Stret

P.O. Box 12489

San Antonio, TX 78212

145

Mr. Elias Mosqueda

Manager, Operations Training

San Mateo County Transit

District (samTrans)

1250 San Carlos Avenue

P. 0. Box 3006

San Carlos, CA 94070-1306

146

Mr. James F. O'Neil, Jr.

Training Supervisor

Central Ohio Transit Authority

1600 McKinley Avenue

Columbus, OH 43222

147

Mr. Bill Rueschaw

Department Manager, Safety

Pace Suburban Bus Division of RTA

550 West Algonquin Road

Arlington Heights, IL 60005

148

Mr. Alfonso Saunders

Director of Transportation

Greater Richmond Transit Company

101 South Davis Avenue

P. O. Box 27323

Richmond, VA 23261-7323

149

Mr. Charles H. Schoenfeldt

Bus Safety Officer

Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority

600 Fifth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

150

Mr. Anthony Borcic, Manager

Bus Operations Training & Development

Chicago Transit Authority

2660 North Clark

Chicago, IL 60614

151

Mr. Lee O. Camardella

Safety /Training Manager

Snohomish County Public Transportation

Benefit Area Corporation

(dba Community Transit)

1133 164th Street, S.W.

Suite #200

Lynnwood, WA 98037

152

Mr. Homer Clemmons

Administrator of Safety/Training

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid

Transit Authority

277 Laredo Drive

Decatur, GA 30030

153

Mr. Richard J. Daley, Jr.

Manager of Training

Automotive Department

Massachusetts Bay

Transportation Authority

21 Arlington Avenue

Boston, MA 02129

154

Mr. Joseph Dorsey

Assistant Director of Transportation

Operations

Regional Transit Authority

6700 Plaza Drive

New Orleans, LA 70127-2677

155

Mr. Paul Ochoa, Sr.

Manager, Operations Safety

Metropolitan Transit Authority

of Harris County

1201 Louisiana

P.O. Box 61429

Houston, TX 77208-1429

156

Mr. C. Ed Roberts

Training Supervisor

Central Ohio Transit Authority

1600 McKinley Avenue

Columbus, OH 43222

157

Mr. John Seccia

Director, Special Projects

and Administration

New York City Transit

Authority (NYCTA)

Office of the Chief Transit Officer

25 Jamaica Avenue

Brooklyn, NY 11207

158

Mr. Larry Stover

Manager of Transportation

Jacksonville Transportation Authority

100 North Myrtle Avenue

P. O. Drawer "O"

Jacksonville, FL 32203

159

Mr. David Sutton

Superintendent of Operations

City of Detroit Department of

Transportation

1301 East Warren Avenue

Detroit, MI 48207

160

Ms. Vicki Varga

Senior Staff Assistant

Los Angeles County Metropolitan

Transportation Authority

818 West Seventh Street

Los Angeles, CA 90017

161

Ms. Sandra Washington

Instructor, Bus Transportation

Metro-Dade Transit Agency

3300 N.W. 32nd Avenue

Miami, FL 33142

162

Mr. Richard L. Fasy, Director

System Safety

Southeastern Pennsylvania

Transportation Authority (SEPTA)

The Sovereign Building

714 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

163

Mr. David M. Harris

Manager of Transportation

Fort Worth Transportation

Authority (The T)

P. O. Box 1477

Fort Worth, TX 76101 -1477

164

Mr. Andrew E. Morales

Director of Safety

VIA Metropolitan Transit

800 West Myrtle Street

P.O. Box 12489

San Antonio, TX 78212

165

Mr. R. K Rogers

Assistant Director of Maintenance

Quality Assurance

Dallas Area Rapid Transit

1401 Pacific Avenue

P.O. Box 660163

Dallas, TX 75266-0163

166

Mr. Phil Liberto

Manager, Project Liability

Southeastern Pennsylvania

Transportation Authority (SEPTA)

5800 Bustleton Avenue

Philadelphia, PA 19149

167

Mr. Jack Logan, Jr.

Assistant Manager, Field Training

Dallas Area Rapid Transit

1401 Pacific Avenue

P. O. Box 660163

Dallas, TX 75266-0163

168

Mr. Robert H. Torres, Manager

Occupational Health & Safety

Los Angeles County Metropolitan

Transportation Authority

818 West Seventh Street

Los Angeles, CA 90017

169

Mr. Thomas E. Bell

Director of Safety

Greater Richmond Transit Company

101 South Davis Avenue

P. O. Box 27323

Richmond, VA 23261-7323

170

Mr. Thomas D. Boyle

Principal

Thomas D. Boyle

6895 N. Tonty Avenue

Chicago, IL 60646

171

Mr. Terry Compton

Supervisor, Transit Safety

Municipality of Metropolitan

Seattle (Seattle Metro)

11911 East Marginal Way South MS/SA

Seattle, WA 98168

172

Mr. Donald J. Dzinski

Director-Business Development

ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc.

9300 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22031-1207

173

Mr. Fred J. Griffith

Manager, Operations Safety

Southeastern Pennsylvania

Transportation Authority

The Sovereign Building

714 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

174

Mr. William Hudson, Jr.

Interim President/General

Manager/CEO

Memphis Area Transit Authority

1370 Levee Road

Memphis, TN 38108

175

Ms. Lynda Jackson

Risk Manager

Capital Metropolitan Transportation

Authority

2910 East Fifth Street

Austin, TX 78702

176

Mr. Ronald H. Jacob, P.E.

Vice President, Engineering

Safety & Systems Assurance

Consultants, Inc.

P. O. Box 29066

Atlanta, GA 30359

177

Mr. H. Norman Ketola, Vice President

Technology & Management Systems, Inc.

99 South Bedford Street

Suite 211

Burlington, MA 01803-5128

178

Mr. Michael G. Marlatt

Sales Manager-Orion II

Bus Industries of America Inc.

Base Road, R.D. 1

Oriskany, NY 13424-0449

179

Mr. Ronald K. McElhose, Sr.

Risk Manager

Peninsula Transportation District

Commission

3400 Victoria Boulevard

Hampton, VA 23661

180

Mr. John Morals

Director of Transportation

Hillsborough Area Regional

Transit Authority (HART)

4305 East 21st Avenue

Tampa, FL 33605

181

Mr. Russell S. Norman

Safety: Loss Control Administrator

Utah Transit Authority

3600 South 700 West

P.O. Box 30810

Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0810

182

Mr. Stephen C. Oller

Superintendent of Transportation

Riverside Transit Agency

1825 Third Street

Riverside, CA 92507-3484

183

Mr. Nick Panchuk

Director, Safety, Training

and Security

ATE Management and Service

Company, Inc.

315 Continental Avenue

Dallas, TX 75207

184

Mr. Kermit A. Saltus

Chief, Bus. Safety Section

Public Transportation Safety Board

New York State Department

of Transportation

1 Hunters Point Plaza, Rm. 508

47-40 21st Street

Long Island, NY 11101

185

Mr. Gary M. Schulman

Principal

Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc.

523 West Sixth Street

Suite 650

Los Angeles, CA 90014

EXHIBIT 3-3. SECOND INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE ON GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

BSP-JNB-94-«1»

August 1, 1994

MAILED

« 2»« 3»« 4»

« 5»

RE: PREVIOUS LETTER DATED MAY 19, 1994 CONCERNING GUIDELINES FOR BUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION

Dear Mr.«3»:

As a current member of APTA Bus Safety Committee, I previously sent you a copy on May 19, 1994 of a Letter, Evaluation Form, and a Summary copy of the Guidelines. At that time, I requested that you review the Guidelines and send the Evaluation Form in, as soon as possible.

Since Ketron remains very interested in your views and reactions to the current Guidelines, I again requested that you fill out the Evaluation Form and return it to me, as soon as possible and, certainly, no later than August 21, 1994. Your comments are important to us since they will be utilized to determine what, if any modifications, should be made to the Guidelines prior to convening a follow-up meeting with the Guidelines Development Committee in Philadelphia. Your views and comments are considered to be extremely important with respect to the approach being taken with the Guidelines. The results of the Guidelines Development process will be forwarded to the Federal Transit Administration for their consideration. It is our understanding that the FTA is interested in the consensus of opinion developed and presented by the APTA Safety Bus Committee.

If you would like to become a member of the Guidelines Development Committee, you are certainly welcome and need only to advise me of your interest.

« 2»« 3»

August 1, 1994

Page 2

If you have any questions regarding the project, or the current version of the Guidelines, feel free to call me or to submit additional written correspondence. Thank you very much for taking the time to assist us in this process. As a member of the APTA Bus Safety Committee, your expertise and opinions are valued. I will keep you informed of the results of this study.

Sincerely,

KETRON Division

of The Bionetics Corporation

John N. Balog

Vice President

Transportation Research, Planning and Operations

JNB/ns

cc: Paul J. Lennon, APTA

Dennis Costello, Chairman

APTA Bus Safety Committee

Enc.

EXHIBIT 3-4. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR BUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT STANDARDIZATION, NOVEMBER 11, 1994

BSP-JNB-94-255

Revised November 11, 1994

PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR
BUS SAFETY EQUIPMENT
STANDARDIZATION

AUTHORED BY:

SUBMITTED BY:

KETRON DIVISION OF
THE BIONETICS CORPORATION
350 TECHNOLOGY DRIVE
MALVERN, PA 19355
(610)648-9000

ABSTRACT

This document presents proposed Guidelines for the standardization of eight safety components on urban transit buses. These Guidelines were developed to correct problems encountered by rescue forces while attempting to gain entry to, shut down, and evacuate urban transit buses that have been involved in an emergency or accident.

This project, funded by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) through grants to the Cambria County Transit Authority (CCTA), and the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center was based on previous work by KETRON. In response to a specific accident, the FTA had previously funded, through CCTA, the development of emergency and accident procedures training for several popular urban transit bus models. A wide disparity with regard to key safety components was discovered among the bus models. In 1991, under a new contract with CCTA, the KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation documented aspects of eleven safety components on six popular urban transit bus models. In August 1991, an inter-industry Guidelines Development Committee, representing vehicle manufacturers, engine suppliers, the American Public Transit Association (APTA), maintenance managers, transit authorities, emergency response forces, the FTA, bus window suppliers, other vendors, and KETRON, met to discuss how to best standardize the safety components on urban transit buses. The Guidelines generated in 1992 were the result of original research and development efforts by KETRON in concert with input from the Committee. KETRON's contract was then amended in 1993 to solicit comments from members of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) Safety Committee and to again provide opportunities for comment to the urban transit bus industry.

These current Draft Guidelines reflect input from the Safety Committee and the industry and detail standard requirements for the availability, location, identification, use, and function of eight components, including: 1) master run switch; 2) driver's side window; 3) emergency engine stop switch in engine compartment, 4) front side door release control; 5) rear side door release control; 6) electrical (batteries) switch; 7) roof-mounted emergency ingress and escape hatches; and 8) passenger side windows. The Guidelines also present a Universal Access Symbol to identify, to rescue forces, key entry points and emergency devices.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation would like to extend its full appreciation to the Federal Transit Administration, the Cambria County Transit Authority, the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and those individuals who were instrumental in initiating this project and for bringing it to its currently successful status:

Franz K. Gimmler, Former Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety
Federal Transit Administration;

Judy Mead
Federal Transit Administration;

Ronald Kangas
Federal Transit Administration;

Carole Ferguson
Federal Transit Administration;

William Hathaway
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center;

Mary Anderson
Federal Transit Administration;

William J. Gasior, General Manager,
Cambria County Transit Authority;

Harold Jenkins, Former General Manager,
Cambria County Transit Authority; and

Michael Quinn, Former Planner,
Cambria County Transit Authority.

KETRON would also like to thank the following individuals and organizations for their valuable contributions to the guidelines and their generous and informed participation through the two Guidelines Development Committees:

Mary Anderson
Federal Transit Administration;

Chief Jonathan Best
National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians;

Peter Bigwood
Ontario Bus Industries;

Carlton K. Brown
Vapor · Mark IV Industries;

Captain Ben E. Blankenship
National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians;

James G. Bolton
Flxible Corporation;

Stephen C. Cunningham
Culver City Municipal Bus Lines;

Captain Joseph Deal
Philadelphia Fire Department;

Daniel A. DiSantis
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority;

Richard G. Duser
Lehigh & Northampton Transportation Authority;

Commander Craig Edwards
Pittsburgh Police Department;

Eric A. Garzon
Greyhound Canada, Inc.;

Douglas E. Greenwood
Cambria County Transit Authority;

William Hathaway
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
U.S. Department of Transportation;

Craig O. Henrikson
Detroit Diesel Corporation;

James J. Higgins
Philadelphia Fire Department;

Rich Himes
Ikarus USA, Inc.;

Harold Jenkins
Formerly with Cambria County Transit Authority;

Ronald C. Lamparter
Transpec, Inc.;

Paul J. Lennon
American Public Transit Association;

John C. Martin
Port Authority of Allegheny County;

James McDowell
Transportation Manufacturing Corporation;

Lt. David D. Smith
Philadelphia Fire Department;

Darrell Sykes
Neoplan USA Corporation;

Professor James C. Wambold
Altoona Bus Testing Facility; and

David West
Transportation Manufacturing Corp.

KETRON would also like to thank the following individuals and organizations for their valuable contributions to the Guidelines through their participation on the Guidelines Development Window Subcommittees:

Mark A. Clinton
J.T. Nelson Company, Inc.;

Tim Commons
G.E. Plastics;

Tim Costello
Ellcon National, Inc.;

Michael H. Hurtekant
Excel Industries, Inc.;

Kurt Koberstein
Storm-Tite, Inc.;

Keith Kroll
Hehr International, Inc.;

J. Peter McGevna
Ellcon National, Inc.;

John McKenna
Beclawat Division of Autosystems Manufacturing, Inc.;

Arthur D. Rohl
R.E. Jackson Company, Inc.; and

Robert J. Watters
Commercial Plastics & Supply Corp.

To the following APTA Safety Committee Members who took the time to review Draft Guidelines and to provide comments, an appreciative thank you:

Oliver Bellard
Metropolitan Transit Authority;

Frank A. Cecere
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority;

Stephen C. Cunningham
Culver City Municipal Bus Lines;

Homer Clemmons
MARTA;

Joseph Dorsey
Regional Transit Authority;

Peter G. Drake
South Coast Area Trasnit;

Rufus Francis
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority;

Jim Gigantino
New Jersey Transit, Inc.;

Fred Griffith
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority;

Theodore V. Janysek
VIA Metropolitan Transit;

Dave Kirby
Central Contra Costa Transit Authority;

Kenneth Kohagen
City of Yakima;

Elias Mosqueda
SamTrans;

Andres E. Morales
VIA Metropolitan Transit;

Adrian Moy
Tri-Met;

Howard Perry
Birmingham Transit Authority;

Homer G. Phillips
Gary Public Transportation Corporation.

Sharon Porter
Central Contra Costa Transit Authority;

Bill Rueschaw
PACE;

Donald L. Toney
City of Yakima; and

Guy Wright
San Francisco Municipal Railway;

For their enthusiasm in spreading the word and coordinating meetings, KETRON acknowledges with great appreciation:

Stephen C. Cunningham
Culver City Municipal Bus Lines,
APTA Bus Safety Committee Chairman;

Dennis Costello
Former APTA Bus Safety Committee Chairman;

Paul J. Lennon
American Public Transit Association; and

Jerome T. Fair
American Public Transit Association.

For their generous contributions of staff, time, and vehicles for the research behind the initial Technical Discussion, KETRON extends thanks to:

Colin J. Holmes and Dave Sklareski
County of Lackawanna Transit System;

Armando Greco and Bruce L. Sokol
Lehigh and Northampton Transportation Authority; and

John C. Martin
Port Authority of Allegheny County.

For generous input of ideas and information for specific components, KETRON extends thanks to:

Russel C. Brewer
Letter-Rite Inc., Franklin Park, IL;

Dan Forester
Mutual Industries Inc., Philadelphia, PA;

James A. Haigh
Transpec, Inc.;

Albert O. Hughs
FMC Corp., Santa Clara, CA;

Ronald C. Lamparter
Transpec, Inc.;

Frank Reo
Naudain Associates Inc., Marlton, NJ.;

Ed Shannon
Quality Components Incorporated, Southeastern, PA; and

Daniel Sikora
Sikora Sign Co., Crosby, TX.

For maintaining a key interest in the research process, thanks to:

Peter Bigwood
Ontario Bus Industries;

Ben E. Blankenship
National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians;

James G. Bolton
Flexible Corporation;

Russel C. Brewer
Letter-Rite, Inc.

Mark A. Clinton
J. T. Nelson Company, Inc.

Tim Commons
General Electric Company;

Dennis Costello
Long Beach Transit Authority;

David Cox
Fire Safety Displays Company;

Robert Dejaifee
Altoona Bus Testing Facility;

Craig Edwards
Pittsburg Police Department;

James J. Farrar
Cummins Engine Company, Inc.

Dan Forester
Mutual Industries, Inc.;

Eric A. Garzon
Transportation Manufacturing Corporation;

Christian Hammerskjold
USSC Group, Inc.;

Craig O. Henriksen
Detroit Diesel Corporation;

Rich Himes
American Ikarus, Inc.;
Colin Holmes
County of Lackawanna Transit Services;

Albert O. Hughes
FMC Corporation;

Michael H. Hurtekant
Excel Industries;

Kurt Koberstein
Storm-Tite, Inc.;

Brian Macleod
Gillig Corporation;

John C. Martin
Port Authority of Allegheny County;

John McKenna
Beclawat Division of Autosystems Manufacturing, Inc.;

Arthur D. Rohl
R. E. Jackson Company, Inc.;

D. K. Sheardown
Bus Industries of America, Inc.;

David A. Stanbury
New Flyer Industries Limited;

Stephen W. Warren
Connecticut Transit, Hartford Division; and

Robert Watters
Commercial Plastics & Supply Company;

KETRON would also like to acknowledge years of support and hours of contribution to bus safety standardization by:

James Parks, Director of Safety
Cambria County Transit Authority;

Anne N. Schwarz, Senior Paratransit/Transit Specialist
KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation;

Mark M. Hood, Paratransit/Transit Specialist
KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation

John B. Morrison, Senior Paratransit/Transit Specialist
KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation;

Jennifer E. Rlmmer, Paratransit/Transit Specialist
KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation; and

Benjamin Gribbon
Formerly with the KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DESCRIPTION PAGE

INTRODUCTION *

BACKGROUND *

DOCUMENTATION OF AVAILABILITY, LOCATION, AND USE OF KEY SAFETY ITEMS *

GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT PROCESS *

THE GUIDELINES *

SAFETY ITEMS FOR STANDARDIZATION *

APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES *

SECTION 1 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE MASTER RUN SWITCH *

SECTION 2 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE DRIVER'S SIDE WINDOW(S) *

SECTION 3 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT *

SECTION 4 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE FRONT DOOR RELEASE CONTROL *

SECTION 5 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE REAR DOOR RELEASE CONTROL *

SECTION 6 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE ELECTRICAL (BATTERIES) SWITCH *

SECTION 7 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR ROOF-MOUNTED EMERGENCY INGRESS AND ESCAPE HATCHES *

SECTION 8 - STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR PASSENGER WINDOWS *

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - RESOURCES *

APPENDIX B - BIBLIOGRAPHY *

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE DESCRIPTION PAGE

I-1 SAFETY DEVICES TARGETED FOR STANDARDIZATION *

1-1 MASTER RUN SWITCH *

1-2 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

2-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

3-1 LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOOR IN THE CLOSED POSITION *

3-2 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

3-3 LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF ACCESS DOOR TO EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT *

3-4 LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOOR IN THE OPEN POSITION *

3-5 EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AND LABELING *

4-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

5-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

6-1 BATTERIES SWITCH AND LEGEND *

6-2 LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF BATTERIES SWITCH ACCESS DOOR *

6-3 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

7-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

8-1 UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL *

INTRODUCTION

Urban bus transit is extremely safe in the United States. However, this achieved level of success causes significant problems for emergency preparedness forces including fire services, police, ambulance, etc., when they arrive on the scene of an accident or emergency. They have had extremely limited experience dealing with urban transit buses and the various kinds of safety equipment and devices on board. Compounding the problem is widespread inconsistencies among the availability, location, identification, use and function of the safety components associated with the various bus models.

Under a grant from the Federal Transit Administration to the Cambria County Transit Authority (CCTA), and with the financial help of the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, the KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation, with the significant help of the American Public Transit Association (APTA) Safety Committee, the Guidelines Development Committees, the Window Subcommittee, and various suppliers, has developed these draft guidelines for the standardization of key safety components. This document presents these draft guidelines in full.

BACKGROUND

In 1981, the Cambria County Transit Authority (CCTA) experienced a severe accident involving one of its buses. The bus, out of control, was wedged, at speed, between a utility pole and a store front. The forces of impact caused its transmission to slip into reverse while the throttle was fully open. The bus literally tore itself in half and set itself on fire. Arriving emergency forces did not know how to gain access to the interior of the bus or how to turn off the engine.

This accident experience served as the basis for an Urban Mass Transportation Administration grant to develop a set of emergency and accident procedures materials for use as training documents for emergency preparedness forces responding to accidents involving public transit buses. This comprehensive and beneficial course, developed by KETRON while under contract with CCTA, has since been distributed and used to train emergency preparedness forces associated with many transit systems across the nation.9

During the development of the Emergency and Accident Procedures Program, KETRON and CCTA had to carefully identify all relevant safety components and their correct operation for each of the three advanced design bus models encompassed within the program: the Neoplan USA, the General Motors RTS, and the Grumman Flxible. One problem which became quite apparent was the lack of standardization of the type, location, and operation of each of the safety components. This lack of standardization causes potentially significant problems for emergency forces arriving on the scene of an accident.

KETRON has conducted a significant number of simulated emergencies and accidents involving urban transit buses in a number of states including Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and West Virginia. It was clear from these simulation exercises that emergency response personnel are very interested in learning how to gain entry, how to shut down engines, and other rescue information regarding buses. Without specific knowledge their approach tends to be quick-actioned, which often results in significant damage to the coach. Once presented information on the safety components, they generally perform well in gaining entry and disengaging systems without any significant damage. This experience testified to the need for transit authorities and others providing transit services to interact on a regular basis with the emergency preparedness forces in their service area so that maximization of knowledge can be shared.

Standardization of safety equipment needs to be adopted by urban transit bus manufacturers as a goal so that emergency response personnel will be more effective in performing their life saving duties. Consequently, this expanded project, sponsored by CCTA and funded by the Federal Transit Administration and the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, was undertaken to assist the industry in achieving this laudable goal.



9Introduction to Urban Transit Bus Accident Experience: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training (includes slides); Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual for the Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus (includes video tape and slides); Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual for the General Motors Corporation RTS Urban Transit Bus (includes video tape and slides); Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual for the Neoplan USA Corporation Urban Transit Bus (includes video tape and slides); and Instructor's Manual: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training for the Neoplan. GMC/RTS, and Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus, authored by the Project Manager, Mr. John N. Balog, can be obtained from The KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation, 350 Technology Drive, Malvern, PA 19355, (610/648-9000).
DOCUMENTATION OF AVAILABILITY, LOCATION, AND USE OF KEY SAFETY ITEMS

One of the key realizations of the original study for CCTA was that there tended to be a lack of standardization for the location and function of the various safety devices among three of the most common urban transit buses _ the Flxible Corporation, General Motors Corporation RTS (Transportation Manufacturing Corporation), and Neoplan USA Corporation. This sample was broadened by KETRON's study of Ikarus USA articulated, Gillig, and Bus Industries of America Orion urban transit buses. Safety components were also found to vary in these vehicles. These six vehicle types studied comprise over 80% of the urban transit buses operating in the United States:

In July of 1991, safety components for each of these vehicles were documented in the KETRON Technical Discussion: Availability, Location, and Use of Safety Items for Standardization on Urban Transit Buses. This document, which includes discussion, tables, and photographs, served as the basis of discussion at the August, 1991 meeting of the Guidelines Development Committee.

GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

On August 21 and 22, 1991, the inter-industry Guidelines Development Committee met at APTA headquarters to introduce the project to the APTA Bus Safety Committee and to discuss eleven key safety components with the goal of standardizing their location, accessibility, labeling, use, and function.

Based on the results of the August meeting, KETRON began, in September, the task of researching additional options and writing the recommended detailed Guidelines. By December over a hundred organizations and sources had been consulted for detailed information on components.

On January 7, 1992, several emergency response members of the Guidelines Development Committee that were unable to participate in the August meeting met with KETRON professionals in Malvern, Pennsylvania. The then current Guidelines for each component were supplemented with the very practical concerns of rescue forces on the scene of an accident. This meeting was essential to ensure an adequate level of input from the emergency response industry.

The Guidelines Development Committee had determined in August that developing an acceptable standard for emergency windows is difficult since it requires additional research and development funding; yet current concerns needed to be addressed. Consequently a Window Subcommittee was formed. This group, made up of the major transit window and frame manufacturers, met on January 12, 1992 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to discuss possible improvements for an emergency window standard.

During January and February, 1992, KETRON put the finishing touches on draft guidelines synthesized from the results of all three meetings and information from additional research. On March 26, 1992 KETRON conducted a meeting with members of the Guidelines Development Committee and the Window Subcommittee to discuss the draft Guidelines.

KETRON then revised the Guidelines by addressing the comments made by Committee members. The Guidelines at that time represented the culmination of these efforts and were presented at the APTA 1992 Bus Operations and Technology Conference in Charlotte, North Carolina.

More recently, additional limited funding has been made available to KETRON from CCTA and Volpe to further interact with the APTA Bus Safety Committee and the Guidelines Development Committee. Members of the APTA Bus Safety Committee were asked to review and comment on Draft Guidelines sent to them on May 18, 1994. A widely disseminated invitation to join the new Guidelines Development Committee was sent by KETRON on May 23, 1994. A summary of the comments made by 21 APTA Bus Safety Committee respondents was generated on August 31, 1994 and distributed to the members of the current Guidelines Development Committee during a meeting in Philadelphia on October 12, 1994.

The Draft Guidelines reported here reflect input from the APTA Safety Committee membership and members of the current Guidelines Development Committee.

THE GUIDELINES

In the development of the current Guidelines, a number of important concerns had to be integrated in order to form comprehensive requirements. The following paragraphs describe these concerns.

These guidelines for urban transit buses were developed with one overriding concern: safety. Of similar importance was the component's ease of use by untrained emergency response personnel. A number of additional goals were nearly equally important. The guidelines were ultimately established with the following hierarchy of priorities.

  1. Components should provide for the maximum safety of passengers, drivers, and emergency personnel in the event of an accident or emergency.
  2. Components should be easily usable by emergency response personnel wearing full gear, including heavily padded gloves, bunker coats, helmets, and possibly air tanks.
  3. Components should be easy to find and obvious in use so as to be easily used by any individual, especially those without training.
  4. The guidelines for components should be precise and unrefutable as to intent.
  5. Costs, and the potential for damage to the vehicle or the components themselves, should be minimized.
  6. Existing standards and widely recognized commonalties should be used to the maximum extent feasible.
  7. Improvements and innovation in the industry should be encouraged.
  8. The potential for misuse and/or vandalism should be minimized.

In recognition of the first four priorities, significant space is devoted to describing the identifying features of each component. In general, emergency controls are described so as to be clearly distinguishable from normal controls. Each is a clearly distinguishable shape and standardly located, and is red, with red on white emergency instructions. Also, a newly designed universal access symbol was developed to identify each component which is accessible from the outside for arriving emergency forces. One significant problem discovered early in the project during field inspections was that good identification and instruction labeling was often found in a deteriorated condition. Consequently, guidelines for the durability of markings are also included.

Significant efforts were made to make each component operable from outside the vehicle by emergency personnel, and from inside as appropriate. This was essential to the goals of the project.

In descriptions of the actual use of each component, existing methods generally prevailed, with standardization the main thrust. Where no clear standard existed, the usage most often employed was selected as standard. The use of up for on and down for off, and similar standards were incorporated as much as possible.

Many of the paragraphs herein describe, in detail, the aspects of existing, common components so that standardization may be achieved and maintained. In other cases, however, no wholly acceptable standard existed for the component or certain aspects of the component. In these cases, a standard was developed based on the priorities described above, discussions on feasibility with vehicle manufacturers, and research with components suppliers.

SAFETY ITEMS FOR STANDARDIZATION

Initially KETRON identified, with CCTA and representatives of FTA, eleven safety items as strong potential candidates for standardization. The original Guidelines Development Committee as a whole determined two candidate safety items, the Emergency Stop Switch in the operator's compartment and the Engine Stop Solenoid Plunger, to be obsolete. More recently, the current Guidelines Development Committee recommended deletion from the Standardization Guidelines, the Master Door Release Control because of its redundant function. It also recommended the Universal Emergency Shutdown Switch be set aside for now because of the technical issues that need to be resolved and which are beyond the fiscal limitations of the current program. In the future such a device would be located at the batteries compartment and it would, when switched off, shut down the engine, disconnect power from the batteries, release the passenger doors, and engage the parking brake. The remaining eight items continue to be studied to develop standards with respect to location, use, and function:

Each component is indicated in Figure I-1, and one section of this document is devoted to each.

FIGURE I-1. SAFETY DEVICES TARGETED FOR STANDARDIZATION

* Flxible Advanced Design Bus used as surrogate for a generic bus

Appendix A and Appendix B conclude this document with a list of some important resources and a bibliography, for readers seeking additional information.

APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES

An issue that did not become apparent until the original Committee had met a second time was that the specificity and degree of improvement of the Guidelines suggested for implementation would be influenced by how they were to be applied. Very few details could be included if the standards were to be suggested for retrofitting all U.S. vehicles. Conversely, significant and detailed improvements in safety components to meet all the needs of evacuation and emergency response would require significant research and development efforts which are beyond the scope of this project.

It was determined that significant standardization through retrofits was financially prohibitive and, even if possible, could leave the industry with standard yet less than perfect equipment. The aim of these guidelines is to standardize urban transit buses to be acquired. Fleet managers may, however, carefully select specific guidelines to apply to existing vehicles to increase overall safety in emergency situations.

It was also necessary to determine whether guidelines should be immediately implementable or would be a standard that involved significant improvements to existing designs and components. Ultimately this was determined by the needs of each component. The safety problems associated with emergency windows require significant amounts of research and development. The Master Run Switch concept, on the other hand, has few safety problems and is nearly standard with regard to some aspects; in order to both provide a usable device for emergency rescue forces and standardize the component, outside accessibility and a change in its size was required. Concepts that would require significant research and development but would contribute only slight improvements to the industry were generally omitted.

With regard to all safety components, KETRON was pleased to have candid and cooperative input from all the members of both the original and current Guidelines Development Committees, the Window Subcommittees, and members of the American Public Transit Association Safety Committee. Their assistance will directly contribute to urban transit bus safety.

SECTION 1
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE MASTER RUN SWITCH

  1. Each bus shall be equipped with a Master Run Switch.
  2. The Master Run Switch shall be equipped with a fluted cylindrical knob that is at least 3" in diameter at its highest surface. The height of the fluted cylindrical knob shall be at least 1?". See Figure 1-1.
  3. The Master Run Switch Knob (MRSK) shall be located on the driver's left side control panel to the immediate rear of and not more than 6" from the standard and distinctive door control handle. There shall not be any other switch or device between the door control handle and the MRSK. The door control handle shall be closer to the windshield than the MRSK.
  4. The MRSK and its mounting surface shall not be recessed. The top surface of the MRSK shall be at least 1?" above the surface of the control panel.
  5. The MRSK, at its top surface, shall be the largest circular knob on the control panel and be bigger in diameter than any other knob on the control panel.
  6. The MRSK shall be easily reachable by any driver who is safety belted in the operator's seat.
  7. The MRSK shall be colored red and be capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily interior bus washings for at least 12 years.
  8. The MRSK shall be easily reachable, by a person 5'6" tall standing outside and adjacent to the bus with feet flat on the ground, through the driver's left side window.
  9. The MRSK shall be easily operated from outside the bus by a rescue individual wearing heavily padded gloves on his/her hands and shall have at least 3" of clear area around the outer edge of its circumference.
  10. A driver's left side window complying with Section 2 of these Guidelines shall allow access to the MRSK by sliding easily rearward without latching along the track at any point, to create an opening no smaller than 8" high and 10" wide and large enough for the MRSK to be easily operated as described in this section. This window shall be non-locking and openable from outside the bus without breakage.

    FIGURE 1-1. MASTER RUN SWITCH
  11. The universal access symbol shown and described in Figure 1-2 indicating the location of the MRSK shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent to the MRSK.
  12. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  13. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  14. The MRSK shall be capable of fully shutting down the engine by turning with one hand (with and without a heavily padded glove) clockwise to its stop position. It shall also be capable of fully shutting down the engine by turning with one hand (with and without a heavily padded glove) counterclockwise to its stop position. The number of non-stop positions and their functionality shall be dictated by local preference.
  15. The MRSK shall not be capable of turning past either stop position (both full clockwise and full counterclockwise).
  16. The MRSK, in a stop position, shall have the effect of shutting down the engine, regardless of when and with what controls the bus was originally started, and regardless of the status of the transmission selector. The MRSK shall not prevent the effective functioning of other engine shut down devices. The engine shall not start with the MRSK in either the full clockwise or full counterclockwise positions.
  17. When the bus engine is shut down by use of the Emergency Engine Stop Switch in the engine compartment, or any other device, the MRSK or any other device shall not be capable of restarting the bus engine until the engine shut down switch is reset.
  18. Additional local requirements for such equipment as a key switch which prevents starting the engine without a key are allowed but shall not supersede the function of any of the above guidelines.

FIGURE 1-2. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

SECTION 2
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE DRIVER'S SIDE WINDOW(S)

  1. A non-locking window (NLW) to the driver's immediate left shall enable the door control handle, Master Run Switch Knob, Master Door Release Control, and driver's left side window emergency egress release mechanism to be easily seen and be easily reached and operated by a person 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground, outside and adjacent to the bus.
  2. The NLW shall allow outside access to driver's controls by sliding easily rearward without latching along the track at any point, to create an opening no smaller than 8" high and 10" wide and at least large enough to easily operate the door control handle, Master Run Switch Knob, Master Door Release Control, and emergency egress release mechanism from outside the bus. The NLW shall be easily opened from outside the bus without breakage.
  3. The access symbol shown and described in Figure 2-1 shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent to and pointing to the exact location at which the NLW opens.
  4. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washing for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  5. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  6. A driver's window to the driver's immediate left side shall be provided.
  7. The NLW shall be permanently attached, along at least one edge, to the body of the bus to prevent falling while being used in an emergency.
  8. The NLW, when closed, shall prevent the entrance of rain water.

    FIGURE 2-1. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL
  9. The NLW shall fully satisfy and/or exceed all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards including FMVSS 205 and conform to all federal, state, and local regulations.
  10. The NLW shall in all other respects conform to FMVSS 217 (Bus Window Retention and Release), except as superseded by these Guidelines.
  11. The NLW shall be similar in design and operation to Passenger Windows wherever possible.
  12. As a result of local preference, the NLW may be equipped with a keylock, opened only from the outside, as long as local standard operating procedures and operator training require the lock to be in its open position whenever the bus is in service. This local preference option shall not supersede the function of any of the above guidelines.

SECTION 3
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT

  1. Each bus shall be equipped with an Emergency Engine Shutdown (EESD) Switch located in the engine compartment.
  2. The EESD Switch shall be located facing the engine compartment door on the same control box and on the same plane as other engine compartment control switches, but at least 4" from other engine compartment control switches and no more than 6" from them.
  3. The control box shall be located in the upper right quadrant of the engine compartment as viewed by a user facing the engine compartment door from outside the bus. The control box surface exhibiting the EESD Switch shall be located no more than 12" from the engine compartment door.
  4. The control box shall be mounted to a structural member of the bus rather than to the engine, and such that the possibility of damage to the switch by vibration is prevented.
  5. The control box surface, upon which the EESD Switch shall be mounted, shall be bright white and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years.
  6. An access door with an opening no smaller than 8" high and 10" wide shall be placed in the engine compartment door so that when the access door is open, the EESD Switch and use instructions can be easily seen and the EESD Switch easily operated by a rescue individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands while standing with both feet on the ground looking directly through the access door opening. See Figure 3-1.
  7. Under no circumstances shall the access door be covered, blocked, or camouflaged by advertising or any other devices or materials.
  8. The access door shall be non-locking, hinged on one side, and easily opened in a single motion by an individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  9. A rectangular metal guide/tunnel, of the same dimension as the access door opening, shall be permanently attached to the inside of the engine compartment door at the same location as the access door opening and shall extend 6" into the engine compartment.

    FIGURE 3-1. LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOOR IN THE CLOSED POSITION
  10. The universal access symbol shown and described in Figure 3-2, indicating the location of the EESD Switch, shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the outside surface of the access door, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washing for at least 3 years. Such symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other material.
  11. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  12. On the inside surface of the access door shall be placed the legend "EMERGENCY ENGINE STOP SWITCH, PUSH TO STOP ENGINE" in red ½" tall legible capital Helvetica bold letters on a bright white background equal in size to the inside dimension of the access door. The legend and background shall be reflective and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figure 3-3.
  13. The EESD Switch shall be an internally illuminated, maintained, non-spark producing, explosion-preventing, push/pull mushroom button switch with a red lens at least 3" in diameter. On the lens in white capital Helvetica bold letters shall be the legend "PUSH TO STOP ENGINE" in the largest legible type. The EESD Switch lens and legend shall be capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figures 3-4 and 3-5.
  14. The EESD Switch, when pushed in to its off position, shall cause the engine to fully shut down regardless of the setting of any other switch or device on the bus. With the EESD Switch in the off (depressed) position, the engine shall not, under any circumstances, be able to be restarted, regardless of all other devices, functions, and settings. All other engine start and stop controls and devices shall function normally only after the EESD Switch is pulled out fully to its on position.

    FIGURE 3-2. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

    FIGURE 3-3. LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF ACCESS DOOR TO EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT

    FIGURE 3-4. LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOOR IN THE OPEN POSITION

    FIGURE 3-5. EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH AND LABELING
  15. Directly above the EESD Switch on the white surface of the control box shall be the legend "EMERGENCY STOP" in ½" tall clearly legible red capital Helvetica bold letters. The legend shall be reflective and permanently attached to the control box surface and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years.
  16. A single and continuous quarter-inch-wide red line shall surround in a rectangular shape the "EMERGENCY STOP" label and the EESD Switch to clearly distinguish it from non-emergency operating switches, instructions, and indicators. This line shall be permanently attached to the white surface of the control box and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposures, for at least 12 years.
  17. The EESD Switch shall be internally illuminated and the interior illumination shall be activated when the engine is running and shall be extinguished otherwise. The illumination shall be bright enough in all light conditions and environments to immediately attract rescuers' attention upon opening the access door, and to clearly enunciate the message "PUSH TO STOP ENGINE" on the EESD Switch lens.
  18. The EESD Switch shall be sealed to prevent intrusion of dirt, grease, moisture, or any other agent which could degrade or prevent full functionality during revenue service, after an accident, or in an emergency.
  19. The EESD Switch shall be separate in use from all other rear/maintenance engine controls and is not intended to be used in normal maintenance operation. The EESD Switch shall not be combined with any non-emergency engine compartment switches, including, but not limited to, light, control, run, ignition, start, or normal stop switches.
  20. All moving engine parts within 18" of the control box switch panel shall be adequately and completely covered to totally avoid any and all potential for injuries to users of the EESD Switch.
  21. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.

SECTION 4
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE FRONT DOOR RELEASE CONTROL

  1. Bus shall be equipped with one interior and one exterior emergency front door release control located at the front door.
  2. The interior control mechanism shall be positioned adjacent to and rearward of the front door such that it can be easily reached by any person.
  3. The exterior control mechanism shall be located adjacent to and rearward of the front door at a height of at least 8 feet above the ground, and shall be recessed so as to prevent damage and accidental operation by tree branches, signs, or other items along any and all service routes.
  4. Access by a person to the interior control shall be easily achievable by any person through a simple one-step operation that can be accomplished safely using only one heavily padded gloved or ungloved hand. Such access may be:
    1. a cover that is lifted or slid to reveal the control; or
    2. a cover panel grooved for easy breakage, which when broken will reveal the control.
  5. The exterior control shall be easily reached and operated with a fireman's standard pike pole by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus.
  6. The access symbol shown and described in Figure 4-1 indicating the location of the control shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent and pointing to the control.
  7. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washing for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.

    FIGURE 4-1. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL
  8. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  9. User instructions for access to the interior control shall be obvious, simple, concise, and effective. The letters shall be uppercase Helvetica bold, in red on a bright white background. Such instructions shall be located on or immediately adjacent to the actual access component.
  10. The access opening to the interior control shall be of a size and shape such that the control shall be immediately visible and obvious to the user once access is gained.
  11. The interior control shall be easily reached and operated with one hand by any person traveling without an escort, irrespective of age, disability, or any other characteristic who may or may not be wearing heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  12. The exterior control shall be ring-shaped, at least 1½" in radius, and shall be easily operated by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus, by pulling with any hook attached to a standard fireman's pike pole.
  13. The use of the controls shall be each accomplished through a simple one-step operation.
  14. The exterior and interior front door release controls shall be: equipped with a zero speed detection device to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped; and equipped with a brake interlock system to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped.
  15. Both interior and exterior controls shall be red, permanently attached, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment for 12 years.
  16. Instructions for use of the interior control shall be in red on white using red uppercase Helvetica bold letters and shall be obvious, simple, and clearly understandable once access to the control has been gained. Such instructions shall remain legible after access to the control has been gained.
  17. The instructions for use shall be permanently attached and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment for 12 years.
  18. Each door release control, when used in an emergency, shall have the effect of releasing or unlocking the front door so that it can be easily pushed open or closed, regardless of the status of any other valves, switches, or controls. Resetting this control shall have the effect of restoring normal operation to this door subject to other valves, switches, or controls.
  19. The control shall operate as a two-position switch.
  20. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.
  21. Front side door release controls shall be the same in operation as the door release controls located at and for the rear side door.

SECTION 5
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE REAR DOOR RELEASE CONTROL

  1. Bus shall be equipped with one interior and one exterior emergency rear door release control located at the rear door.
  2. The interior control mechanism shall be positioned adjacent to and forward of the rear door such that it can be easily reached by any person traveling without an escort, irrespective of age, disability, or any other characteristic.
  3. The exterior control mechanism shall be located adjacent to and forward of the rear door at a height of at least 8 feet above the ground, and shall be recessed so as to prevent damage and accidental operation by tree branches, signs, or other items along any and all service routes.
  4. Access by a person to the interior control shall be easily achievable by any person, through a simple one-step operation that can be accomplished safely using only one heavily padded gloved or ungloved hand. Such access may be:
    1. a cover that is lifted or slid to reveal the control; or
    2. a cover panel grooved for easy breakage, which when broken will reveal the control.
  5. The exterior control shall be easily reached and operated with a fireman's standard pike pole by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus.
  6. The access symbol shown and described in Figure 5-1 indicating the location of the control shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent and pointing to the control.
  7. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washing for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.

    FIGURE 5-1. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL
  8. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  9. User instructions for access to the interior control shall be obvious, simple, concise, and effective. The letters shall be uppercase Helvetica bold, in red on a bright white background. Such instructions shall be located on or immediately adjacent to the actual access component.
  10. The access opening to the interior control shall be of a size and shape such that the control shall be immediately visible and obvious to the user once access is gained.
  11. The interior control shall be easily reached and operated with one hand by any person traveling without an escort, irrespective of age, disability, or any other characteristic who may or may not be wearing heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  12. The exterior control shall be ring-shaped, at least 1½" in radius, and shall be easily operated by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus, by pulling with any hook attached to a standard fireman's pike pole.
  13. The use of the controls shall be each accomplished through a simple one-step operation.
  14. The exterior and interior front door release controls shall be: equipped with a zero speed detection device to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped; and equipped with a brake interlock system to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped.
  15. Both interior and exterior controls shall be red, permanently attached, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment for 12 years.
  16. Instructions for use of the interior control shall be red on white using red uppercase Helvetica bold letters and shall be obvious, simple, and clearly understandable once access to the control has been gained. Such instructions shall remain legible after access to the control has been gained.
  17. The instructions for use shall be permanently attached and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment for 12 years.
  18. Each door release control, when used in an emergency, shall have the effect of releasing or unlocking the rear door so that it can be easily pushed open or closed, regardless of the status of any other valves, switches, or controls. Resetting this control shall have the effect of restoring normal operation to this door subject to other valves, switches, or controls.
  19. The controls shall operate as a two-position switch.
  20. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.
  21. Rear side door release controls shall be the same in operation as the door release controls located at and for the front side door.

SECTION 6
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR THE ELECTRICAL (BATTERIES) SWITCH

  1. The batteries compartment shall be located on the street side of the bus.
  2. The bus shall be equipped with a batteries shut-off switch.
  3. The batteries shut-off switch shall be a non-spark-producing, explosion-preventing knife type switch. The switch shall be encased and the entire assembly permanently attached to the forward structural wall of the battery compartment, such that the strength of the wall will reduce the possibility of damage to the switch in all weather environments and in accident situations.
  4. The switch assembly shall be mounted so that the switch handle moves in a vertical plane.
  5. The switch handle knob shall be spherical in shape and at least 1½" in diameter. The knob shall be red in color and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposure for at least 12 years. The switch handle knob shall have at least 3" of clear area around the outer edge of its circumference along the entire corridor of travel for the switch handle knob.
  6. The switch shall be a two-position maintained switch configured so that full up is the on position and full down is the off position. The switch handle shall not move from its normal run position to the off position during operation of the bus as a result of vibration or any other cause. Moving the switch fully down to the off position shall prevent all electrical flow from all batteries to both the 24- and 12-volt electrical systems, except to the hazard warning lights.
  7. An instruction label shall be permanently posted adjacent to the knife switch on a plane parallel to the centerline of the bus. The legend "ON" in at least ½" tall legible red capital, Helvetica bold letters shall appear on the instruction label at the fully on (up) position of the spherical handle of the knife switch. The legend "OFF" in at least ½" tall legible red capital, Helvetica bold letters shall appear on the instruction label at the fully off (down) position of the spherical handle of the knife switch. A double-headed arrow 3/16" in width shall be shown vertically, equal in length, next to and parallel to the corridor of travel for the knife switch. The instruction label shall be rectangular and bright white in color. The instruction label shall provide at least a ¼" white border around the ON-OFF legends and be capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figure 6-1.
  8. An access door with an opening no smaller than 8" wide by 10" tall shall be placed in the battery compartment door so that when the access door is opened the switch handle knob and use instructions can be easily seen and the knife type switch can be easily used by a rescue individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  9. The access door shall be non-locking, hinged on one side, and easily opened in a single motion by an individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  10. On the inside surface of the access door shall be placed the legend EMERGENCY BATTERY DISCONNECT SWITCH, MOVE RED KNOB DOWN TO OFF in ½" tall legible red capital, Helvetica bold letters on a bright white background equal in size to the inside dimension of the access door. The legend shall be capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleaning, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figure 6-2.
  11. The universal access symbol shown in Figure 6-3 shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, and permanently attached to the outside surface of the access door, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical washing for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other material.
  12. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  13. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.

FIGURE 6-1. BATTERIES SWITCH AND LEGEND

FIGURE 6-2. LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF BATTERIES SWITCH ACCESS DOOR

FIGURE 6-3. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

SECTION 7
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR ROOF-MOUNTED EMERGENCY INGRESS AND ESCAPE HATCHES

FIGURE 7-1. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL

SECTION 8
STANDARDIZATION GUIDELINES FOR PASSENGER WINDOWS

  1. At least 80% of all passenger side windows shall be emergency exit windows. This requirement cannot be waived or lessened by the provision of roof exits and/or doors.
  2. Each emergency exit window (EEW) shall be releasable by a passenger or other individual from inside the bus by operating one mechanism. The use of this mechanism shall not be hampered by seatbacks, stanchions, railings, or any other component.
  3. The release mechanism on each EEW shall be in conformance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217.
  4. After the release mechanism has been operated, the EEW shall be manually openable by a single occupant to a Full Emergency Egress Position that provides a clear opening wide enough to facilitate the entrance of emergency response personnel wearing helmets, bunker coats, gloves, and possibly airpacks, and facilitate the safe removal of passengers on backboards or stretchers, and having a minimum opening width parallel to the bus floor of at least 22" and a minimum clear opening height perpendicular to the bus floor of at least 22".
  5. Top-hinged push out EEWs shall be capable of being extended to a Full Emergency Egress Position which allows the window glazing and frame to be held horizontal and parallel to the floor of the bus.
  6. Each EEW shall have a built-in mechanical means of being automatically secured open when opened to any and all points beyond at least 65% of the travel to the Full Emergency Egress Position. The device used to secure open the emergency window shall be automatic or shall be easily engaged by any user inside or outside the bus using only one hand.
  7. The securement device shall not cause latched or unlatched windows to open further prior to the attainment of 66% of travel to the Full Emergency Egress Position, regardless of the motion of the bus.
  8. Each EEW, when secured open, shall require deliberate action by an individual in order to close the window, and shall allow the individual full control of the window while closing, such that the potential for the window to accidentally close or injure a rescuer or passenger is totally eliminated.
  9. EEWs shall be clearly identifiable to trained emergency response personnel as rescue points, while discouraging unauthorized access. The universal access symbol shown and described in Figure 8-1 shall identify each EEW, located at each exterior access point and release mechanism which is reachable from outside.
  10. The access symbol shall be red on a white background, 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the outside bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washing for at least 3 years. Such symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  11. At the end of 3 years the symbol shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement symbols shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  12. The access symbol, if located on the glazing, shall be 1½" in diameter, white with the glazing as background, permanently attached, reflective, easily visible to rescuers outside the vehicle, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, fading, disintegration, or deterioration in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washing for at least 3 years. At the end of 3 years the symbol shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement symbols shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  13. The legend EMERGENCY EXIT and concise operating instructions for use of emergency windows shall be obviously posted on the interior in red on white or white on red adjacent to each interior release mechanism, oriented so as to be plainly legible to passengers. It shall also be in conformance with the requirements in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217.
  14. All EEWs shall be permanently attached, along one edge, to the body of the bus to prevent falling while being used in an emergency.
  15. Drains shall be appropriate in design to prevent cold weather freezing of EEW assembly and/or corrosion; EEWs shall remain easily openable without maintenance more frequent that once every two months.

    FIGURE 8-1. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL
  16. All windows and glazing shall satisfy all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards including FMVSS 205 and conform to all federal, state, and local regulations.
  17. Except as superseded by these Guidelines, passenger side windows must conform to FMVSS 217 (Bus Window Retention and Release).
  18. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.

APPENDIX A

RESOURCES

FIRE AND RESCUE ORGANIZATIONS

Fire and Rescue Training Institute University of Missouri-Columbia

International Association of Fire Fighters

International Association of Fire Chiefs

International Society of Fire Service Instructors

International Fire Services Training Association (IFSTA)

Joint Council of National Fire Organizations

Lancaster County Fireman's Association

Maryland Fire & Rescue Institute

Montgomery County (PA) Fire Academy

National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors (NAFED)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

National Association for Search & Rescue

National Fire Academy

Pennsylvania Fire Academy

Philadelphia Fire Fighters Union Local 22

SAFETY & TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATIONS

National Safety Council

National Transportation Safety Board

Transportation Research Board (TRB)

Transportation Safety Institute

STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS

American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

American Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Canadian Standards Institute

National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)

National Institute of Standards and Technology

National Standards Association

National Technical Information Service

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.

APPENDIX B

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Balog, J.N. Introduction to Urban Transit Bus Accident Experience: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training (includes slides), KETRON, Inc., Malvern, PA; June, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual For: The Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus (includes slides and video tape); KETRON, Inc., Malvern, PA; March, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual For: The Neoplan USA Corporation Urban Transit Bus (includes slides and video tape): KETRON, Inc., Malvern, PA; March, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual For: The General Motors Corporation RTS Urban Transit Bus (includes slides and video tape); KETRON, Inc., Malvern, PA; March, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Instructor's Manual: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training For: The Neoplan, GMC/RTS, and Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus; KETRON, Inc., Malvern, PA; January, 1989.

Balog, J.N. and Gribbon, R.B. Bus Safety Standardization (Presentation); KETRON, Inc., Malvern, PA; August 21, 1992.

Balog, J.N.; Gribbon, R.B.; Schwarz, A.N.: Chia, D.; and Ketola, H.N. KETRON Technical Discussion: Availability, Location, and Use of Safety Items for Standardization on Urban Transit Buses; KETRON, Malvern, PA; August 7, 1991.

Balog, J.N. and Gribbon, R.B. Bus Safety Standardization Guidelines Development Committee Meeting (Presentation); KETRON, Inc., Malvern, PA; August 21-22, 1991.

Balog, J.N. and Gribbon, R.B. Minimizing Your Risks and Reducing Accident Cost: Proposed FTA Guidelines for Bus Safety Equipment Standardization; KETRON Division of The Bionetics Corporation, Malvern, PA; May 18, 1992.

Baseline Advanced Design Transit Coach Specifications, with Addendums; APTA, Washington, DC; April 4, 1977.

Principles of Extrication; First Edition, International Fire Service Training Association, Fire Protection Publications, Oklahoma State University; Stillwater, OK; 1990.

4. STANDARD EMERGENCY SAFETY COMPONENTS: AN APPLICATION APPROACH

This section presents an application approach recommended by KETRON as a result of its work with the Guidelines Development Committees and the APTA Safety Committee for the standardization of urban transit bus safety equipment. The approach takes the form of guidelines based on the research and discussions held throughout the project. In this section, guidelines are presented for the Master Run Switch; Emergency Engine Stop Switch in the engine compartment; Driver's Side Window; Front and Rear Door Release Controls; Electrical (Batteries) Switch; Emergency Escape/Ingress Hatch; and Passenger Windows.

Although the intent of these Guidelines is to maximize accessibility to the various safety components by emergency preparedness forces, some transit officials are concerned with the potential for vandalism or security problems if such devices are not locked. Consequently, it is left to local determination as to whether or not the components should be behind locked doors. If this choice is made, the transit authorities must standardize the locks with non-reproducible (normal channels) keys, provide an ample supply of keys to all emergency preparedness forces and provide regular training on their use.

Each of these Guidelines has been addressed with stand alone requirements. As such, if all are adopted as authored, a large number of universal access symbols would be placed on the skin of each bus. Each transit authority should decide when one symbol would provide communication to emergency preparedness forces for more than one safety component.

4.1 MASTER RUN SWITCH

  1. Each bus shall be equipped with a Master Run Switch.
  2. The Master Run Switch shall be equipped with a fluted cylindrical knob that is at least 3" in diameter at its highest surface. The height of the fluted cylindrical knob shall be at least 1?". See Figure 4-1.
  3. The Master Run Switch Knob (MRSK) shall be located on the driver's left side control panel to the immediate rear of and not more than 6" from the standard and distinctive door control handle. There shall not be any other switch or device between the door control handle and the MRSK. The door control handle shall be closer to the windshield than the MRSK.
  4. The MRSK and its mounting surface shall not be recessed. The top surface of the MRSK shall be at least 1?" above the surface of the control panel.

    FIGURE 4-1. MASTER RUN SWITCH
  5. The MRSK, at its top surface, shall be the largest circular knob on the control panel and be bigger in diameter than any other knob on the control panel.
  6. The MRSK shall be easily reachable by any driver who is safety belted in the operator's seat.
  7. The MRSK shall be colored red and be capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily interior bus washings for at least 12 years.
  8. The MRSK shall be easily reachable by a person 5'6" tall standing outside and adjacent to the bus with feet flat on the ground, through the driver's left side window.
  9. The MRSK shall be easily operated from outside the bus by a rescue individual wearing heavily padded gloves on his/her hands and shall have at least 3" of clear area around the outer edge of its circumference.
  10. A driver's left side window complying with Section 4.2 of these Guidelines shall allow access to the MRSK by sliding easily rearward without latching along the track at any point, to create an opening no smaller than 8" high and 10" wide and large enough for the MRSK to be easily operated as described in this section. This window shall be non-locking and openable from outside the bus without breakage.
  11. The universal access symbol shown and described in Figure 4-2 indicating the location of the MRSK shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent to the MRSK.
  12. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  13. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to be removed and replaced. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.

    FIGURE 4-2. UNIVERSAL ACCESS SYMBOL
  14. The MRSK shall be capable of fully shutting down the engine by turning with one hand (with or without a heavily padded glove) clockwise to its stop position. It shall also be capable of fully shutting down the engine by turning with one hand (with or without a heavily padded glove) counterclockwise to its stop position. The number of non-stop positions and their functionality shall be dictated by local preference.
  15. The MRSK shall not be capable of turning past either stop position (both full clockwise and full counterclockwise).
  16. The MRSK, in a stop position, shall have the effect of shutting down the engine, regardless of when and with what controls the bus was originally started, and regardless of the status of the transmission selector. The MRSK shall not prevent the effective functioning of other engine shut down devices. The engine shall not start with the MRSK in either the full clockwise or full counterclockwise positions.
  17. When the bus engine is shut down by use of the Emergency Engine Stop Switch in the engine compartment, or any other device, the MRSK or any other device shall not be capable of restarting the bus engine until the engine shut down switch is reset.
  18. Additional local requirements for such equipment as a key switch which prevents starting the engine without a key are allowed but shall not supersede the function of any of the above Guidelines.

4.2 DRIVER'S SIDE WINDOW(S)

  1. A non-locking window (NLW) to the driver's immediate left shall enable the door control handle, and Master Run Switch Knob to be easily seen and be easily reached and operated by a person 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground, outside and adjacent to the bus.
  2. The NLW shall allow outside access to driver's controls by sliding easily rearward without latching along the track at any point, to create an opening no smaller than 8" high and 10" wide and at least large enough to easily operate the door control handle, Master Run Switch Knob, Master Door Release Control, and emergency egress release mechanism from outside the bus. The NLW shall be easily openable from outside the bus without breakage.
  3. The access symbol shown and described in Figure 4-2 shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent to and pointing to the exact location at which the NLW opens
  4. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  5. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  6. A driver's window to the driver's immediate left side shall be provided.
  7. The NLW shall be permanently attached, along at least one edge, to the body of the bus to prevent falling while being used in an emergency.
  8. The NLW, when closed, shall prevent the entrance of rain water.
  9. The NLW shall fully satisfy and/or exceed all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards including FMVSS 205 and conform to all federal, state, and local regulations.
  10. The NLW shall in all other respects conform to FMVSS 217 (Bus Window Retention and Release), except as superseded by these Guidelines.
  11. The NLW shall be similar in design and operation to Passenger Windows wherever possible.

4.3 EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT

  1. Each bus shall be equipped with an Emergency Engine Shutdown (EESD) Switch located in the engine compartment.
  2. The EESD Switch shall be located facing the engine compartment door on the same control box and on the same plane as other engine control switches, but at least 4" from other engine control switches and no more than 6" from them.
  3. The control box shall be located in the upper right quadrant of the engine compartment as viewed by a user facing the engine compartment door from outside the bus. The control box surface exhibiting the EESD Switch shall be located no more than 12" from the engine compartment door.
  4. The control box shall be mounted to a structural member of the bus rather than to the engine, and such that the possibility of damage to the switch by vibration is prevented.
  5. The control box surface, upon which the EESD Switch shall be mounted, shall be bright white and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years.
  6. An access door with an opening no smaller than 8" high and 10" wide shall be placed in the engine compartment door so that when the access door is open, the EESD Switch and use instructions can be easily seen and the EESD Switch easily operated by a rescue individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands while standing with both feet on the ground looking directly through the access door opening. See Figure 4-3.
  7. Under no circumstances shall access doors be covered, blocked, or camouflaged by advertising or any other devices or materials.
  8. The access door shall be non-locking, hinged on one side, and easily opened in a single motion by an individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  9. A rectangular metal guide/tunnel, of the same dimension as the access door opening, shall be permanently attached to the inside of the engine compartment door at the same location as the access door opening and shall extend 6" into the engine compartment.
  10. The universal access symbol shown and described in Figure 4-2, indicating the location of the EESD Switch, shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the outside surface of the access door, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. Such symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other material.
  11. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.

    FIGURE 4-3. LOCATION AND CHARACTERSITICS OF THE EMERGENCY
    ENGINE STOP SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT
    DOOR IN THE CLOSED POSITION
  12. On the inside surface of the access door shall be placed the legend "EMERGENCY ENGINE STOP SWITCH, PUSH TO STOP ENGINE" in red ½" tall legible capital Helvetica bold letters on a bright white background equal in size to the inside dimension of the access door. The legend and background shall be reflective and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figure 4-4.
  13. The EESD Switch shall be an internally illuminated, maintained, non-spark producing, explosion-proof, push/pull mushroom button switch with a red lens at least 3" in diameter. On the lens in white capital Helvetica bold letters shall be the legend "PUSH TO STOP ENGINE" in the largest legible type. The EESD Switch lens and legend shall be capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figures 4-5 and 4-6.
  14. The EESD Switch, when pushed in to its off position, shall cause the engine to fully shut down regardless of the setting of any other switch or device on the bus. With the EESD Switch in the off (depressed) position, the engine shall not, under any circumstances, be able to be restarted, regardless of all other devices, functions, and settings. All other engine start and stop controls and devices shall function normally only after the EESD Switch is pulled out fully to its on position.
  15. Directly above the EESD Switch on the white surface of the control box shall be the legend "EMERGENCY STOP" in ½" tall clearly legible red capital Helvetica bold letters. The legend shall be reflective and permanently attached to the control box surface and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years.
  16. A single and continuous quarter-inch-wide red line shall surround in a rectangular shape the "EMERGENCY STOP" label and the EESD Switch to clearly distinguish it from non-emergency operating switches, instructions, and indicators. This line shall be permanently attached to the white surface of the control box and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposures, for at least 12 years.

    FIGURE 4-4. LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF ACCESS DOOR TO
    EMERGENCY ENGINE STOP SWITCH IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT

    FIGURE 4-5. LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGENCY
    ENGINE STOP SWITCH AS VIEWED WITH THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT
    DOOR IN THE OPEN POSITION

    FIGURE 4-6. EMERGENCY ENGINE STOP SWITCH AND LABELING
  17. The EESD Switch shall be internally illuminated and the interior illumination shall be activated when the engine is running and shall be extinguished otherwise. The illumination shall be bright enough in all light conditions and environments to immediately attract rescuers' attention upon opening the access door, and to clearly enunciate the message "PUSH TO STOP ENGINE" on the EESD Switch lens.
  18. The EESD Switch shall be sealed to prevent intrusion of dirt, grease, moisture, or any other agent which could degrade or prevent full functionality during revenue service, after an accident, or in an emergency.
  19. The EESD Switch shall be separate in use from all other rear/maintenance engine controls and is not intended to be used in normal maintenance operation. The EESD Switch shall not be combined with any non-emergency engine compartment switches including, but not limited to, light, control, run, ignition, start, or normal stop switches.
  20. All moving engine parts within 18" of the control box switch panel shall be adequately and completely covered to totally avoid any and all potential for injuries to users of the EESD Switch.
  21. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.

4.4 FRONT DOOR RELEASE CONTROL

  1. Buses shall be equipped with one interior and one exterior emergency front door release control located at the front door.
  2. The interior control mechanism shall be positioned adjacent to and rearward of the front door such that it can be easily reached by any person.
  3. The exterior control mechanism shall be located adjacent to and rearward of the front door at a height of at least 8 feet above the ground. The mechanism shall be covered so as to prevent damage and accidental operation by tree branches, signs, or other items along any and all service routes. The cover shall be flush with the outer skin of the bus.
  4. Access by a person to the interior control shall be easily achievable by any person through a simple one-step operation that can be accomplished safely using only one heavily padded gloved or ungloved hand. Such access may be:
    1. a cover that is lifted or slid to reveal the control; or
    2. a cover panel grooved for easy breakage, which when broken will reveal the control.
  5. The exterior control shall be easily reached and operated with a fireman's standard pike pole by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus.
  6. The access symbol shown and described in Figure 4-2 indicating the location of the control shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent and pointing to the control.
  7. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  8. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  9. User instructions for access to the interior control shall be obvious, simple, concise, and effective. The letters shall be uppercase Helvetica bold, in red on a bright white background. Such instructions shall be located on or immediately adjacent to the actual access component.
  10. The access opening to the interior control shall be of a size and shape such that the control shall be immediately visible and obvious to the user once access is gained.
  11. The interior control shall be easily reached and operated with one hand by any person who may or may not be wearing heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  12. The exterior control shall be ring-shaped, at least 1½" in radius, and shall be easily operated by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus, by pulling with any hook attached to a standard fireman's pike pole.
  13. The use of the controls shall be accomplished each through a simple one-step operation.
  14. The exterior and interior front door release controls shall be equipped with a zero speed detection device to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped; and equipped with a brake interlock system to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped.
  15. Both interior and exterior controls shall be red, permanently attached, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment for 12 years.
  16. Instructions for use of the interior control shall be in red on white using red uppercase Helvetica bold letters and shall be obvious, simple, and clearly understandable once access to the control has been gained. Such instructions shall remain legible after access to the control has been gained.
  17. The instructions for use shall be permanently attached and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment for 12 years.
  18. Each door release control, when used in an emergency, shall have the effect of releasing or unlocking the front door so that it can be easily pushed open or closed, regardless of the status of any other valves, switches, or controls. Resetting this control shall have the effect of restoring normal operation to this door subject to other valves, switches, or controls.
  19. The control shall operate as a two-position switch.
  20. Helvetica Bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.
  21. Front side door release controls shall be the same in operation as the door release controls located at and for the rear side door.

4.5 REAR DOOR RELEASE CONTROL

  1. Buses shall be equipped with one interior and one exterior emergency rear door release control located at the rear door.
  2. The interior control mechanism shall be positioned adjacent to and forward of the rear door such that it can be easily reached by any person.
  3. The exterior control mechanism shall be located adjacent to and forward of the rear door at a height of at least 8 feet above the ground. The mechanism shall be covered so as to prevent damage and accidental operation by tree branches, signs, or other items along any and all service routes. The cover shall be flush with the outer skin of the bus.
  4. Access by a person to the interior control shall be easily achievable by any person through a simple one-step operation that can be accomplished safely using only one heavily padded gloved or ungloved hand. Such access may be:
    1. a cover that is lifted or slid to reveal the control; or
    2. a cover panel grooved for easy breakage, which when broken will reveal the control.
  5. The exterior control shall be easily reached and operated with a fireman's standard pike pole by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus.
  6. The access symbol shown and described in Figure 4-2 indicating the location of the control shall be placed on the outside surface of the bus directly adjacent and pointing to the control.
  7. The access symbol shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  8. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  9. User instructions for access to the interior control shall be obvious, simple, concise, and effective. The letters shall be uppercase Helvetica bold, in red on a bright white background. Such instructions shall be located on or immediately adjacent to the actual access component.
  10. The access opening to the interior control shall be of a size and shape such that the control shall be immediately visible and obvious to the user once access is gained.

    FIGURE 4-7. BATTERIES SWITCH AND LEGEND
  11. The interior control shall be easily reached and operated with one hand by any person who may or may not be wearing heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  12. The exterior control shall be ring-shaped, at least 1½" in radius, and shall be easily operated by a rescuer 5'6" tall standing with feet flat on the ground outside and adjacent to the bus, by pulling with any hook attached to a standard fireman's pike pole.
  13. The use of the controls shall be each accomplished through a simple one-step operation.
  14. The exterior and interior rear door release controls shall be: equipped with a zero speed detection device to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped; and equipped with a brake interlock system to prevent the doors from being released or opened unless the bus is stopped.
  15. Both interior and exterior controls shall be red, permanently attached, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment for 12 years.
  16. Instructions for the use of the interior control shall be red on white using red uppercase Helvetica bold letters and shall be obvious, simple, and clearly understandable once access to the control has been gained. Such instructions shall remain legible after access to the control has been gained.
  17. The instructions for use shall be permanently attached and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment for 12 years.
  18. Each door release control, when used in an emergency, shall have the effect of releasing or unlocking the rear door so that it can be easily pushed open or closed, regardless of the status of any other valves, switches, or controls. Resetting this control shall have the effect of restoring normal operation to this door subject to other valves, switches, or controls.
  19. The control shall operate as a two-position switch.
  20. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold. Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.
  21. Rear side door release controls shall be the same in operation as the door release controls located at and for the front side door.

4.6 ELECTRICAL (BATTERIES) SWITCH

  1. The batteries compartment shall be located on the street side of the bus.
  2. The bus shall be equipped with a batteries shut-off switch.
  3. The batteries shut-off switch shall be a non-spark producing, explosion-proof knife-type switch. The switch shall be encased and the entire assembly permanently attached to the forward structural wall of the battery compartment, such that the strength of the wall will reduce the possibility of damage to the switch in all weather environments and in accident situations.
  4. The switch assembly shall be mounted so that the switch handle moves in a vertical plane.
  5. The switch handle knob shall be spherical in shape and at least 1½" in diameter. The knob shall be red in color and capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposure for at least 12 years. The switch handle knob shall have at least 3" of clear area around the outer edge of its circumference along the entire corridor of travel for the switch handle knob.
  6. The switch shall be a two-position maintained switch configured so that full up is the on position and full down is the off position. The switch handle shall not move from its normal run position to the off position during operation of the bus as a result of vibration or any other cause. Moving the switch fully down to the off position shall prevent all electrical flow from all batteries to both the 24-volt and 12-volt electrical systems, except to the hazard warning lights.
  7. An instruction label shall be permanently posted adjacent to the knife switch on a plane parallel to the centerline of the bus. The legend "ON" in at least ½" tall legible red capital, Helvetica bold letters shall appear on the instruction label at the fully on (up) position of the spherical handle of the knife switch. The legend "OFF" in at least ½" tall legible red capital, Helvetica bold letters shall appear on the instruction label at the fully off (down) position of the spherical handle of the knife switch. A double-headed arrow 3/16" in width shall be shown vertically, equal in length, next to and parallel to the corridor of travel for the knife switch. The instruction label shall be rectangular and bright white in color. The instruction label shall provide at least a ¼" white border around the ON-OFF legends and be capable of exhibiting negligible color change in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figure 4-7.
  8. An access door with an opening no smaller than 8" wide by 10" tall shall be placed in the battery compartment door so that when the access door is opened the switch handle knob and use instructions can be easily seen and the knife-type switch can be easily used by a rescue individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  9. The access door shall be non-locking, hinged on one side, and easily opened in a single motion by an individual with heavily padded gloves on his/her hands.
  10. On the inside surface of the access door shall be placed the legend EMERGENCY BATTERY DISCONNECT SWITCH, MOVE RED KNOB DOWN TO OFF in ½" tall legible red capital, Helvetica bold letters on a bright white background equal in size to the inside dimension of the access door. The legend shall be capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, revenue service, steam cleanings, and chemical exposures for at least 12 years. See Figure 4-8.
  11. The universal access symbol shown in Figure 4-2 shall be 4" in diameter, reflective, and permanently attached to the outside surface of the access door, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical washing for at least 3 years. The access symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other material.
  12. At the end of 3 years the symbol label shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement labels shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  13. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.

FIGURE 4-8. LEGEND ON INSIDE SURFACE OF BATTERIES SWITCH ACCESS DOOR

4.7 ROOF-MOUNTED EMERGENCY INGRESS AND ESCAPE HATCHES

4.8 PASSENGER SIDE WINDOWS

  1. At least 80% of all passenger side windows shall be emergency exit windows. This requirement cannot be waived or lessened by the provision of roof exits and/or doors.
  2. Each emergency exit window (EEW) shall be releasable by a passenger or other individual from inside the bus by operating one mechanism. The use of this mechanism shall not be hampered by seatbacks, stanchions, railings, or any other component.
  3. The release mechanism on each EEW shall be in conformance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217.
  4. After the release mechanism has been operated, the EEW shall be manually openable by a single occupant to a Full Emergency Egress Position that provides a clear opening wide enough to facilitate the entrance of emergency response personnel wearing helmets, bunker coats, gloves, and possibly airpacks, and facilitate the safe removal of passengers on backboards or stretchers, and having a minimum opening width parallel to the bus floor of at least 22" and a minimum clear opening height perpendicular to the bus floor of at least 22".
  5. Top-hinged push out EEWs shall be capable of being extended to a Full Emergency Egress Position which allows the window glazing and frame to be held horizontal and parallel to the floor of the bus.
  6. Each EEW shall have a built-in mechanical means of being automatically secured open when opened to any and all points beyond at least 65% of the travel to the Full Emergency Egress Position. The device used to secure open the emergency window shall be automatic or shall be easily engaged by any user inside or outside the bus using only one hand.
  7. The securement device shall not cause latched or unlatched windows to open further prior to the attainment of 66% of travel to the Full Emergency Egress Position, regardless of the motion of the bus.
  8. Each EEW, when secured open, shall require deliberate action by an individual in order to close the window, and shall allow the individual full control of the window while closing, such that the potential for the window to accidentally close or injure a rescuer or passenger is totally eliminated.
  9. EEWs shall be clearly identifiable to trained emergency response personnel as rescue points, while discouraging unauthorized access. The universal access symbol shown and described in Figure 4-2 shall identify each EEW, located at each exterior access point and release mechanism which is reachable from outside.
  10. The access symbol shall be red on a white background, 4" in diameter, reflective, permanently attached to the outside bus surface, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, legend fading, blistering, or edge curl in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. Such symbol shall not be covered or obscured in any way by paint, logo, trim, advertising, or any other materials.
  11. At the end of 3 years the symbol shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement symbols shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  12. The access symbol, if located on the glazing, shall be 1½" in diameter, white with the glazing as background, permanently attached, reflective, easily visible to rescuers outside the vehicle, and capable of exhibiting negligible color change, fading, disintegration, or deterioration in any operating environment including, but not limited to, daily mechanical bus washings for at least 3 years. At the end of 3 years the symbol shall be reasonably easy to remove and replace. Replacement symbols shall be readily available as spare parts from the Original Equipment Manufacturer.
  13. The legend EMERGENCY EXIT and concise operating instructions for use of emergency windows shall be obviously posted on the interior in red on white or white on red adjacent to each interior release mechanism, oriented so as to be plainly legible to passengers. It shall also be in conformance with the requirements in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217.
  14. All EEWs shall be permanently attached, along one edge, to the body of the bus to prevent falling while being used in an emergency.
  15. Drains shall be appropriate in design to prevent cold weather freezing of EEW assembly and/or corrosion; EEWs shall remain easily openable without maintenance more frequent than once very two months.
  16. All windows and glazing shall satisfy all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards including FMVSS 205 and conform to all federal, state, and local regulations.
  17. Except as superseded by these Guidelines, passenger side windows must conform to FMVSS 217 (Bus Window Retention and Release).
  18. Helvetica bold text may be substituted with only the following sans-serif fonts in uppercase so as to be plainly legible in emergency situations: Megaron Bold, Megaron Bold Condensed, Triumvirate Bold Condensed, Eurostile, Eurostile Bold, Universal (filled), and Universal (filled) Bold.

APPENDIX A. STUDY SET OF URBAN TRANSIT BUS MODELS

Grumman

Flxible 870

Cambria County Transit Authority

Johnstown, PA

Inspected Spring, 1988

Vehicle #208

Mfr. Date: 1981

General Motors Corporation

RTS II

Cambria County Transit Authority

Johnstown, PA

Inspected Spring, 1988

Vehicle #104

Mfr. Date: 1980

Gillig Corporation

Phantom

County of Lackawanna Transit System Authority

Scranton, PA

Inspected July 17, 1991

Vehicle #558

Mfr. Date: 1987 (D-Deck 1)

Ikarus USA, Inc.

Articulated 60' Urban Transit Bus

Port Authority of Allegheny County

Pittsburgh, PA Inspected July 23, 1991

Vehicle #3220

Mfr. Date: 1991

Neoplan USA Corporation

AN-40-A

Cambria County Transit Authority

Johnstown, PA

Inspected Spring, 1988

Vehicle #309

Mfr. Date: 1983

Bus Industries of America, Inc.

Orion

Lehigh & Northampton Transportation Authority

Allentown, PA

Inspected July 18, 1991

Vehicle #8950;

Mfr. Date: September 1989

APPENDIX B. RESOURCES

FIRE AND RESCUE ORGANIZATIONS

Federal Emergency Mgmt. Association Fire and Rescue Training Institute University of Missouri-Columbia

International Association of Fire Fighters

International Association of Fire Chiefs

International Society of Fire Service Instructors

International Fire Services Training Association (IFSTA)

Joint Council of National Fire Organizations

Lancaster County Fireman's Association

Maryland Fire & Rescue Institute

Montgomery County (PA) Fire Academy

National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors (NAFED)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

National Association for Search & Rescue

National Fire Academy

Pennsylvania Dire Academy

Philadelphia Fire Fighters Union Local 22

SAFETY & TRANSPORTATION ORGANIZATIONS

National Safety Council

National Transportation Safety Board

Transportation Research Board (TRB)

Transportation Safety Institute

STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS

American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

American Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Canadian Standards Institute

National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)

National Institute of Standards and Technology

National Standards Association

National Technical Information Service

OTHER EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.

APPENDIX C. REFERENCES

Balog, J.N. Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual For The Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus (includes slides and video tape), KETRON, Malvern, PA; March, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual For The General Motors Corporation RTS Urban Transit Bus (includes slides and video tape); KETRON, Malvern, PA; March, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Emergency & Accident Procedures Training Manual For The Neoplan USA Corporation Urban Transit Bus (includes slides and video tape); KETRON, Malvern, PA; March, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Introduction to Urban Transit Bus Accident Experience: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training (includes slides); KETRON, Malvern, PA; June, 1988.

Balog, J.N. Instructor's Manual: Emergency & Accident Procedures Training For: The Neoplan, GMC/RTS, and Flxible Corporation Urban Transit Bus; KETRON, Malvern, PA; January, 1989.

Balog, J.N.; Gribbon, R.B.; and Schwarz, A.N. KETRON Technical Discussion: Availability, Location, and Use of Safety Items for Standardization on Urban Transit Buses; KETRON, Malvern, PA; August 7, 1991.

Balog, J.N. and Gribbon, R.B. Bus Safety Standardization Guidelines Development Committee Meeting (Presentation); KETRON, Malvern, PA; August 21-22, 1991.

Balog, J.N. and Gribbon, R.B. Minimizing Your Risks and Reducing Accident Cost: Proposed FTA Guidelines for Bus Safety Equipment Standardization; KETRON/APTA Information Center; May 18, 1992.

Balog, J.N. and Gribbon, R.B. Bus Safety Standardization (Presentation); KETRON, Malvern, PA; August 21, 1992.

Balog, John N., "Bus Safety Standardization program: APTA Safety Committee Evaluation Summary of Guidelines," KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation, Malvern, PA, BSP-JNB-94-234, August 30, 1994.

Balog, John N., "Proposed Guidelines for Bus Safety Equipment Standardization," KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation, Malvern, PA, BSP-JNB-94-255, November 11, 1994.

Balog, John N., "Bus Safety Standardization Program: APTA Safety Committee Evaluation Summary of Revised Guidelines," KETRON Division of the Bionetics Corporation, Malvern, PA, BSP-JNB-94-356, December 6, 1994.