TRANSIT SECURITY IN THE 90's

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U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Transit Administration 

FTA-MA-26-9009-97-01

DOT-VNTSC-FTA-96-11

TRANSIT SECURITY IN THE 90's

Sponsored by:

The Federal Transit Administration

Office of Safety and Security

400 7th St. SW

Washington, DC 20590

Conference Summary
October 1996

 


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This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.


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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

October 1996

Conference Report
February 27-28, 1996

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

Transit Security in the 90's - Conference Summary

TT631/U6114

6. AUTHOR(S)

Kathryn C. Powell

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

8.   PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

Hernandez Engineering, Inc.*
4700 Boston Way
Lanham, MD 20706

REPORT NUMBER

DOT-VNTSC-FTA-96-11

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10.  SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Transit Administration
Office of Safety and Security
400 Seventh Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20590

FTA-MA-26-9009-97-01

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

U.S. Department of Transportation*
Research and Special Programs Administration
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center Cambridge, MA 02142

*under contract to:

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12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

This document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

As a result of the Federal Transit Administration's concern for the potential of terrorist attacks on our Nation's transit systems, especially in a year when we are hosting the Olympics, a conference was held in Atlanta, Georgia, on February 27-28, 1996. The purpose of the conference was to assist transit security specialists to recognize, prepare for, and respond to the terrorist threat.

Invitees included heads of security from many of the 100 largest transit systems in the country and/or their corresponding city or transit chiefs of police. Representatives from U.S. Government agencies who would be involved in the event of an actual terrorist attack also attended.

Speakers included the Secretary of Transportation; terrorism specialists from France, Israel, and Japan; Federal Transit Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; DOT Office of Intelligence and Security; Department of Defense; Federal Emergency Management Agency; Public Health Service; New York Police Department Transit Bureau; American Public Transit Association; Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games; Cable News Network; and the Red Cross.

This document summarizes the proceedings of the conference.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

terrorism, security, transit systems, transit system security specialists

104

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
298-102

PREFACE

The Federal Transit Administration's Office of Safety and Security, the Office of the Secretary Office of Intelligence and Security, and the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, identifying that, generally, most transit systems in the U.S. have not had extensive training or experience in handling terrorist attacks, sponsored a two day conference in Atlanta, Georgia, to discuss the importance of Transit Security in the 90's.

The conference audience consisted of heads of security from many of the nation's 100 largest transit systems, transit chiefs of police, representatives from agencies of the U.S. Government who would be involved in the event of an actual terrorist attack, and speakers including U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña; terrorist specialists from France, Israel, and Japan; and subject specialists from the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the DOT Office of Intelligence and Security, the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Public Health Service, the New York City Police Department Transit Bureau, the U.S. Army, the American Public Transit Association, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games, CNN, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, the Department of Justice, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Houston Metropolitan Transit Authority, Silverberg Communications, and the American Red Cross.

This report represents the cooperative efforts of many people. The author gives special thanks to Ms. Judy Meade and Ms. Edith Rodano of the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA), Office of Safety and Security; and Mr. William Hathaway and Ms. Lenora Burke of the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center who guided this project from beginning to end.

The author wishes to extend a special appreciation to the participants, speakers and attendees, who through their insightful knowledge of this subject contributed to the success of this conference.

METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS

ENGLISH TO METRIC

METRIC TO ENGLISH

LENGTH (approximate)

LENGTH (approximate)

1 inch (in)

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2.5 centimeters (cm)

1 millimeter (mm)

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0.04 inch (in)

1 foot (ft)

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30 centimeters (cm)

1 centimeter (cm)

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0.4 inch (in)

1 yard (yd)

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0.9 meter (m)

1 meter (m)

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3.3 feet (ft)

1 mile (mi)

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1.6 kilometers (km)

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0.6 mile (mi)

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6.5 square centimeters (cm2)

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0.16 square inch (sq in, in2)

1 square foot (sq ft, ft2)

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0.09 square meter (m2)

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1.2 square yards (sq yd, yd2)

1 square yard (sq yd, yd2)

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0.8 square meter (m2)

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0.4 square mile (sq mi, mi2)

1 square mile (sq mi, mi2)

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2.6 square kilometers (km2)

10,000 square meters (m2)

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1 hectare (ha) = 2.5 acres

1 acre = 0.4 hectare (he)

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4,000 square meters (m2)

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MASS - WEIGHT (approximate)

1 ounce (oz)

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28 grams (gm)

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0.036 ounce (oz)

1 pound (lb)

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0.45 kilogram (kg)

1 kilogram (kg)

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2.2 pounds (lb)

1 short ton = 2,000 pounds (lb) = 0.9 tonne (t)

1 tonne (t) = 1,000 kilograms (kg) = 1.1 short tons

VOLUME (approximate)

VOLUME (approximate)

1 teaspoon (tsp)

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5 milliliters (ml)

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0.03 fluid ounce (fl oz)

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15 milliliters (ml)

1 liter (I)

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30 milliliters (ml)

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1.06 Quarts (qt)

1 cup (c)

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0.24 liter (I)

1 liter (I)

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0.26 gallon (gal)

1 pint (pt)

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0.47 liter (I)

1 cubic meter (m3)

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36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft3)

1 quart (qt)

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0.96 liter (I)

1 cubic meter (m3)

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1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd3)

1 gallon (gal)

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3.8 liters (I)

1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft3)

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0.03 cubic meter (m3)

1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd3)

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0.76 cubic meter (m3)

TEMPERATURE (exact)

TEMPERATURE (exact)

F = 9/5(°C)

 °C = 5/9(°F - 32)

QUICK INCH-CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION

 

QUICK FAHRENHEIT -CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSION

 

For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and Measures. 

Price $2.50. SD Catalog No. C13 10286.  

 Updated 8/1/96

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

1. INTRODUCTION 

2. THE CONFERENCE 

   2.1 DAY ONE - MORNING SESSIONS 

       2.1.1 The Keynote Address 
       2.1.2 The Threat to Transit 
       2.1.3 Worldwide Threat 
       2.1.4 The Media's Role in Reporting 

   2.2 DAY ONE - AFTERNOON SESSION 

   2.2.1 The French Perspective 
   2.2.2 The Israeli Perspective
   2.2.3 The Japanese Perspective
   2.2.4 The American Perspective 
   2.2.5 The British Perspective 

   2.3 DAY TWO - MORNING SESSIONS 

   2.3.1 Anatomy of a Transit Incident 

   2.4 DAY TWO - AFTERNOON SESSION 

       2.4.1 Resources Available 

 2.4.1.1 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 2.4.1.2 Health and Human Services (HHS)
 2.4.1.3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
 2.4.1.4 Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
 2.4.1.5 U.S. Army
 2.4.1.6 American Public Transit Association (APTA)
 2.4.1.7 Cable News Network (CNN) 

3. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS AND CLOSING REMARKS 

4. LESSONS LEARNED 

APPENDIX A CONFERENCE AGENDA 
APPENDIX B LIST OF ATTENDEES 
APPENDIX C SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES 
APPENDIX D RESOURCES 

1. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has established security and safety as its number one priority in its vision statement. With the advent of recent events in this country such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the shooting on the Long Island Rail Road, the importance of terrorism and potential attacks on transit systems has become paramount in importance. A look at the history of terrorist attacks in other countries proves that transit systems are prime targets. With 1996 being a year in which the U.S. is hosting the Olympics, it becomes especially important for transit systems to become aware of and prepare for the threat of terrorism. The FTA recognizes this threat and also recognizes that generally most transit systems in the U.S. have not had extensive training or experience in handling terrorist attacks. To aid transit security specialists in recognizing, preparing for, and responding to the threat of terrorism, a conference on Transit Security in the 90's was held in Atlanta, Georgia, February 27-28, 1996.

The conference keynote speaker was United States Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña who discussed the current Administration's dedication to the issue of terrorism and described Presidential Decision Directive 39 dealing with this issue. The Secretary cited many examples of the very real threat of terrorism to our transit agencies.

The first morning was directed at awareness of the threat of terrorism in the United States. Rear Admiral Paul Busick, Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security, Department of Transportation (DOT), spoke about specific threats to transit and programs that are in place to assist transit in combating terrorism. He was followed by Kevin Giblin, Senior Intelligence Officer of the FBI, who addressed the conference regarding worldwide threat. Mr. Giblin also described the responsibilities of the FBI in the event of a terrorist attack.

Ms. Bonnie Anderson, National Correspondent for CNN, spoke of the media's role in reporting terrorist events. She recommended ways in which transit officials can make their relationship with the media one of cooperation rather than confrontation.

The afternoon session of day one was dedicated to international guest speakers. Terrorist specialists from France, Israel, and Japan addressed the conference, followed by a speaker from the New York City Police Department Transit Bureau who represented the American perspective. Each speaker presented his or her own experiences of actual terrorist events and provided lessons learned from those events.

On the second morning of the conference, a fictional terrorist scenario entitled "Anatomy of a Transit Incident" was presented. This tabletop drill offered a chance to review which major agencies would be involved in the event of a terrorist attack on a transit system. Eleven subject specialists acted as panel members and presented the likely actions that would be taken by their organization in such an event.

The scenario was presented in three parts. Each part was read by the facilitator and panel members were given the chance to indicate what their involvement would be. The fictional event escalated, giving each member time to relate their organization's responsibility and what actions they would take. This case study offered the audience a chance to learn what kind of cooperation is necessary to smoothly coordinate so many participants in a terrorist action.

The final session of the conference was dedicated to speakers from seven different organizations who discussed their agency's responsibilities and listed resources available to transit professionals. The organizations represented by the speakers included the FBI, U.S. Public Health Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, FTA, U.S. Army, American Public Transportation Association, and CNN.

LESSONS LEARNED

Several common themes emerged during the conference presentations. They are included as "lessons learned" due to their commonality. The lessons learned included themes such as:

            ·                     Threat awareness

·                     International expertise

·                     The American approach to terrorist events

·                     The importance of preplanning

·                     The importance of networking with resource organizations

·                     The importance of agency cooperation and coordination

·                     Technology advances

·                     Public perception

2. THE CONFERENCE

2.1 DAY ONE - MORNING SESSIONS

The first morning of the conference was directed to awareness of the threat of terrorism in the United States. Tom Lambert, Assistant General Manager and Chief of Police of Houston's Metropolitan Transit Authority, greeted attendees and noted that this conference offered an excellent opportunity to network with and learn from one another. Chief Lambert continued by saying that transit agency personnel carry the most valuable cargo in the nation -- people. Attendees at this conference share a fundamental responsibility to provide a safe and secure environment for those who are dependent on public transportation as well as those who have a choice and who elect to use the public systems. He noted that transit is an integral part of every community, and transit officials must know how to network with all resources within the community to address the potential risk of terrorism on our systems. Chief Lambert then introduced FTA Administrator Gordon Linton, complimenting him on making the enhancement of safety and security of all transit systems in this country his number one priority and on his vision in holding this conference.

Mr. Linton thanked everyone for attending, noting the timeliness of this conference and stating that it will allow everyone to address the most important issues facing the transit industry in the next few years. Mr. Linton then described the FTA's two roles in transit safety and security incidents -- response and prevention. FTA response involves analysis and reaction after an accident has taken place; prevention consists of working behind the scenes to prevent accidents, and includes implementing procedures and training, including this type of conference. The provision of safe and secure transportation is FTA's top priority. The numerous safety and security initiatives undertaken by the FTA over the past few years support the President's goal of "putting people first" and focus on the human issues involved in transportation. Transportation is not just about concrete and rail -- it is about people. He noted that if you talk to people who use transit systems about security, concern about safe travel is foremost in their minds. Administrator Linton then introduced the keynote speaker, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña.

2.1.1 The Keynote Address

Mr. Peña's address included thanking the Mayor of Atlanta for being the host city for this conference and the international guest speakers. He acknowledged the participation of conference attendees, recognizing some of the problems of transit security, including difficulties due to budget constraints, the problem of having enough information before decisions are made or strategies are implemented, and the effort of coordination with law enforcement agencies at the state, local, and regional levels. He discussed how this conference represents a unique and historic opportunity to change how we in the transit industry do business.

Mr. Peña indicated there are many areas where we can seek international cooperation, and the subject of terrorism affords one of the most important areas in which to share information and learn from each other. He noted that the international speakers attending this workshop provide valuable expertise and unique perspectives regarding the prevention of terrorism and thanked them for their important contribution.

Mr. Peña announced that the President has made fighting crime one of the highest priorities in our country. He mentioned measures being taken to reduce crime: the new crime bill which adds more police officers to community policing throughout the country and the Brady bill, which addresses the gun control issue. While crime rates and murder rates have fallen in this country over the past few years, terrorism remains a serious concern. In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, Federal facilities have enhanced security measures in an effort to prevent similar attacks. The President has instructed Secretary Peña to ensure that our transportation infrastructure at every level be more attentive to the problem of potential terrorist attacks throughout the country.

Mr. Peña said that although historically terrorism has been an uncommon event in this nation, it is a mistake to think that the United States is immune to it. We are no more immune to suicide bombs on buses or gas attacks on subways than the innocent people injured or killed in Jerusalem, London, and Tokyo. He cited the derailment of the Amtrak train in Arizona as an example. Since 1991, transportation has been the target of 20 percent of all terrorist attacks, worldwide. In 1995, 170 violent attacks were made against transportation targets throughout the world.

Mr. Peña warned that while in the past airports and airlines were primary targets, currently surface transportation is four times more likely to be attacked than aircraft. Transportation targets, especially surface transportation targets, are visible, highly populated, run on predictable schedules and in large geographic areas, and are readily accessible, all of which make it difficult to put in place countermeasures to guard against terrorism. He cited rail as an example of the number of targets available to the terrorist, including stations, railcars, tracks, switches, signals, bridges, and tunnels. In many cases, rail transportation to a terrorist often represents the symbol of the government, regardless of who actually manages it. For all these reasons, transit is an attractive target.

Mr. Peña noted that, in addition to the devastating loss of life and property that occurs during an incident, terrorism places other often overlooked financial burdens on agencies. He referred to the case in France in which five bombs were detonated on subways last year. As a result, there was a substantial decrease in subway ridership, causing a considerable loss of revenue to the Paris Metro. Further, the French had to deploy 12,000 extra police and 5,400 additional soldiers to patrol the system, causing a tenfold increase in their security costs. Additionally, tourism in the city fell due to fear and lack of confidence. He indicated there are all sorts of ramifications to terrorism which affect an entire economy within a community beyond the human tragedy.

Mr. Peña discussed how high-profile events such as the Olympic Games offer attractive targets for terrorists. This summer, all of the elements that are tempting to terrorists are going to be in Atlanta, such as a large international media which ensures that any attack receives enormous publicity. Forty heads of state, hundreds of athletes, and 400,000 visitors a day from around the world will be in attendance at the various Olympic sites and could be the target of an attack. The Atlanta transit system, MARTA, will be responsible for providing transportation to most of these visitors.

Mr. Peña cited his authority to increase the level of security at airports and, based upon sensitive information received from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies, has changed the level of security based upon the level of threat. He also noted his authority to increase security on maritime ships under U.S. flag. However, security measures for rail, highway, and mass transit are a shared responsibility with most of the pressure on transit, state, and local agencies. The Secretary vowed his support by sharing intelligence and disseminating information in time to possibly prevent a terrorist attack. Secretary Peña urged all conference participants to include security measures in their planning, design, and construction or renovation of transit systems, including facilities, equipment, and policies. He also urged participants to review their current security plans based on current information collected by intelligence agencies.

Mr. Peña announced that he has enhanced DOT's intelligence efforts this past year in order to better anticipate problems and provide local agencies with timely intelligence information. Circulars concerning intelligence and threat related information are faxed to systems that may be targets of criminal or terrorist acts. In addition, a toll-free line (800-424-0201), has been set up to collect information on significant events and threats to transportation. He urged transit professionals to report any information they have collected.

He concluded by saying that compared to other countries of the world we have been fortunate, we have been blessed, and in some cases we have been lucky. There are people in the world who make a living from terrorism or who do it because of philosophical motivations. Our transportation system in this country, which has an enormous responsibility and is critical to our economy, cannot reach its full potential as long as these terrorists continue to be a threat, frightening people and keeping customers away. There are many citizens in every community who want to be involved and want to help. He cited the positive customer response to new tightened airport security measures. The majority of American people agree with tightened security, understand the need, are ready to work with transit in a supportive and cooperative way. He encouraged the audience to work with their employees, citizens, and civic groups to take practical steps to make security a real community effort.

Richard Simonetta, General Manager of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) was the next speaker on the agenda. Mr. Simonetta remarked that one of the objectives of this conference should be awareness to the possibility of a terrorist event and from that awareness should come action. Like most transit agencies, MARTA performs ridership surveys and marketing research and has found that the main concern among riders is personal safety and security. Mr. Simonetta stated that while public perception of crime on a transit system may not reflect real crime levels, it is necessary to respond to those perceptions in order to attract ridership. He noted that transit security has become a hot topic in the past few years, citing the gas attacks on the Tokyo subway, the suicide bomb attacks on Israeli buses, the downtown London bus explosion, and the Paris subway bombings. He stated that the World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Amtrak derailment dispel any notion that terrorist attacks will not happen on U.S. soil. MARTA the official transportation system for Olympic visitors, and public transportation, will be the sole means of transporting millions of Olympic spectators to the different venues, including travel to sites for the Olympic events, the airport and hotels, and food and entertainment sites. Mr. Simonetta remarked that sharing information from the intelligence community is an important first line deterrent against terrorist activities. However, the support of the local agencies is equally critical. MARTA has worked extensively with local, state, and federal agencies to combine resources and to ensure appropriate plans are in place to reduce the possibility of an incident and provide effective response to any terrorist incident.

2.1.2 The Threat to Transit

Rear Admiral Paul Busick, Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security, DOT, spoke next about the threat to transit. He discussed how agencies experience many more threats than actual incidents and said it is the challenge of transit managers to respond to credible threats while maintaining efficient operational capability. As an example, Admiral Busick cited that the British have had 5,000 bomb threats and over 6,000 suspicious packages reported since 1991, and only 30 of those threats have turned out to be real.

Admiral Busick described Presidential Decision Directive 39, which addresses the subject of terrorism, stresses the reduction of vulnerabilities, and gives the highest priority to protecting national assets; detecting and disarming conventional explosive devices; and managing the consequences of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He shared a videotape done by Mr. Dick Clark, advisor to the President from the National Security Council, which expressed the concerns of the White House. On this tape, Mr. Clark read the following quotes from the President:

"New technologies and greater openness make borders more vulnerable to terrorists and to dangerous weapons. Newly independent nations offer ripe targets for international criminals and nuclear smugglers. Today, to be sure, we face no Hitler, no Stalin, but we do have enemies, enemies who share their contempt for human life and human dignity, and the rule of law, and enemies who put lethal technology to lethal use. Our generation's enemies are the terrorists and their outlaw nation sponsors, people who kill children or turn them into orphans. Their reach is increased by technology. Today the threat to our security is not from an enemy's missile silo, but from a briefcase or car bomb in the hands of a terrorist. The bombing in Oklahoma City and the deadly gas attack in Tokyo, all of these things remind us that we must stand against terror and support those who move away from it. The recent discoveries of laboratories working to produce biological weapons for terrorists demonstrate the dangerous link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." (quote from a speech given in San Francisco to the United Nations)

"It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens. The United States shall reduce its vulnerabilities to terrorism, at home and abroad. . . . The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat, and manage the consequences of, nuclear, biological, and chemical materials or weapons used by terrorists. . . . The Federal Emergency Management Agency, with appropriate support from other agencies, shall review the adequacy of the Federal Response Plan to deal with a nuclear, biological, or chemical related terrorist incidents. The ability to implement these plans shall be reviewed on an urgent basis, and any shortfalls, in stockpiles, capabilities, or training, shall be identified and remedied. This review shall assess the adequacy of (a) stockpiles of antidotes and other special medicines, (b) the National Disaster Medical System, and (c) procedures for direct DOD support, including support with medical facilities and decontamination." (quote from Presidential Decision Directive 39)

Admiral Busick stressed the successful efforts already undertaken by the Department of Transportation in target hardening the airline industry and gave the assurance that even more will be done. However, he also acknowledged that the likelihood of attacks on transportation systems other than aviation are significantly greater and that bus and rail systems are logical targets. The Admiral went on to describe several initiatives DOT has undertaken on behalf of surface transportation to support Presidential Decision Directive 39. For example, investigation of the sabotage of the Amtrak train in Arizona has emphasized the need for alternative track technologies to monitor rail systems. The Admiral noted that DOT is actively involved in researching feasible alternatives for the industry.

Admiral Busick continued by saying that threats come in new ways with significant departure from conventional methods. This changing nature of terrorism makes the issue exceptionally difficult to address. He cited the discovery of an (alleged) terrorist plot to use a liquid bomb to get through airport checks, as opposed to the plastic explosives which are more easily detected. Were it not for an apartment raid in which the police found the bomb, this terrorist might have been successful. He mentioned that biological and chemical devices are of special concern in the wake of the recent Tokyo gas attacks. DOT has secured funding to place chemical detectors in subway systems to test for the presence of a chemical agent, identify the chemical used, and thus respond more appropriately.

The Admiral concluded by reminding everyone of the victims of the most recent attacks on mass transit facilities in London and Jerusalem. He asked each person to remember the families of the victims and to concentrate of efforts to ensure that this kind of events does not occur here in the United States.

2.1.3 Worldwide Threat

Kevin Giblin, Senior Intelligence Officer of the FBI, was next to address the conference about the worldwide threat. Mr. Giblin began by pointing out that "terrorism evolves, but never erodes." Terrorism is always there, but always changing. The job of the FBI and transit is to try to diagnose such changes and recognize the threat. He noted that ten years ago acts of terrorism included airline highjackings and the murder of a military officer by an international terrorist organization. Three years later, the face of terrorism changed on Pan Am Flight 103 with a bomb attack by state-sponsored terrorists. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center again changed our expectations of venue, target, and perpetrators.

Mr. Giblin continued by giving the definition of terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." He noted the use of the word "unlawful," stating that there is no law in the United States against terrorism. The persons convicted in 1995 of the World Trade Center bombing were convicted of "seditious conspiracy." Mr. Giblin described the two kinds of terrorism: international, which includes involvement of a foreign power or individuals trying to influence political or social change; and domestic, which is made up of indigenous U.S. individuals or groups.

The FBI fights terrorism in two ways -- prevention and reaction. Prevention includes security awareness, discussion of current threats, and information sharing. However, when there is a terrorist attack the FBI is responsible for the investigation (reaction). Mr. Giblin then posed the question, "What is different about how we fight terrorism?" The FBI has individual terrorism task forces at their field offices all over the U.S. that include other law enforcement officers, such as diplomatic security agents from the State Department, Secret Service representatives for counterfeit matters, and local police officers who know the city and the assets and how to break down jurisdictional issues. Another form of prevention is the "Key Asset and Infrastructure" program. In the late 1980's, the FBI started this program to identify key assets and infrastructure within the United States. The program identifies where key assets are nationally and what kinds of information systems are already set up to get information to those who need it. Mr. Giblin urged participants to contact their local FBI field office representatives in order to become active in this program.

Mr. Giblin stressed that warning is critical. Through the process of the Special Events Management program, the FBI monitored the World Cup soccer games held in this country last year. The soccer games included nine venue sites, 3.5 million foreign visitors, and 52 games over a period of 30 days. The FBI gets terrorist information to law enforcement and security people through special reports which point out antipathies between countries. This type of report will also be published this year for the Olympic Games. Mr. Giblin further explained that in 1989 the Attorney General directed the FBI to create the Domestic Terrorism Warning System which included a small number of Government agencies. Recently, the FBI has converted this system into a program for the private sector called the Development of Espionage, Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Awareness (DECA). The FBI also makes use of the National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS) to get information out.

Mr. Giblin continued by explaining the FBI's role in investigating terrorist incidents using the World Trade Center as an example. He had actual photos of the building after the bombing to illustrate the damage done by this bombing as well as the investigation. Mr. Giblin described ways in which the Government fights terrorism, including diplomacy, sanctions, military actions, covert actions, and law enforcement. He also enumerated activities in the United States in 1995 that represent the threat of terrorism, including four convictions of members of an anti-government, anti-tax group who had developed a biological agent to use against law enforcement agents; the Oklahoma City bombing; the arrest of an individual who illegally purchased four vials of bubonic plague; and the derailment of an Amtrak train.

Mr. Giblin concluded by stating that we have had fewer incidents of terrorism, but when there are attacks, casualties are higher. He warned that anniversary dates can play a key role in when attacks are likely to happen. Terrorist tactics and goals have changed; terrorists now make use of unconventional weapons. As long as violence is viewed as a means for putting forth a political and social agenda, terrorism will continue. It is the responsibility of transit security, the FTA, the FBI, and all the other agencies involved in transit security to work together to fight terrorism.

2.1.4 The Media's Role in Reporting

Ms. Bonnie Anderson, National Correspondent for CNN, concluded the first morning's activities by speaking of the media's role in reporting a terrorist event. Ms. Anderson mentioned that the traditional relationship between the media, transit, and police agencies has largely been an adversarial one. However, the bombing in Oklahoma City proved that both can work together as a team with the best interests of the public in mind.

Ms. Anderson advised the audience that transit has a formidable challenge in protecting its patrons against terrorism and warned that its efforts will only be as good as its weakest link. She related a personal story of a recent incident at an airport baggage check in which what seemed to be a hand grenade was detected in a passenger's carry-on. While the security staff did notify police, there was no effort made to isolate or search the passenger or to stop passage up and down the concourse in the vicinity. While the object turned out to be a cigarette lighter, the point was made that the threat of an explosive device was not taken seriously, and no effort was made to ensure the safety of other passengers in the area.

Ms. Anderson related many accounts of her exposure to terrorism, most of which occurred in foreign countries, but which did include the bombing in Oklahoma City. She noted that, despite all of this experience with terrorism, nothing frightened her more as an American than seeing an attack on U.S. soil. What she has seen are strained relations between law enforcement and the media and certain misconceptions about what the media should and should not be doing.

Her premise is that the media's rights don't change with circumstances; they are protected by the First Amendment. Law enforcement cannot deny media cameras access to locations where the rest of the general public is allowed or tell the media what they can or cannot shoot. The media's responsibilities are to inform the public quickly and accurately, and as completely and responsibly as possible. She noted that this responsibility also includes not interfering with law enforcement. She urged participants to take action in those cases where the media is obstructive, but to fully understand what rights they have.

Ms. Anderson also encouraged the audience to use the media to their advantage. She stated that, she has never seen a better working relationship between the media and federal, state, and local law enforcement officials than in Oklahoma City. The media received the information they needed for the public and cooperated with law enforcement officials. CNN immediately began to air sketches of the suspects and the licence plate number every half-hour at the top of each news show. There is a necessity for only one point of contact at the crisis command center to provide information to the media. Through the information provided from the command center, the media is able to tell the public where to go for information on their loved ones; to keep the public away from the bomb site and off cellular phones; to list the survivors; to name those injured; to tell what hospitals are receiving injured; and to advise where to go to donate blood, food, and clothing.

Incidents such as the Oklahoma City bombing always carry the threat of a secondary device. In these cases, there is often the temptation for police officers to worry about the safety of the media, but the media should also be responsible for themselves. She urged participants not to waste valuable time trying to protect the media as long as they are not interrupting the work of law enforcement and rescue. If the media is in the way, the police should call a news director or network president.

The issue of when information should not be released was discussed. CNN regularly withholds information regarding stories in cases where reporting such information may be detrimental to parties involved. She cited a personal example of extensive knowledge she had at Waco that was not reported because the information could have endangered lives. She also noted that some media cannot be trusted and warned participants to err on the side of caution. Ms. Anderson discussed the difference between reporting facts or reporting rumor and speculation. Hopefully, the media does not report rumor but only information from official sources. She did note, however, that often the media has to report information from official sources that is speculation at the time and may ultimately turn out to be incorrect. She stated that when events are developing because of the media coverage, it is the responsibility of the media to "turn the cameras off."

Ms. Anderson concluded by stating that the media is there to do a job and can be very helpful. She advised participants to take advantage of the media, manipulate the media, and know that the media doesn't want to hinder law enforcement and rescue efforts. She had the following recommendations on ways to handle the press in the event of a terrorist incident:

·                     Immediately assign a media representative who should be kept current on developments in rescue efforts and share this information with the press.

·                     Hold regular, frequent, and scheduled press conferences.

·                     When possible, allow photographers to shoot close footage of the site.

·                     In general, a free flow of what is known and what is not is a step toward cooperation. Tell the media what can be released and what should not be released.

2.2 DAY ONE - AFTERNOON SESSION

The second portion of day one was dedicated to perspectives of terrorism and included specialists from France, Israel, Japan, and the U.S. Participants were advised to consider four major issues when listening to these speakers:

·                     Those things the speakers have done that would be useful in preventing an event from occurring.

·                     Those things being done that establish order and control within the transit system, both prior to and during the event.

·                     Threat management issues and sorting criteria.

·                     Consequence management issues such as managing the event, taking care of the injured, and reestablishing normalcy.

2.2.1 The French Perspective

There were two French speakers: Dominique Guiseppi, Police Commissioner, Metropolitan Transit System of the Paris Prefecture of Police, and Alain Caire, Director, Department of Environment and Security for the Paris Metro. They discussed experiences they have had with terrorist attacks against the system.

The Paris transit system provides eight to nine million trips each work day and represents 80% of all public passenger transportation in the greater Paris area with an annual operations budget of four billion dollars. It is most unfortunate that France can boast a fairly broad experience in the field of bombing. Since the bombing campaign in 1986, they have gained efficiency in the management of terrorism which enables them to react and adapt.

When a major security incident occurs in Paris, the first emergency organization notified is the fire brigade. This Parisian rescue organization has an average response time of five to ten minutes. In the case of a disaster, an intervention emergency procedure known as "Red Plan" is implemented. This plan coordinates several fire brigade units and organizes a comprehensive and efficient emergency response plan under their authority. This is actually an emergency command and control plan and governs a number of response functions which are activated as soon as a critical incident occurs, allowing for progressive reinforcement of manpower. It also includes a crisis communication plan which defines all procedures allowing for the exchange of information, and, most importantly procedures involving the press or the families of actual or potential victims.

A similar plan for hospitals is detailed in the "White Plan" which covers activities for critical cases. Activation of the White Plan is concurrent with the Red Plan. The White Plan alerts hospitals and organizes all emergency medical resources within metropolitan Paris. Specifically, this plan details procedures for contacting emergency surgery teams, clearing a maximum number of beds in intensive care units, and mobilizing surgery units. The coordination of the medical intervention is assigned to SAMU, an emergency medical service, which is part of a national organization located in every major district in France.

Coordination of police staff and service is critical and can be very difficult. Since the 1986 bombing campaign the heads of all the various police departments (intelligence, criminal, public security, traffic, riot, explosives, transit) are housed in the same headquarters building. The Police High Commissioner, (the Prefect of Police), who is in charge of all the police departments as well as the emergency and hospital services activates the Red Plan. He is also the General of the Fire Brigade, a military task force. All of these organizations report to one person which results in effective coordination of services. In the event of a bombing, three command centers are established: police and emergency services, fire brigade, and press. All three centers are adjacent and establish direct communication with each other and with police headquarters for briefings and instruction.

The most crucial issue in a bombing is the swiftness of police intervention. A secure area must be set up as quickly as possible, an evacuation lane must be established, crowd control must be established, and traffic must be controlled in a large area, not just in the immediate area of the incident. There is also a danger of too many police and emergency personnel responding -- often arriving police are turned away if they were not called. A bomb search for secondary devices should be initiated while firemen are working. Assistance is provided to emergency services by protecting an area to be used as a first aid station for treatment of the most seriously injured.

The press is not initially allowed at a bomb site. They are escorted at all times by police from whom they receive briefings. They are allowed access to the bomb site only after completion of the initial investigation. No pictures are allowed unless taken by the fire brigade or the police investigators.

In order to ensure appropriate response, monitor the system, and continually improve methodology, a full-scale exercise is performed monthly with one of the fire brigades from the Paris district. In addition, each year a major disaster simulation, implementing both the Red and White Plans, is held in conjunction with the police department and all fire brigades. This simulation replicates actual conditions. In order to avoid closing the transit system or alarming the general population, these drills are held between 1:15 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.

The French described an actual bomb attack at the St. Michel station in Paris, a transfer point with two platforms. The bomb attack took place at exactly 5:30 p.m. while the train was preparing to stop. The driver saw the explosion in a rear view mirror used to survey passenger movement. He immediately reported to the control room and asked that the fire brigade and police be immediately notified. At 5:36 p.m. firemen and doctors arrived and immediately initiated the Red and White Plans. The police were on the scene to provide crowd control and were available to help the injured.

The bomb had been placed under the seat of the sixth subway car. The left side and doors of the car were destroyed, a door pillar on the side near the platform was blown out onto the platform, the blast twisted the body, and all the doors were blown off. Doors at the end of the car were blown into the adjacent car. A passenger was thrown out, but suffered only minor injuries. Others were very seriously hurt. Eight died, fourteen people were badly injured, and more than sixty people sustained minor injuries. At the point of the explosion, the temperature was more than 3000°, but no fire started due to the fireproof materials used in car construction.

After the explosion, tighter security measures were put into place to ensure safe service and reassure people. Identity checks, parcel inspections, trash can removal, routine train inspections, and increased military and police patrol were implemented. These controls have since been continued in the system with a resulting significant decrease in the crime rate.

Lessons learned from Paris disasters are that it is essential to foresee the various situations that are likely to occur, work out plans to confront these situations, perform training to implement these plans, and continually improve them, taking into account problems discovered during training exercises. Cooperation by the various participating organizations (medical teams, firemen, police, and transit agency staff) is paramount to provide effective response to emergencies. It is necessary that, at all levels of the chain of command, personnel are trained and know exactly what they have to do.

The French speakers concluded by stating that the use of increased security measures has fostered the feeling of security by the public. The decrease in subway ridership has not been significant; moreover, the public has been willing to help. People phone as soon as they see something suspicious and no one complains about controls and searches. Delinquency has decreased due to the increased police presence. The public has requested that the heightened security measures be continued.

2.2.2 The Israeli Perspective

Israel was represented by Commander David Tsur, Israeli National Police Counter-Terrorism Unit. He noted that Israel has a longstanding history of terrorism within its borders and has recently had an increase in transit related terrorism. Israel differs from the United States in that the entire country is policed by one national centralized force of approximately 25,000 officers under the command of one commissioner. There are two main divisions within the police force: the Border Guard Police, which is a semi-military group, and the Blue Police, which consists of all other standard police departments.

The nature of terrorist incidents has changed in the past few years. From 1968 to 1993, the PLO was responsible for most incidents in Israel. Since 1993, the main military groups of the PLO are not actively engaged in as many military actions against the Israelis. Minority groups opposing the peace process have been responsible for the majority of terrorist acts in recent months. These minority groups have increased terrorist attacks tremendously in the last two years, especially with respect to the number of casualties. He noted that in the United States, we experienced fewer terrorist events in 1995 but significantly higher casualties.

The media can play a major role in terrorist events. One of the main goals of terrorists is to gain notoriety in order to give voice to their point of view. He mentioned the incident at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany, where terrorists successfully riveted the entire world's attention by their attack on Israeli athletes. He observed that the Olympic games are a great stage for terrorists to make their protests known to the whole world.

Israel has experienced thousands of terrorist incidents, so many in fact that they have lost count. In past years, these acts consisted of throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails at buses during uprisings. More recently, the rash of suicide bombings on board buses has presented another more devastating challenge to Israeli Police. Suicide bombings are difficult to anticipate and prevent.

A map of Israel showed an area called the territories in which 99% of all their terrorist incidents occur. He stated that Israel is a very safe country overall with no significant security problems in the majority of the country. He pointed out the Gaza Strip is very narrow, but very densely populated, having 1.2 million Palestinians and only 3,000 Jewish settlers. This imbalance in nationality creates an extremely difficult problem in securing the territory. Palestinians harbor adversarial groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad, which are directly supported by Iran, Syria, and Northern Lebanon. Every day, 60,000 Palestinians from the West Bank of the Gaza Strip have certificates that permit them to work in Israel and require them to return every night to the West Bank. Each of these is a potential suicide bomber.

Daily dozens of buses take children to school in this region as well as provide transportation to the general public. A number of measures provide security for these buses: the windows are made of plastic which stones cannot penetrate, have bulletproof glass, and do not move unless there is a military convoy to escort them to and from school.

Buses use a system which is similar to GPS and satellites and use a network of detectors to give position and location. This system is very effective since Israel is such a small country. The buses are equipped with emergency alarms which notify central control in the event of any problems and the bus operators are well trained. The drivers must check their bus before and after each tour and before and after every break the operator takes.

However, Israeli buses are closed since they are all air conditioned. The impact of three or four kilos of TNT exploding in a closed area is tremendous. The buses are destroyed but, more importantly, dozens of people are killed, maimed, or badly injured in such attacks. Identifying victims is extremely difficult. The Israeli media avoids sensationalizing these events out of respect for victims and their families. Israeli citizens have learned to go to hospitals to give blood after such attacks. Witnesses rush to the aid of the injured before medical staff can arrive. This causes confusion and there is the further risk of outraged bystanders seeking revenge against suspects.

Suicide bombers usually sit in the middle of a bus to cause the most damage and kill the most people and attack during the rush hour. They never board the bus at the first or last stop since that is where the driver is most aware of the passengers. Suicide bombers also explode their bombs in stores in major shopping areas and other heavily populated public places. Suicide bombers are beginning to use a second bomber or device which explodes when emergency services and police respond.

In Israel, everyone is taught about terrorism using programs and free commercials on television and as part of their education, beginning with kindergarten. They are taught to look for suspicious packages, not to touch them, and to notify the police. If an Israeli woman forgets a handbag and goes back later to look for it, chances are good that the military will already have exploded it as a suspicious package.

Dealing with suspicious bags often causes traffic problems because of blocking off the area where a suspicious bag is found, but the public prefers the strict security measures used and recognizes that their safety is more important than the inconvenience. This awareness by the Israelis has made it more difficult for terrorists to leave bombs unattended and has given rise to suicide bombers.

Many instances of terrorist and hostage incidents on aircraft were cited. Until the mid '70s, there was an international organization of dissident groups making concerted attacks on aircraft all over the world. In Israel, there was only one successful hijacking of an E1 A1 flight in which a flight to Algeria was hijacked and the passengers were held for two months. Since that time, hijacking E1 A1 aircraft has not been successful because of "marshalls" on every flight. During rescue operations, marshalls shoot terrorists which acts as a deterrent to plane hijacking. Bombing attempts on E1 A1 aircraft have not been successful due to the tight security measures taken throughout the airport and procedures which require all bags to be checked. Today the main threat to aircraft comes from fundamentalist Islamic groups supported by Iran, Libya, and Syria.

In conclusion, Commander Tsur stated that the transit industry must maintain a balance between security measures and effective management of a transit system. While passengers can be instructed to arrive at the airport one hour before a flight, there is no way to inspect baggage before a bus ride. In a hostage incident, there must be no negotiation and the terrorists must not be allowed to survive, since terrorists will often kill themselves and as many hostages as they can. The Israeli experience has shown that in order to save lives, the tactical approach to this kind of incident must be immediate. To avoid risk to the lives of hostages, terrorists must be neutralized in seconds.

2.2.3 The Japanese Perspective

Mikio Shiokawa, Deputy Director of the Security Division of the Japanese National Police Agency, addressed the conference on the March 1995 sarin gas attacks on Tokyo's subway system. Mr. Shiokawa prefaced his remarks by noting that he was impressed by the cooperation and capability of the American Embassy in providing next day information for the Osaka conference attended by Secretary Peña and Vice President Gore in spite of the ten hour time difference between Washington, D.C., and Tokyo. He mentioned that protection of VIPs requires cordoning off the area and controlling access, while protecting stations and trains is much more difficult because of the size of the systems, the volume of people, and the fact that transit is for public use.

Mr. Shiokawa began by describing the organizational structure of the Japanese police. Their police system is based on a "prefecture of police," or local police forces. Mr. Shiokawa is a member of the National Police Agency, a coordinating agency which does not implement the law. That is the responsibility of local police forces.

He showed pictures from a sarin gas attack information leaflet prepared by the National Police Agency and distributed to the Japanese public after the sarin attacks. There are an estimated 10,000 activists in Japan but, due to countermeasures by the Japanese government, these numbers are decreasing dramatically.

Aum Shinrikyo, the terrorist group responsible for the sarin attacks, had several plants near the base of Mount Fuji where they produced this gas. This cult had recruited numerous chemists, scientists, and doctors to develop and produce chemical weapons which formerly had only been produced by military forces throughout the world. Aum Shinrikyo had considerable funding, estimated at about $30 million, mainly donated by cult members. Without these resources, it would be very difficult to produce biochemical or nuclear weapons.

The sarin was placed in nylon bags, wrapped in newspaper, and left near umbrellas. The simultaneous release occurred around 8:00 a.m. in five different locations within the subway system. The terrorists chose the morning rush hour to create maximum damage and confusion and hamper police efforts. The three subway lines affected by the attacks served the central offices of the Japanese National Police Agency and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, suggesting the intent of the Aum Shinrikyo was to disrupt police activities. Fortunately, police crime laboratories determined very early that the substance was sarin. This speed enabled police to have medicines and neutralizes on the scene almost immediately. Even with such a rapid response, 11 people were killed and 3,800 were injured.

The police were not prepared to defend against a chemical or biological attack, but received help from a defense agency, the Ground Self Defense Force which provided biochemical protective suits to the police. Since this attack, however, the police have obtained their own protective suits as well as detectors and neutralizer systems.

On the day of the attack, the three lines affected stopped operations, but were back in service the next day after decontamination. Since sarin is absorbed by the skin, exposed clothing, newspapers, and magazines were discarded, air conditioning was shut off, and vending, coin, and token machines were shut down.

In the aftermath of this event, video cameras are now more widely used in the Tokyo subway to monitor the transit system and underground shopping arcades. Other countermeasures include closing off trash cans, searching for unattended packages and refuse, monitoring surveillance cameras, and patrolling rest rooms. However, Mr. Shiokawa cautioned that terrorists will always find some way and some place to carry out their atrocities, regardless of what security countermeasures there are in effect. He told of a recent event in which a canister of sodium cyanide was found in a lavatory in the Tokyo subway. This was discovered before it could do damage, but proves that, regardless of how much security there is, terrorists will always find a way to circumvent any precautions.

Training and preplanning are critical in combating terrorist activity. The key to successfully controlling terrorists events is to have minimum tactical error. Early police judgment was important in avoiding confusion during the sarin attacks. Reporting was quick and efficient. While detection of chemical devices is difficult prior to release, intelligence is a useful detection tool. The Japanese police also recognize the danger of "copy cat" attacks on the subway system. Recently at a Yokohama station concourse some gas was released and passengers felt pain in their eyes. If the police had not been capable of quickly determining what gas was used, dangerous mass panic and confusion could have resulted.

Public perception of security has declined as a result of the sarin attacks. It is often difficult to convince the public to put up with any inconvenience due to increased security measures. However, since the sarin gas incident, people understand and respect the importance of those measures. In the aftermath of the sarin attacks, and given the existence and activities of the Japanese Red Army, Japan admits that it has a terrorist problem. Japanese police once took pride in the fact that they had a safe country. Now the Japanese people feel that law and order have deteriorated. The Aum Shinrikyo group, which has never targeted countries other than Japan, has been drastically reduced through police investigation and countermeasures, enforcement of a 1952 subversion law, a new illegal entity law recently enacted, and bankruptcy law.

2.2.4 The American Perspective

Kenneth J. Donohue, Chief of the Transit Bureau of the New York Police Department, presented the American perspective with observations based on experiences in New York. The chief noted that New York has the advantage of having 38,000 sworn officers as well as regional offices of the FBI, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, there are also three other major police departments in the area: the Metro North Police Department, the Long Island Rail Road Police Department, and the Port Authority Police Department. There is a plethora of resources available to help respond to any type of incident that could occur in New York, including terrorist attacks.

By definition, two or more persons must be involved in an event for it to be classified as terrorism. Because of this, most incidents perceived by the public to be terrorist in nature are not actually classified as terrorist events. ATF reported that in 1994 there were 3,000 incidents of criminal bombings which do not fit the definition of terrorism. However, these acts demand the same response as those committed by terrorists.

Only two actions in the past two years affecting transportation have been classified as terrorism or attempted terrorism -- the sabotage of an Amtrak train in Arizona and the attempted bombing of several bridges in New York by Muslim groups. However, as discussed earlier, because of its easy accessibility and large numbers of potential victims, public transit still makes an appealing target for terrorists, especially since other modes of transportation such as airports are more hardened targets. With respect to transportation, we should not constrict ourselves to such a narrow definition of terrorism.

Much publicity is given to incidents that occur on public transportation facilities. In addition, acts against public transportation create increased public fear and apprehension. Most terrorist groups and criminals know that transportation systems are inextricably linked to the viability of the city they support, and they can disrupt the economy of a city by disrupting transportation. Media coverage and patron fear are two of the main reasons terrorists select a target.

Another problem connected with terrorist events is the negative influence on manpower and deployment and, ultimately, the cost associated with these events. The publicity that is generated by terrorists acts encourage "copy cat" attacks and increased threats. For example, New York received hundreds of suspicious package calls after a fire bomb incident on the subway. All threats must be investigated and following up on such calls interrupts service and wastes the time of valuable emergency response resources.

It is the job of a transit agency to not only protect their transit personnel and the ridership, but to protect against anything that could be disruptive to service. This includes non-revenue facilities, such as power stations, towers, and switching areas, as well as protection of transit employees. For example, New York has now installed bomb detection devices in mail rooms to protect their staff. They have also initiated search procedures for every facility in the event of a bomb threat.

The United States has been very fortunate to have had only a small number of terrorist attacks against transit systems, but we must continue to be vigilant for such acts. Chief Donohue detailed incidents that occurred in New York including the arrest of five people making chemical bombs, arrest of ten Islamic extremists plotting to bomb the United Nations Headquarters, the arrest of Edward Leary who was responsible for two gasoline bomb attacks on subway trains, the arrest of Colin Ferguson who was responsible for a shooting on a Long Island Rail Road train in which 17 people were injured and 6 killed, and the arrest of several people responsible for igniting flammable liquid in a token booth killing a transit employee. The news media and the public consider the Ferguson shooting, the Leary bombings, and the token booth fire as terrorist acts.

There are common characteristics of all major transportation disasters, whether terrorism or not. This commonality also means that there are several initiatives regarding such acts which should be standard practice. These include the gathering of accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment, proper use of incident command, training, coordination, and appropriate equipment.

The cooperation of Federal agencies in sharing information with police intelligence and the fact that members of the New York Police Department are members of the FBI Terrorist Task Force are aids in dealing with terrorism. Knowledge is critical in establishing the validity of any threats that are received. Intelligence not only takes place before an incident happens but also at the scene by relaying critical information to the police in a timely way. Information provided to the media can help with quick apprehension of the perpetrator and also avoid panic. Rapid deployment is critical -- getting to the scene quickly prevents injury and death.

A command post at the scene is crucial to ensure proper communication and deployment of resources. One single point of command will ensure that someone is assigned to cover each aspect of a response and that there is not more than one person or .group responding for the same purpose and interfering with each other. All first responders need to know their own duties and responsibilities as well as obligations of others who also respond to the incident.

Last year New York City merged both the Transit and Housing Police with the City Police Department. Presently, 34,000 police officers are now being trained in track safety in order to better protect the transit system. First responders, such as the emergency service and bomb squad units, are also being trained to identify track signals that have been tampered with. Since the sarin gas attacks in Tokyo, train operators are now being trained in procedures in the event of a chemical attack.

The problems identified during a recent mock gas attack drill held in New York emphasized the importance of establishing effective chains of command and communication. There were many examples, such as unnecessary confusion caused by the color of protective clothing used by different agencies. Often the same function was performed by people wearing different colored outfits with no way to identify which agency was responding. Conversely, people from different agencies wearing the same colored outfits performed different tasks. This indicated the importance of agency cross training and standardization. Another problem discovered during the drill was the use of different terminology from agency to agency. There was some confusion among the fire department, emergency medical services, and the police department as to what something as simple as a stretcher was called. These basic issues are often overlooked which, when dealing with a major emergency, could cost valuable time.

While the purchase of equipment can be expensive, because of the different types of attacks we are faced with today investment of funds for equipment, such as biochemical suits for first responders, is necessary. Transit and police agencies in the United States must have advanced equipment and technology such as portable base line air detectors and computerized central threat assessment centers.

Drills and exercises conducted in New York continuously point up common errors made during emergencies. Examples of basic procedures which, if not followed, can impede a successful response include:

·                     Dispatching adequate resources -- authority to call for response is often at too high a level;

·                     Giving adequate directions to the scene for responding units;

·                     Establishing routes for access and egress to the scene;

·                     Leaving keys in responding vehicles so they can be moved if necessary;

·                     Establishing appropriate perimeters at a crime scene;

·                     Establishing perimeters based on type of incident -- bombs or chemical attacks require a much larger perimeter;

·                     Designating a single incident commander;

·                     Area maps and carbon paper should be made available to those who need them;

·                     Those who belong at the scene and know what they should do must be identified along with what they know and what assets they have;

·                     Response teams should be tracked and receive progress reports;

·                     Timely information should be received regarding problem resolution;

·                     Supervisors should only coordinate not perform physical tasks;

·                     Staging areas, routes, and alternate routes to these staging areas should be established;

·                     Safety precautions should be taken and adequate equipment provided to personnel;

·                     Treat patients only in triage area with thought to placement of additional victims;

·                     Hospitals should be notified as to the nature of the incident giving details on numbers of persons expected and the type of medical teams needed;

·                     Control ventilation systems -- air conditioning at transit stations and local homes and businesses must be shut down during a chemical or biological incident and movement of trains must halt to stop movement of air through tunnels;

·                     Hospitals should be notified when the event is over; and

·                     Everyone involved should be notified when the incident is over.

In conclusion, Chief Donohue recommended that transit systems develop an Emergency Management Plan for critical incidents, a Hazardous Material Response Plan, a Field Command Operations Guide, and individual procedures for all transit police officers. He described specific procedures used for special events held in New York including:

·                     Examine the entire subway system (468 stations, 738 miles of track, and 6,000 subway cars), including tunnel searches.

·                     Identify all rooms on the system and secure them, with police evidence seals on rooms in key areas and ensure that those seals are not broken during the event.

·                     Install intrusion alarms linked to the transit command center on emergency exits.

·                     Position officers at both ends of underwater tubes and train tunnels to monitor for anyone exiting or entering.

·                     Have officers ride trains.

·                     Request stoppage of construction work efforts during the event and identify all workers by photo and name badge.

·                     If a train stops abruptly in a tunnel, immediately send officers to search for anyone exiting a car.

·                     At least two weeks prior to the event, increase quality of life and high visibility patrols in and around the subway. Collect information on anyone arrested or summoned for any type of violation in order to identify and investigated those cited more than once.

·                     Assign officers on foot patrol to ride in the front car of the first train who can search the entire train for suspicious packages or people.

·                     Have specific tactical maps and schematics available.

·                     Ensure that all officers know mobilization plans.

·                     Be sure that responding units know where emergency equipment is kept.

·                     Staff must be made aware of key areas and protect the most vulnerable of them.

2.2.5 The British Perspective

Rear Admiral Paul E. Busick, Director of the DOT Office of Safety and Security, concluded the afternoon by addressing the conference with notes provided by the British speakers who were unable to attend due to increased bomb attacks in their country. Since 1991, the British have experienced 5,100 threats and 6,200 suspicious packages, but have had only 33 actual devices. Less than half of the calls received contained "code words" typically used by the Irish Republican Army, but some of those threats without such code words were, in fact, real. As a result, the British made the decision to create a threat analysis system to sort out credible threats. They established a partnership between their police force and the British security services to create a computer data base which provides protocols on past incidents, describes the response, and lists the type of information provided. The system which determines threat credibility is called the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES).

Some lessons can be learned from the British regarding bomb attacks. In Britain, suspicious and unattended packages are usually not bombs and non-security people usually handle them. Most bombs are usually left in places where they are not easily discovered, such as in trash cans, under seats, on or near tracks, in restrooms, and in other out-of-the-way places. The British have removed trash cans, sealed hiding places, and periodically inspect the seals. Station personnel make hourly housekeeping sweeps to look for suspicious packages. During high threat times, they require station personnel to inspect each station in the early morning when the stations are not yet open and make periodic checks throughout the day. Public service announcements are made which have proven successful in getting passengers to take their newspapers and trash with them. They consider housekeeping a significant issue, and transit agency employees work diligently to keep the system free of litter. Of the many agencies that respond to an emergency situation, including the fire department, the local Chief Constable, and federal agencies, the British Transport Police is the lead agency for bomb threats.

The British understand that there is no substitute for training and exercises. In an emergency, it is crucial that all responders understand what they and others are supposed to do. Tabletop exercises are invaluable for training those in the command structure. Field exercises are critical for the actual responders to learn how to operate smoothly as a team and work out any problem areas in their response before there is an actual event. Both tabletop drills and field exercises are held regularly in England.

The British have a strategy to build public confidence, criminalize the terrorists, seek media support for this, and try to control reactions to events. Typically, they assign an incident commander on the scene to serve as the point of contact for the media. This person handles most inquiries, but every officer is taught to understand when it is appropriate to respond to media questions. They take a "common sense" approach. It is alright for an officer to acknowledge that an event has occurred, that there are injuries, or to acknowledge anything that is common knowledge, but the officer politely directs any further questions to the incident commander. They do not give out operational details of the response to incidents and they talk only of facts.

Rear Admiral Busick concluded by discussing the probability of a chemical attack in the United States. It is clear to the intelligence community that the likelihood of such an attack has increased, but collective judgment is that the probability of a chemical attack as opposed to an attack using a conventional bomb is significantly less. The most important question is not "How am I going to deal with a chemical attack?" It is easy to create a bomb and, if there is going to be an attack by terrorists, it will most likely be with bombs. There is a wealth of experience with bomb attacks and on how to deal with them.

2.3 DAY TWO - MORNING SESSIONS

Chief Lambert briefly reviewed the information from the first day of the conference. Participants had an opportunity to learn of the tragedies and realities of terrorism. They heard of the victims of terrorism -- the children who lose their lives and the people who are maimed. They heard about communities where there is fear and callousness due to such tragedy. They heard overviews from international and domestic experts regarding lessons learned. They learned the importance of preplanning, emergency management planning, and having the necessary resources to manage an incident. They learned of the importance of training and mock drills and tabletop exercises. The importance of communication, cooperation, and coordination, as well as the importance of an incident command structure was stressed. They heard about crime prevention through environmental design -- looking at facilities in preparation for possible events and taking them into consideration in both the operational and design phases to minimize negative impact to the system. They looked at applying technology to assist in operating and securing systems. A case study of a fictional terrorist scenario entitled "Anatomy of a Transit Incident" was introduced to give participants the opportunity to learn of the cooperation necessary to smoothly coordinate the many participants involved in response to a terrorist event.

2.3.1 Anatomy of a Transit Incident

This tabletop discussion offered an opportunity to review the major agencies which would be involved in a terrorist attack on a transit system. Subject specialists acted as panel members and presented likely actions that would be taken by their respective organizations as follows:

Panel Facilitator:

Sharon Papa, Chief of Police, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority

Transit:

Paul Lennon, Executive Director of Security & Safety, American Public Transit Association

Fire:

David Chamberlin, Fire and Safety Manager, Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games

Police:

Kenneth J. Donohue, Chief, New York Police Department Transit Bureau

Media:

Beverly R. Silverberg, President, Beverly R. Silverberg Communications

FBI:

Stephen R. Wiley, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Atlanta Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation

PHS:

William Clark, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

FEMA:

Laura Buchbinder, Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training and Exercise Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency

DOD:

Colonel John J. Ellis, Director, Combating Terrorism, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts, Office of the Secretary of Defense

DOT:

Rear Admiral Paul E. Busick, Director, Office of Intelligence and Security, Department of Transportation

Public Services:

Jennifer Goad, Product Manager, Atlanta Red Cross

The scenario was presented in three phases, each read by the facilitator. The audience was given a few moments to jot down thoughts and then panel members indicated what their involvement would be. The fictional event escalated, giving each panelist the opportunity to speak of their organization's responsibility, when they would be called to respond, and what actions would be taken during the development of the incident. Chief Papa took questions from the audience after each phase of the scenario was discussed. Initially each panel member was given the opportunity to describe the function of their organization and its role in a terrorist response.

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS): The Office of Emergency Preparedness is the primary agency for delivery of health and medical services in a domestic emergency. They ensure that the Federal Government has appropriate plans, training, and capabilities to assist state and local governments with urgent requirements.

Department of Transportation (DOT): DOT conveys the needs of the transit property to federal agencies for both operational and security requirements. In the event of a disaster of national scope, DOT has a key role in the Federal Response Plan which would be activated by FEMA.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): The FBI's primary focus is to prevent a terrorist incident from occurring. If one does occur, they take the lead in the investigation and also for coordinating Federal agencies responding to the incident.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): FEMA supplements the resources and efforts of state and local governments in consequence management. They are the lead for the Federal agencies providing assistance to the public in the event of a disaster.

Fire Department: The fire service provides firefighting and emergency medical response in a crisis. They are the first responder to every disaster, and take the lead on safety issues at the scene.

Media: The media is traditionally present almost immediately after a terrorist incident to report the events as they happen.

Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Combating Terrorism Office of the Department of Defense deals with crisis management, consequence management, and resolution of any terrorist incident which may require special mission units. They provide a support group to assist with movement and deployment of special assets when required.

Police Department: The police provide security at the scene and initiate any investigation. They are a first responder to every disaster and take the lead on security issues at the scene.

Red Cross: The Red Cross is a humanitarian relief agency which arrives after a terrorist event has occurred to provide services to the public.

Transit Agency: The transit agency is usually the first to learn of a terrorist incident on their system. They call fire, police, FBI, and other responders and organize the incident command center.

SCENARIO:

The scenario begins in the early hours of a Monday morning in a large city. The city has stations serving the downtown business district with both subway connections and bus transfer points. These stations are heavily used, drawing thousands of commuters from suburban areas into the downtown business district. In addition, the downtown area attracts many tourists and visitors. Rush hours are particularly busy.

PHASE A:      At 6:00 a.m. in the morning, a bomb explodes in a transit bus storage yard. There are no injuries or casualties. Damage is limited to fire engulfing an empty bus and accompanying damage to nearby parked and empty buses.

Transit:

·                     Transit employees at the yard are aware of the incident first and notify their central control which, in turn, notifies the fire and police departments by calling 911.

·                     Transit police and safety department personnel are notified.

·                     Transit supervisory personnel are dispatched to render assistance at the scene.

·                     The senior transit supervisor is the on-site coordinator who interfaces with fire and police personnel.

·                     Transit establishes an incident command post for all responding agencies and establishes a unified command with their incident commanders.

·                     A media relations person is dispatched to the scene. The media is informed of reportable facts as well as possible delays in service due to the incident.

·                     Transit alerts the FBI concerning the incident.

·                     When it has been determined whether a bomb has been used, transit notifies DOT.

·                     The entire transit system is put on alert and buses already in service are inspected by drivers or supervisory personnel for suspicious packages.

Fire:

·                     Fire receives the 911 call and dispatches fire units and possibly emergency medical teams, hazardous materials, or chemical units. The first unit on the scene assesses the incident and requests adequate resources.

·                     Since this event occurred in a secure bus yard, the fire department probably arrives before police.

·                     An incident commander is assigned, determines the safety of the situation for responders, and formulates a plan of attack. He determines the severity of the fire, whether it can be contained, if there are any run-off or downwind problems, if there's a probability of other explosions, etc.

·                     The fire department sectors off areas for staging and anything else required.

·                     The fire department determines if this is an accident or a criminal explosion. Witnesses are interviewed to aid in this determination.

·                     The primary responsibility of the fire department in Phase A is to contain the fire and ensure the safety of responders.

·                     When the fire is extinguished, the fire department searches for any dead, injured, or trapped persons.

Police:

·                     Police receive the 911 call simultaneously with fire and dispatch patrol units and possibly an emergency service unit, the bomb squad, and a crime scene unit. The first unit on the scene assesses the incident and requests adequate resources.

·                     All personnel are instructed not to use radios or cellular phones to prevent inadvertent detonation of a possible second device.

·                     An incident commander is assigned. An operations officer controls all operations including tactics, plans, and organization; an intelligence officer begins to gather information concerning the incident; a personnel administration officer tracks personnel and arranges for mobilization of additional units if required; and a logistics officer supplies needed equipment.

·                     Status boards are needed for posting essential information regarding deployment of personnel and equipment as well as assignment status.

·                     Colored identification vests may be needed to identify responding units and their responsibilities.

·                     The incident commander establishes liaison with other responding agencies.

·                     A 1,000 foot perimeter is established around the scene and crowd control activities are activated to secure this perimeter.

·                     Situation maps are requested to determine the staging area, mobilization points, triage area, and outer and inner perimeters. Maps should indicate key locations and include phone numbers of schools, hospitals, religious facilities, arenas, etc., that could be used if necessary. Copies are made available for responding units.

·                     Traffic and highway patrol departments are contacted to assist in enforcing the perimeter and maintaining traffic control.

·                     The bomb squad searches for additional devices.

·                     When the bomb squad declares the area free of secondary devices, a crime scene search and investigation can begin.

Media:

·                     The media monitors rescue, police, and fire frequencies and often hear of incidents, arrive at the scene before the transit agency media representative.

·                     The media makes efforts to reach their transit, police, or fire "contacts" to gain access to the secured area.

FBI:

·                     FBI dispatches an agent investigator and agent bomb technician, as needed, to the scene.

·                     Agency personnel begin gathering information regarding the likelihood that the event is a Federal violation, such as terrorism or extortion. In addition, the FBI begins researching likely perpetrators.

·                     ATF is contacted to investigate the device.

PHASE B:      At 7:30 a.m., the transit agency receives a call from a recognized terrorist group claiming responsibility for the bus explosion. The group claims to have a chemical agent and states that they are willing to use it. The FBI has listed this group as a known terrorist group with a history of chemical agent use. The callers indicate they will detonate another bomb during the height of rush hour unless a payment of $10 million is made to an organization that is known to be a front for this group. They identify the station where the bomb is located, but do not specify whether the bomb is in the tunnel, at the bus transfer point, or on a bus or train and they do not say what type of bomb it is. They indicate that the bomb is scheduled to detonate at 9:30 a.m.

Transit:

·                     A second joint operations command center for all responding incident commanders and their groups is established at the targeted station.

·                     Station design plans and ventilation designs are retrieved to assist responding personnel.

·                     Hospitals are notified of the type of threat and possibility of increased casualties and injuries from an unknown chemical agent.

·                     Transit assigns separate radio channels at the scene for use by incident commanders and all responders.

·                     Transit police and operations personnel are briefed on what to look for and then initiate a search of the targeted station area. A facilities search for suspicious packages occurs in mechanical rooms, ventilation shafts, electrical rooms, and restrooms.

·                     With two hours advance notice, service would not necessarily be shut down immediately. However, if required because of the ventilation system, the line may be shut down.

·                     A "bus bridge" and re-routing of the bus routes through that station is organized.

·                     Since the possibility exists that the explosion may occur on a bus or train at that station, escalated searches are conducted in those areas as well.

·                     The transit control center is notified of all actions taking place that would effect service on the transit system.

·                     Media coordination is performed by a media representative. As much information as possible should be released without endangering the public or transit police efforts.

·                     Other bus carriers or van operators with ADA capabilities in the immediate area are alerted in case they are needed to evacuate people from nearby buildings.

·                     Briefing messages are sent to key agency personnel regarding any developments.

·                     All stations in other parts of the system are put on alert in case the identification of this station is a decoy.

Police:

·                     FBI takes over at this point, assuming it is a confirmed threat.

·                     Departments of sanitation and health are notified.

·                     Transit agency is notified to skip service to that station after 9:00 a.m.

·                     Unnecessary personnel are immediately evacuated from the station and a 1,000 foot perimeter is enforced.

·                     Weather conditions and wind patterns that may affect the spread of a chemical or biological device are noted to determine the extent of necessary evacuation.

·                     Adjacent buildings are evacuated. If difficult-to-evacuate buildings are nearby, (i.e., hospitals, nursing homes), these facilities are required to shut off ventilation systems from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.

·                     Trains in outlying areas scheduled to arrive at that station around 9:30 a.m. are searched.

·                     Transit operations personnel are recruited to help with the search.

·                     Beginning at 9:00 a.m., no train is allowed to enter the station.

·                     At 9:20 a.m., all personnel are evacuated from the area.

FBI:

·                     FBI acts as the lead Federal agency in dealing with this terrorist threat, working with state and local officials.

·                     When the incident has been validified, the local FBI notifies the FBI Headquarters terrorism section who implement their interagency Chemical and Biological Incident Response Plan which coordinates responding Federal agencies.

·                     The FBI has simultaneous responses on both a national and local level. The national effort includes establishing a strategic operations center and bringing in interagency experts. Local efforts include establishing a command center and a joint operations center.

·                     Local FBI receives a threat assessment from Headquarters.

·                     FBI Headquarters research what was known about the terrorist group, who their members are, where are they located, and what they have done before in an effort to stop this attack.

·                     Federal experts are deployed as required.

·                     The DOT Office of Intelligence and Security is notified of the terrorist threat.

·                     FEMA is notified.

Fire:

·                     As soon as Phase B occurred, fire moves into a secondary role.

 

·                   Fire notifies the media to contact only law enforcement personnel for further information.

·                     Fire studies station and ventilation design plans and weather conditions to assist with the development of threat assessment and plan of operation in the event a chemical agent is released.

·                     Fire prepares to defend against a biochemical hazardous situation to the best of their capabilities. They call for the closest available experts and resources to serve until the national response team can arrive.

·                     The fire service informs law enforcement that they have assets that can assist with negating the effect of explosive devices and some chemical agents.

DOD:

·                     There are both local and Washington units of DOD prepared to respond to public needs with procedures in place which are well defined, laid out, exercised, and rehearsed to respond to local authorities.

·                     Base commanders normally have a Memorandum of Understanding in place with the local community to come to their assistance. The Secretary of Defense has authorized local Commanders to assist in emergencies without going through Washington.

·                     Agencies should know the resources available at local DOD facilities and bases, such as hospitals, firefighting equipment, chemical expertise and equipment, transportation, supplies, personnel, weapons experts, and bomb squads. Discussions should occur ahead of time so resources can be tapped efficiently in case of an emergency. Experts on base who are available along with their phone number should be known.

·                     The Base Commander alerts the Director of Military Support at the Pentagon that there is an event in progress. When DOD hears "chemical", they become proactive since they have the necessary expertise. They begin analysis and send information to assist the FBI, FEMA, and locals.

·                     DOD can move people and equipment quickly. They are always on stand-by alert and can divert planes to wherever they are needed. Helicopters can be used to find people and bring them in rapidly.

·                     DOD cannot and will not act without a request for their help.

Public Health Service:

·                     The local PHS representative is notified by local personnel (fire, police, transit). There is usually a reluctance to notify medical services regarding something that has not yet occurred, but when there is a credible threat, PHS should be notified so they can prepare for any medical repercussions.

·                     The primary consequence of the use of any weapon of mass destruction is the health, medical, and the environmental impacts. The effect of using these weapons is casualties which must be dealt with. At the national level, PHS assists with determining what the agent is, what the treatments for it are, and where those treatments are available.

·                     World class experts would be called upon to contact and support those who are working at the local level.

·                     Health and medical services are very complex, including local, county, state, Federal, and private sectors. As a result, many authorities have jurisdiction making this a public/private effort. Some agencies regulate and provide oversight and coordination while others actually deliver services. Consider the ambulance service that would be delivering the first victims of a chemical attack. This service might be public or private, career or volunteer. It may have basic life support or advanced life support. This can have a big impact on initial treatment that victims receive. Hospitals might not have people prepared to handle chemical emergencies. Where do they get help beyond their scope of knowledge? The local coroner or medical examiner has jurisdiction over fatalities. The local PHS representative coordinates and supports all separate health and medical entities.

·                     The local PHS representative would determine what must be done to meet the potential medical needs of victims, who is available to do it, and how it will be done.

FEMA:

·                     FEMA provides support efforts for the FBI, Red Cross, and Health and Human Service agencies and prepares for consequence management.

·                     The FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Team is placed on alert.

·                     Discussions are held with local elected officials (city mayor, Governor) to coordinate mobilization of resources to meet the needs of the community if required.

Red Cross:

·                     In the Federal Response Plan, the Red Cross is responsible for Emergency Support Function Number Six, mass care. At the national level, the Red Cross alerts appropriate teams within their organization of a possible disaster and makes preparations for bulk distribution of food and supplies. At the local level in the event of an evacuation, the Red Cross sets up shelters and reception sites for those people evacuated.

DOT:

·                     DOT gathers information in order to understand the threat to transit and what help transit might need at the Federal level that DOT could coordinate. DOT alerts other Federal agencies to prepare to respond to any requirements which transit might have during the incident.

Media:

·                     This is the point at which the media can be the most help. They have the ability to provide instant communication with the public. The transit agency will deal mostly with the broadcast media -- radio and television.

·                     The incident command control center must coordinate messages internally. All information must be verified. The media contacts transit, fire, police, FBI, FEMA, and everyone else for information.

·                     The media continues to supply information on which transit stations are closed, possible service delays, and alternate routes. Estimates of the expected duration of these delays are given.

·                     The tools the media has available should be used. There is a broadcast fax capability. Information for a press conference can be put on the wire in order to have people there in minutes.

PHASE C:      At 9:30 a.m., the bomb explodes in the tunnel platform area of the identified station. There are blast and chemical casualties at the    station as well as structural damage. Reports begin to arrive of chemical casualties several blocks from the station.

Transit:

·                     Transit operations personnel assist emergency medical personnel in evacuating the injured.

·                     Buses are made available to transport the walking wounded to the hospital. Ambulance service is generally not adequate for large-scale disasters.

·                     Service is rerouted around the scene for a minimum of 24 hours, depending on the nature of the explosion. Organization of a 24-hour bus bridge begins.

·                     Transit agency engineers check for structural damage to the station.

·                     Train stations along the entire line as well as the adjacent tunnel environments are checked for blast damage and for chemical presence before any train service is restored.

·                     Information regarding changes in bus and train service and plans for restoration of normal service are given to the media.

·                     All transit changes are coordinated with the police, FBI, city traffic engineering departments, and city civil engineering departments.

·                     Agency staff begins to plan repairs to the station.

·                     Transit officials begin tracking expenditures in order to apply for Federal grants.

·                     Agency employees are informed as to the nature and the extent of the damage.

Fire:

·                     Good incident command and good emergency management are critical at this stage. Coordination and cooperation among all responders is crucial.

·                     First responders must be made aware of recognized biochemical attacks so that they do not become victims.

·                     Fire emergency medical services handle treatment, triage, and transportation of casualties.

·                     The fire decontamination unit works with law enforcement to establish a baseline to identify the chemical and control its effects.

·                     Fire takes measures to abate the fire from the explosion.

·                     If available, the fire department provides chemical suits to those at the scene.

Police:

·                     The major role of the police is now as a support unit.

·                     Officers continue to control traffic around the scene including access and egress control for emergency vehicles.

·                     Police take the lead on evacuation of surrounding buildings.

·                     Police assist emergency medical personnel.

·                     Police begin investigation of transit employees as possible suspects.

·                     Tow trucks or other heavy construction equipment is requested if needed.

·                     Unattended parked cars are moved to vacant lots away from the scene.

Public Health Service:

·                     PHS personnel concentrates on decontamination efforts at the scene and at the hospital.

·                     PHS coordinates provision of required equipment, such as chemical sensors, suits, and antidotes.

·                     At the appropriate time, PHS officials certify that the station is safe for the public to re-enter.

Red Cross:

·                     Red Cross operates shelters for those who are evacuated.

·                     Canteen service is provided both for victims and emergency personnel.

·                     Disaster health service personnel providing advanced first aid are used to augment local emergency personnel.

·                     Mental health specialists work both with victims and the relief workers to provide crisis intervention.

·                     The Red Cross handles disaster welfare inquiries to locate victims or potential victims for relatives.

FEMA:

·                     Support from FEMA depends on the magnitude of the event. If state and local authorities can handle the emergency, FEMA only offers support if needed. If the event is catastrophic, FEMA declares an emergency and mobilizes additional resources, such as urban search and rescue and disaster medical teams. FEMA also coordinates federal support to victims as required.

DOD:

·                     DOD is available for decontamination efforts. Field hospitals are set up if needed. Triage must be aware of the danger of sending contaminated people into hospitals and spreading the contamination.

FBI:

·                     At this stage, the FBI begins an investigation of the crime. They assume there may be more devices since the terrorist demand for money has not been met. They determine what is known about the group and try to apprehend the parties responsible. They are concerned about what may happen next. Another attack in a different part of the country is not out of the question. The FBI makes an attempt to contact the terrorists.

DOT:

·                     The Office of Emergency Transportation is DOT's link to FEMA. They analyze the overall impact on the transportation system.

·                     The Office of Intelligence and Security tries to predict the continuing nature of the threat. They ensure that the transit security officer has sufficient information to determine what additional security measures are needed to protect the system.

·                     The Federal Transit Administration coordinates additional resources for use by transit in order to restore service.

Media:

·                     At this point the media will look for verified facts. The media relations person should be prepared to answer questions on how many were killed, injured and evacuated. Questions such as time of the incident, nature of the incident, a description of the damage, number of blasts, and what chemicals were used should be anticipated. The media will also want to know what caused the explosion, what kind of bomb or explosion it was, and, of course, who is responsible and what is known about them. The media will generally ask for a description of property damage, estimated cost of the damage, and whether there is any historical significance to the property. Media may also ask questions on the effect on the surrounding area and related insurance issues. They will interview FEMA, PHS, and Red Cross for information on the rescue and relief and will look for both heroes and villains.

·                     They will seek an "angle" to the story, such as whether it is the first such incident or what makes it different and will probably begin to engage in second guessing. On the second and third day, they will look for villains.

In response to questions, Mr. William Clark of the U.S. Public Health Service detailed recognized problems regarding chemical attacks. The most difficult problem is in recognizing the chemical agent. The FBI Interagency Chemical and Biological Incident Response Plan brings together those in the Federal Government with world class expertise in this area. They know the signs and symptoms and, in many cases, can make a very good determination of the cause. Once the agent is identified and confirmed, the next problem is treatment for it. There are no antidotes for many agents. Some of the existing antidotes have only been used experimentally and not on humans. Another problem is that treatments have been used only on healthy persons. Doses for children, the aged, or people whose immune systems are compromised are not known. Chemical attacks often cause a sudden onset of symptoms which are observable. There are many biological agents that, once released, may not be detected for days, and, with so many people using air transportation, contamination may be widespread by the time symptoms become apparent.

Effectively handling and minimizing effects from biochemical attacks presents one of the most difficult challenges facing the medical community. The interagency group is prepared to assemble rapidly and tie in electronically to any location in the United States in order to give local authorities the best advice on what should be done.

Colonel Ellis of the Department of Defense concluded by describing efforts made at the national level by the interagency group. The President has made this group a top priority of the Federal Government. FTA has focused on biochemical issues even before the sarin attacks in Tokyo. All the issues Mr. Clark mentioned are being looked at right now. Members of the interagency group meet weekly and sometimes daily to address these issues and solve the problems associated with them. Decisions are made such as what must be stockpiled, where it's kept, and for how long. It is recognized that in transit, fire, police, and emergency services are the ones at ground zero. Federal assistance can move rapidly, but first responders must deal with the problem until it arrives.

After the case study, FTA Administrator Gordon J. Linton addressed participants at the conference, including the international speakers and panel members. He stated that the number of terrorist events and other serious crimes occurring on surface transportation over the past few years demonstrates the need for such a conference. Atlanta is an appropriate venue for the conference, given the upcoming Olympics. Atlanta can showcase to the world the many agencies, resources, and security measures the United States provides its citizens.

The responsibility of the Department of Transportation is to work with transit, be their advocate in the Federal Government, share information and intelligence, provide more training, target resources, coordinate with the White House, go before Congressional hearings, and petition Congress regarding transit's needs and issues. Security must be included in overall system planning and management. DOT is planning for and investing in advanced technology which will enhance transit security for use throughout the United States.

Transit providers, police, and security for transportation systems share a singularly important responsibility -- that of providing security for the riding public. He concluded by voicing the sentiment of the Secretary of Transportation that transit is the connection that ties America together.

2.4 DAY TWO - AFTERNOON SESSION

The final session of the conference was dedicated to speakers who discussed responsibilities of their respective agencies and listed resources available to transit professionals. Dr. Phyllis McDonald of the National Institute of Justice acted as facilitator for this group of speakers. She noted that the speakers would not only tell what resources were available but, more importantly, how to access them. She stated that this conference has stressed the importance of preplanning and cited the plane crash at Sioux City, Iowa, as one of the finest examples of coordination and cooperation among local responders. It was noted that many resources and experts are available to assist transit agencies in preventing and responding to terrorist events.

2.4.1 Resources Available

2.4.1.1 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Mr. Steven Wiley, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, explained that the FBI is responsible for investigation of violations of Federal laws governing a number of criminal violations including acts of terrorism and, while it is not against the law to be a terrorist, acts of terrorism are illegal. The President has designated the FBI as the lead Federal agency in combating terrorism in the United States. The approach taken by the FBI regarding terrorist activities is to use prevention measures and intelligence-gathering activities. If there is a threat, the goal is to prevent terrorists from making good on the threat.

Some of the resources the FBI can provide to transit are available through the 56 FBI field offices in the United States, as follows:

·                     An Evidence Response Team including investigative specialists who have been trained to collect evidence and who can provide special equipment.

·                     A co-located FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force (available in most large cities) with members from state and local police forces, U.S. Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Secret Service. This group provides coordination within the counterterrorism community along with possessing considerable response capabilities.

·                     Bomb technicians since the FBI does not have "render-safe" teams: but can only determine what has occurred and collect evidence.

·                     A Special Weapons and Tactics team for high risk arrests. Larger field offices have "enhanced" teams with as many as 30 SWAT team members who have received advanced training.

·                     Negotiators.

Mr. Wiley noted that transit officials should know the location of the closest FBI field office and be aware of the resources available through their office.

Counterterrorism is one of the primary programs at FBI Headquarters. The counterterrorism branch addresses both domestic and international terrorism. In the event of a terrorist incident, the FBI field office immediately notifies this branch which will activate an Operations Center at FBI Headquarters and call in the other Federal agencies which will participate throughout the incident.

The FBI also has a "Rapid Start" group which consists of computer specialists who input data into a database in order to produce special summary reports during an investigation. The FBI has legal experts who can contact foreign law enforcement agencies all over the world for leads in international cases.

The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) based at Quantico, Virginia, is a permanent team available to respond to major incidents at any time. This team is trained in hostage rescue, negotiations, and counterterrorism tactics. It includes behavioral scientists who study patterns of terrorists and produce profiles for use in evaluating personality types of terrorists to determine what they might do next and how best to negotiate with them. CIRG also has Crisis Management Trainers who stage exercises for FBI field offices to standardize FBI response to critical incidents.

The FBI laboratory has an explosives unit that assists the field explosive ordnance disposal units, a chemistry and toxicology unit that works with Department of Defense specialists, and a DNA analysis unit that processes identification evidence. FBI Headquarters also has extensive techniques for collecting intelligence. Most of these resources are available only when the Bureau has jurisdiction in a case. However, resources such as negotiators and SWAT teams can be made available to local agencies on request.

2.4.1.2 Health and Human Services (HHS)

Mr. William Clark, Deputy Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, of the U.S. Public Health Service, presented a synopsis of what Health and Human Services does both internally and on an interagency basis at the Federal, state, and local levels. In a terrorist incident, HHS supports the FBI and may be called upon by them to assist at both local and national levels.

HHS currently has a Presidential imperative to develop the capability to provide immediate assistance in a terrorist incident. As a result, they meet with FEMA twice a week to develop response to terrorist attacks which will be included in the Federal Response Plan. They have developed an interim chemical/biological plan consisting of a national team with interagency capability, including calling upon the DOD. They have begun developing a local government program known as the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team and are reviewing their pharmacy stockpiles and related issues.

The National Disaster Medical System is one whereby the Federal Government partners with the private sector to have medical teams and hospitals participate in a national system. There are over 5,300 people assigned to medical teams who could be detailed to the Federal Government and sent to the scene in the event of an emergency. If numerous casualties must be evacuated there are almost 2,000 networked hospitals that would be ready to receive them on short notice.

There are several types of assistance available from HHS for a terrorist incident. They can immediately assist the FBI with an initial threat assessment. They can provide a national level emergency consultation team of experts that assist the incident commander on the scene and procure additional assets as needed. They are able to mobilize and transport their own resources as well as work with other agencies to bring in needed health and medical support, and have an interim chemical/biological plan in effect in case of an attack using non-conventional weapons.

A recent initiative from the President is the development of local capability. After the Tokyo gas incidents and the Oklahoma City bombing, the President received a letter from the Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments expressing concern and requesting assistance with hazmat response in the event of an emergency. The Office of Emergency Preparedness was tasked to respond to this request. As a result, a partnership resolution has been passed to bring together Federal, state, local, and private sectors to develop joint local response plans and procedures. Currently, a number of groups (such as police, fire, medical, intelligence, and hazmat) are working to identify capabilities and decide how best to effect a joint response.

In the event of a crisis, the U.S. Public Health Service will also serve as a national disaster mortuary to assist with fatality management for mass fatalities, and provide health surveillance services to notify local officials of outbreaks of disease and provide medical support through the Center for Disease Control.

2.4.1.3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Ms. Laura Buchbinder, Deputy Associate Director for the Preparedness, Training, and Exercise Directorate of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, explained that FEMA is called into action when a crisis is too large for state and local authorities to handle. The Federal Response Plan is the mechanism for major disasters and taps the resources of a number of Federal agencies to provide assistance to state and local governments. This plan divides the Federal response into twelve different functional areas with one lead agency and others providing assistance and resources. FEMA has the lead in two functional areas of the FRP--information and planning, and urban search and rescue.

Normally a request for assistance is received from the governor of the state and sent to the President for approval. For terrorist events such as the Oklahoma City bombing, the President immediately declares an emergency without waiting for a request from the governor in order to dispatch resources as quickly as possible.

In the event of a disaster, FEMA provides coordination between Federal agencies and state and local governments, bringing in communications assets as well as the resources and services of other Federal agencies. FEMA also provides assistance with requests for financial aid for state and local governments.

FEMA coordinates voluntary relief associations such as the Red Cross. FEMA's Urban Search and Rescue Teams can be called in from all areas of the country to assist rescue efforts. They coordinate disaster medical assistance teams and disaster mortuary services provided through the Department of Health and Human Services. FEMA arranges for critical mental health and stress management treatment which are provided to rescuers as well as to victims at the scene. FEMA assists with low interest loans through the Small Business Administration. FEMA is developing a new Chemical-Biological Information Network known as CABIN which is being tested for use by state and local governments.

Training for fire, police, and emergency personnel is offered through FEMA's Emergency Management Institute in Maryland. Among the many courses taught at the Institute are a response and recovery curriculum which includes a mass fatalities course, a disaster/crime scene course, a fire and emergency response enhancement course, and an integrated emergency management course, all at no cost. Independent study courses are also available for the general public and those who have responsibility in emergency management.

2.4.1.4 Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

Ms. Judy Meade, Director of the Office of Safety and Security of the Federal Transit Administration, explained the FTA role in transit security is to provide transit professionals with the training and technical assistance necessary to address transit security. The FTA approach to security is a systems approach taking into account people, procedures, equipment, facilities, and environment.

There are several security initiatives that have been implemented in recent years to benefit transit. In 1995, FTA held several workshops and conferences, including a National Leadership Conference on Transit Security held in Philadelphia with transit general managers and their chiefs of police or heads of security attending as teams, as well as two regional workshops on Transit Security attended by transit security specialists and law enforcement personnel. Reports are available that detail the proceedings of these meetings.

There are several security-related reports and documents which the Office of Safety and Security has funded over the past few years. Two publications which were made available to participants included the "Transit System Security Program Planning Guide," and the "Transit Security Procedures Guide." These documents introduce the concept of a system security program and describe how to apply the systems approach to transit security planning. The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center in Boston acts as a clearinghouse for DOT publications and a listing was made available at the conference.

The recent State Safety Oversight rule, developed by the Office of Safety and Security, contains a requirement for rail transit systems to have in place a security plan for submission to and approval by their state oversight agencies by January 1, 1998. The Volpe Center also supports FTA with these efforts, including the development of several courses on the topic.

Through an interagency agreement with the Transportation Safety Institute, FTA conducts training courses for over 5,000 persons annually. They offer 21 courses at no cost to participants. Of special interest are courses in Transit System Security, Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, and the Transit Explosives Incident Management Seminar. Some courses are held at the TSI facility in Oklahoma City but many are hosted by transit facilities throughout the country. One of the strengths of TSI is the ability to provide training with very little notice in response to emergency situations.

Through a grant to the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, FTA has developed a crisis intervention management training program. This program, which resulted from the Long Island Rail Road shooting in 1993, includes a videotape showing emergencies that can occur on a train, including emotional crises, incidents involving weapons or threatened violence. An instructional guide to accompany the video is also available.

The Safety and Security Bulletin Board provides a central communication point for information on transit safety and security. The board is accessible seven days a week, 24 hours a day via a toll free number (800-231-2061) and can also be accessed through the FTA home page on the Internet at www.fta.dot.gov. It includes items of current interest such as: Transportation Safety Institute training; Federal, state, and local government sponsored training; events of interest to the Federal Transit Administration; current safety and security related publications; and FTA regulations, including Notices of Proposed Rulemaking. Transit Security Information Circulars are prepared and issued on a timely basis and faxed to the 40 largest transit properties, APTA, and FTA's ten regional offices. One of these circulars announced Secretary Peña's establishment of a hotline which can be used to report safety or security-related emergencies outside of normal working hours. That toll free number is 800-424-0201.

2.4.1.5 U.S. Army

Mr. Jim Genovese, Chief of the Chemical/Biological Anti-terrorism Team, Chemical and Biological Defense Command of the U.S. Army, detailed the activities of his organization. The C/B Anti-Terrorism Team is the lead agency and main DOD responder for chemical and biological incidents. This organization has a history of more than 75 years of research and development focused on chemical and biological protection for U.S. Armed Forces. They provide this expertise to the Armed Services and maintain an unsurpassed capability to support national, state, and local response in the event of a biological or chemical incident.

This Command has teams of scientists and engineers with expertise in hundreds of chemical and biological areas. These teams include the Technical Escort Unit, the Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ERDEC), and the Army Materiel Command Treaty Laboratory. The resources of these organizations are available to civilian groups through the FBI.

The Technical Escort Unit provides worldwide on-site sampling, safe transport, render-safe, decontamination, neutralization, and disposal services in response to toxic chemicals, munitions, and other hazardous materials. This Unit has the readiness capability for which the military is famous. Through the AMC Treaty Laboratory, mobile units are available which provide state-of-the-art on-site environmental analysis.

The Anti-Terrorism Team is part of ERDEC. Working closely with other Federal agencies, this group develops technological countermeasures and equipment for warning and rapid response to chemical or biological incidents. Mitigation techniques to reduce hazards after the fact are also being explored. The team also does market surveys of available equipment and lists what is available, where it may be obtained, what its capabilities and limitations are, and the cost. This information can be made available to operations management at the local level.

This unit has developed an advanced remote chemical detector known as the Mobile Analytical Response System which performs environmental C/B sensing and redundant testing. This state-of-the-art system can be mobilized anywhere in the world. The heart of the system is the Mobile Emergency Response Center which can be shipped on a C-130 transport anywhere in the world. It is configured with an NSA approved frequency for secure satellite communication. The system includes hazard prediction, modeling, and chemical database capability, as well as all the interfaces necessary to communicate with other government agencies such as the FBI Strategic Information and Operations Center and the Office of Emergency Preparedness. The Mobile Environmental Analytical Platform has state-of-the-art mass spectroscopy and is a detection unit for unique chemical agents. An upgrade to the system will take samples to provide preliminary diagnostics at the site. The system could be located at the site of a suspected biological or chemical incident and used for a redundant assessment and identification capability.

In the case of a biological or chemical incident where people's lives are at stake, there should be more than one answer and redundant information is important. Responders must know what the agent is, how toxic, where is it going, how is it neutralized, and must receive that information as soon as possible. Without the correct answers, decision making will not be timely or adequate and mistakes will be made and mistakes will turn into casualties. When responding to biological or chemical incidents, it is crucial to have as much qualified capability and as many redundant systems as possible to verify the diagnosis so that any problem can be quickly corrected.

This group also has a state-of-the-art mobile laboratory, the only one of its kind in the world, that tests for environmental levels and concentrations as well as neat chemical agent sampling.

This unit can be taken to the site of an incident for on-site analysis. Moving neat chemical agents across a state or flying them across the United States to deliver them to a laboratory can create serious political problems. The on-site capability of this laboratory avoids such problems.

Working together with this Command are the Army's medical teams from the Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense and the Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. These medical centers lead the way with developments in chemical and biological emergency patient care and are an excellent adjunct to the Public Health Service in a response to a chemical or biological incident.

Training and education to effectively respond to a local incident is more important than having the latest generation detector. Terrorism occurs at the local level and first responders must be trained. The Army is making an effort to obtain funding which will enable them to train civilian responders. The C/B Defense Command is currently working on specific courses that will be helpful, such as physical and collective protection, detection and monitoring, and hazard reduction techniques. The military does not perform hazard reduction in the battlefield, but they do contamination avoidance, i.e., determine where the hazard is and stay out of the area, a process known as terrain denial. If a hazard occurs in a public building in the U.S., that hazard must be contained and reduced. DOD is working to provide adequate training for civilian first responders.

The Army Medical Research Command has an excellent course on Chemical and Biological Casualty Management and Care. Due to resource and personnel constraints, it is not currently available to civilians. However, it is the Army's intention to make it available as soon as funding is available to do so.

The Anti-Terrorism Team chairs the Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures subgroup for the interagency Technical Support Working Group. This group funds research and development projects which develop prototype solutions and equipment and send them into the field. The Mobile Analytical Response System is one of the systems developed through this group. This system will continue to be improved until it is highly dependable, easy to use, and affordable.

This group is prototyping advanced biological and chemical detectors which are smaller and easier to use. They are also working on refined hazard reduction techniques for chemical and biological incidents for use at the local level. In the area of readiness assessment, formerly called vulnerability assessment, they are working with the FAA in a study of how chemical vapors move through aircraft as well as a subway assessment project with FTA through the DOT Office of Intelligence and Security.

The group was cautioned on the dangers of relying too heavily on detectors. The importance of knowing the limits of detectors and the agents they will actually detect was pointed out.

The audience was reminded to decide in advance regarding false positives. Operators should use sensors for one important piece of information to respond more effectively.

2.4.1.6 American Public Transit Association (APTA)

Mr. Paul Lennon, Executive Director of Security and Safety Programs of the American Public Transit Association, presented an overview of the police and transit security efforts of his organization. APTA is an international organization with mass transit interests whose mission is to promote the use of public transit and to ensure the vitality of the transit industry. APTA's members serve the public by providing safe, secure, reliable service and by improving those services to meet national and local conservation, environmental, and economic goals. More than 95 percent of buses, rail transit, and commuter railroads are represented by APTA. Associate members from private businesses supply products, service, and consulting services to the transit industry.

Additional benefits include annual meetings, conferences, and workshops such as the General Managers Meeting, the Legislative Conference, the Commuter Rail Conference, the Bus Operations Technology and Management Conference, the Police Security Workshop, the Rapid Transit Conference, the State Affairs Conference, an Intermodal Planning Workshop, the Fare Collection and Technology Workshop, and the Annual Meeting. APTA is making an effort to make their meetings more interactive with topics that reflect today's challenges. These conferences and workshops also present an opportunity for transit professionals to network. In addition, APTA has committees such as operations, finance, police and security, and legislative which meet to address special issues.

In light of the FTA's recent State Safety Oversight rule and its requirement for rail transit systems to have in place a security plan for submission and approval by their state oversight agency by January 1, 1998, APTA and the FTA will present a one day workshop on Rail Transit System Security Plan Development as part of the APTA Police Security Workshop to be held in Washington, D.C., in June 1996. Attendees will learn what will be required in this mandatory System Security Plan.

An APTA service of which they are most proud is the peer review process which has been in existence for ten years. Peer reviews pull together four or five security specialists who, at the request of a transit system, work within that system for a week, becoming extensions of the staff, to assist with solutions to problems. Transit systems donate the time for their security experts to attend a peer review; the only cost to the transit system requesting the review is travel and per diem costs for the experts.

2.4.1.7 Cable News Network (CNN)

The final speaker of the day, Mr. Henry Schuster, Producer with the Special Reports Unit of CNN, began by thanking the organizers and attendees for allowing them to participate in this conference and stating that it provided an opportunity for them to better understand the concerns of participants regarding the media.

Participants were urged to cultivate relationships with the media in order to use them as a resource. Allowing the media to attend training exercises is an excellent way to develop and cultivate such a relationship. It educates the media about what transit does and is trying to accomplish and teaches them what they should expect their role to be. When the media arrives at the scene of a hostage incident, a chemical spill in the subway, or the scene of what may turn out to be a false alarm, they know what is being done and what access they can expect to have.

The media must have accurate information. Transit systems should designate a spokesperson who can give accurate information quickly and reliably. Use of a designated spokesperson prevents the media from getting in the way. This spokesperson should also be the source the media would contact for questions "off camera." It is quite likely, for instance, that terrorists will call the media. The media could then go to the designated source, let them know about the call, indicate they are thinking about using the information, and ask if it can be confirmed. The source could confirm the accuracy or truth, but indicate there may be concerns about releasing any or all of the information.

Often the media gets the information first. In that case, CNN would call local and national officials for further information and work with their local affiliates. CNN tests the accuracy of information received from the local affiliates, since these affiliates may give out information that is not fully confirmed. As a story progresses, CNN makes a number of ethical and journalistic decisions. They contact officials in charge of the event and ask them to confirm information. If the information could be detrimental or counterproductive, CNN asks officials what facts they do want reported.

Participants should be prepared for coverage on live television. If they have a message, it should not be assumed that the media will understand its importance. The media should be informed enough of its importance to give it air time.

The challenge is to use the media effectively to air the story as it should be told. Participants should be aggressive in doing so. The media has an experts list on most subjects. They will put those experts on the air to give their opinions as the story progresses. However, these experts work with limited information and it is critical to have the accurate, timely information on the air. It is in the best interest of both the media and the officials in charge of an event to avoid confusing or conflicting information. Participants must realize that much of the information will be aired whether they like it or not. They should trust the media to give out information that avoids airing misinformation, but should also be prepared to tell the media when information should not be aired.

In conclusion, Mr. Schuster reminded the audience that the business of television is pictures. He advised them to be prepared to give the media access to the scene as soon as possible, taking into account safety issues as well as the integrity of the crime scene. He urged them to recognize that these pictures are the public's link to what is being aired and can help represent their story more effectively.

In summary, Dr. McDonald pointed out that the Federal Government is focusing on the issue of terrorism, particularly chemical and biological hazards, which are high priorities of the President. Today's tabletop scenario and the information made available from the resource speakers should be a model for attendees to use in their own systems, and also give them ideas on enhancing their own response to critical emergencies such as terrorist events. The importance of drills was stressed as well as that of evaluating the drills after they are held to identify problem areas in procedures used. Participants should meet with representatives of Federal agencies, fire, police, and local government in their area and begin the coordination process by developing Memoranda of Understanding so everyone is prepared for a terrorist event.

 

3. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS AND CLOSING REMARKS

Tom Lambert delivered a summary of the conference mentioning that participants should learn the importance of preplanning. They should anticipate events that could occur on their systems and look at the exposure they have. Since transit is providing a public service, transit systems must be accessible or open systems. As a result, it is critical for transit officials to understand and identify their susceptibility to problems and preplan for them. Everyone in transit organizations and external to transit organizations who has potential involvement in an emergency must be informed on what is being done within the transit system to plan for an emergency.

The importance of having an excellent training program was stressed. It is necessary to train staff regarding what they are expected to do and how by having procedures in place to be followed. It is critical that procedures be tested by holding mock exercises. The best way to utilize all of the resources available in a drill, is to critique what was done in response to a previous incident. A mock drill should be held and the results of the drill should be evaluated. This technique will enable the system to maximize safety and security.

The importance of having a media plan was discussed. Transit officials must understand how to balance the need-to-know with the value of using the media to inform the public. Transit officials must be confident with the media. The media will look to transit to let them know what is taking place and what they must do to respond to the circumstances. If transit officials know what they are doing and go about things in an orderly, structured, cool, calm fashion, the media will have confidence in the transit system. That is done by being prepared for whatever may occur.

Administrator Gordon Linton closed the conference by expressing his thanks to the presenters and the participants. He expressed his desire that everyone would take something back that would help them to save and serve the American public. It is clear that one of the keys to the success of transit is to plan ahead, test the plan, correct the plan, and practice the plan. The only way to work out relationships and roles among the various agencies responding to any crisis is to hold drills with all members participating. He counseled everyone to practice, practice, practice.

 

4. LESSONS LEARNED

Several common themes emerged during the conference presentations. They are included as lessons learned due to their commonality.

The Threat. Historically, relatively few terrorist events have occurred in the U.S., and even fewer have involved transportation targets. However, recent events indicate that terrorist attacks are possible, even probable, in this country. With 1996 being a year in which the U.S. is hosting the Olympics, the possibility of an attack against this country becomes even greater. One hundred and seventy violent attacks were made against transportation targets worldwide in 1995. Clearly, transit systems are favorite targets of terrorists. It is also true that, while there have been fewer events, the number of casualties has been significantly higher.

International Expertise. European, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations have considerably more experience dealing with terrorism than the United States. Their experience has demonstrated the importance of preplanning, coordination among responding agencies, and effectively managing the media. Most other countries that have faced terrorist events are much smaller in size and in number of citizens than the U.S. As a result, responsibility for the management of terrorist incidents is usually handled capably by two or three agencies.

The American Approach. The United States is unique when compared to other nations in that responsibility for the management of terrorist incidents is shared with agencies at the Federal, state, and local level, as well as the private sector. These groups must work together as a team to provide the support necessary to handle a terrorist attack.

Preplanning. Preplanning is the key to handling a terrorist event successfully. The development of a formal, documented Emergency Management Plan is essential in detailing the responsibilities and activities of all emergency responders to terrorist events. Training exercises reinforce procedures in the Emergency Management Plan and also indicates any shortcomings the plan may have.

Resources. The resources available from local, state, and Federal agencies should be researched by transit agency personnel. Methods for tapping these resources in the event of an emergency should be understood. Getting to know the representatives from these agencies is a must.

Coordination. Effective incident response requires considerable coordination among the local transit agencies, fire and police departments, state organizations, Federal agencies, and the private sector. Successful coordination demands long-term planning, response training, the preparation of joint Emergency Management Plans, the conduct of drills and tabletop exercises, and debriefings to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the overall response effort.

Technology. Detection and response to changing terrorist threats involve the utilization of new technologies, many of which are still in the developmental stage. Transit agencies should become aware of what is available to assist them, but should also be cautious when procuring leading-edge technology.

Media. Traditionally, the media and the transit agency have had a confrontational relationship regarding the coverage given to major incidents. Transit agencies should recognize steps they can take to receive favorable and accurate coverage of an event in progress. They should also recognize how the media can assist in communicating information to the public.

Public Perception. The public perception of a terrorist attack is that is can often be an unusually violent act, such as the shooting on the Long Island Railroad, which does not conform to the legal definition of a terrorist act. Transit professionals should be aware that high profile crimes are often interpreted by the public as terrorist events. In general, the public will cooperate with increased security measures especially if they believe in the reality of the threat.

APPENDIX A

CONFERENCE AGENDA

TRANSIT SECURITY IN THE 90'S
CONFERENCE AGENDA

February 27 & 28, 1996 Atlanta, Georgia

GOAL:          To assist transit systems in recognizing, preparing for, and responding to the terrorist threat, disseminate information that can be used by the transit systems, and provide an opportunity for networking.

Tuesday, February 27, 1996:

SESSION I:

Opening Remarks:

Tom Lambert, Assistant GM and Chief of Police, Houston MTA

Introduction of Secretary:

Gordon Linton, FTA Administrator

Keynote Address:

Federico Peña, Secretary of Transportation

SESSION II:

Welcome:

Richard Simonetta, General Manager, MARTA

The Threat to Transit:

RADM Paul Busick, Director,
Office of Intelligence and Security, DOT

Overview of Terrorist Threat World-Wide:

Kevin Giblin, Sr. Intelligence Officer, FBI

 

 

The Media's Role in Reporting Terrorist Events:

Bonnie Anderson, National Correspondent, CNN

SESSION III:

Real Life Experiences - Introductions by RADM Busick

oThe French Perspective

Dominique Guiseppi, Commissaire de Police, Prefecture de Police,

Metropolitan Transit System and

Alain Caire, Director du Départment, Environment et Sécurité, Régie

Autonome Des Transports Parisiens

oThe Israeli Perspective

Commander David Tsur, Israel National Police Counter-Terrorism Unit

oThe Japanese Perspective

Mikio Shiokawa, Deputy Director, Security Div, National Police Agency

oThe American Perspective

Kenneth J. Donohue, Chief, NYPD Transit Bureau

Summary of Perspectives - RADM Busick

Closing Remarks - Tom Lambert

Wednesday, February 28,1996:

SESSION IV:

Opening Remarks for the Day - Tom Lambert

Anatomy of a Transit Incident, A Case Study/Facilitator Led Panel

Panel Facilitator:        Sharon Papa, Chief of Police, LACMTA

 

Transit:            Paul Lennon, Executive Director of Security & Safety, APTA

 

Media:             Beverly Silverberg, President, Silverberg Communications

 

Fire:                David Chamberlin, Fire and Safety Manager, ACOG

 

Police:             Kenneth J. Donohue, Chief, NYPD Transit Bureau
 

PHS:                 William Clark, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Public Health Service

FBI:                   Stephen R. Wiley, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FBI

FEMA:            Laura Buchbinder, Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and Exercise Directorate, FEMA

DoD:                 Col. John J. Ellis, Director, Combating Terrorism, SOLIC

DOT:                RADM Paul Busick, Director, Office of Intelligence and Security

  Public Services:          Jennifer Goad, Product Manager, Atlanta Red Cross

  Address to the Conference - Gordon J. Linton, FTA Administrator

SESSION V:

Resources Available - A Panel Discussion

Experts will represent his or her resources available to transit agencies and discuss support and training available.

Facilitator:       Phyllis McDonald, National Institute of Justice, DOJ

FBI:                Stephen Wiley, Assistant Special Agent in Charge

PHS:               William Clark, Deputy Director, Office of Emergence Preparedness

FEMA:           Laura Buchbinder, Deputy Associate Director for Preparedness, Training, and  Exercise Directorate

FTA:               Judy Meade, Director, Office of Safety and Security

Federal:           James Genovese, Chief, C/B Antiterrorism Team, ERDEC

APTA:             Paul Lennon, Executive Director of Security & Safety Programs

CNN:              Henry Schuster, Producer, Special Reports Unit

SESSION VI:

Summary of Proceedings - Tom Lambert

Closing Remarks - Gordon Linton

APPENDIX B

LIST OF ATTENDEES

TRANSIT SECURITY IN THE 90'S: ATLANTA, GA FEBRUARY 27 & 28,1996

Last Name

First Name

Title

Title/Transit System/Agency

Address

Phone/Fax #

Anderson

Bonnie

Ms.

National Correspondent
CNN

1 CNN Center
Box 105366
Atlanta, GA 30348

(404) 827-5672
(404) 827-1784 (fax)

Anderson

Sherrie D.

Ms.

Transportation Security Specialist
OST/S-60 (DOT)
Office of Intelligence & Security

400 Seventh St., S.W.
Washington, DC 20590

(202) 366-6605
(202) 366-7261 (fax)

Ansbro

Michael

Assistant Chief

Transit Bureau - NYPD

370 Jay Street, 2nd Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201

(718)243-3441
(718) 243-8909 (fax)

Arcangeli

Louis

Deputy Chief

Atlanta Police Department

175 Decatur Street, SE
Atlanta, GA 30335

(404)818-6668
(404) 658-7116 (fax)

Ash

Ronald W.

Mr.

Safety/Security Manager
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit
(HARTline)

430521st Avenue East
Tampa, FL 33605-2300

(813) 623-5835 x143
(813) 664-1119 (fax)

Avery

Vera

Lieutenant

Port Authority of Allegheny County

2235 Beaver Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15233

(412) 255-1350
(412) 255-1352

Baker

Arnold W.

Chief

Chief of Staff
San Francisco Municipal Railway

949 Presidio Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94115

(415)923-6139
(415) 923-6180 (fax)

Benton

Nicole P.

Ms.

Analyst
Atlanta Police Department

c/o FBI 2635 Century Parkway
N.E.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30345

(404)679-1462
(404)679-1501 (fax)

Black

Charles

Mr.

Security Director
Metro Dade Transit Agency

111 N.W. 1 Street
Miami, FL 33128

(305) 375-5857
(305) 375-5770 (fax)

Boyd

Annabelle

Ms.

Principal
Boyd, Maier & Associates

Route 2
Box 242
Barboursville, VA 22923

(804)985-1033
(804) 985- 8977 (fax)

Brown

Doug

Mr.

Deputy General Manager
MARTA

2424 Piedmont Road
Atlanta, GA 30296

(404)848-5351
(404) 848-5005 (fax)

Buchbinder

Laura

Ms.

Deputy Associate Director
for Preparedness, Training, and
Exercise Directorate
FEMA

PT-DAD
Room 622
500 C Street S.W.
Washington, DC 20472

(202) 646-3487
(202) 646-4557 (fax)

Burke

Lenora

Ms.

Task Manager
U.S. DOT/Volpe Center

55 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02142

(617) 494-2206
(617) 494-2684 (fax)

Busick

Paul E.

RADM

Director, Office of Intelligence &
Security
Office of the Secretary
Department of Transportation

400 Seventh St., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

(202) 366-6525
(202) 366-7261 (fax)

Cacini

Rick

Mr.

Transit Division
DTI-80
Transportation Safety Institute

P.O. Box 25082
Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5050

(405) 954-3682
(405) 954-3521 (fax)

Caire

Alain

Mr.

Directeur Du Départment Environment
et Sécurité
Régie Autonome Des Transports
Parisiens

54, Quai De La Rapée
Lac B9 16-75599
Paris Cedex 12, France

33.1 44.68.30.27
33.1 44.68.28.60 (fax)

Callen

Douglas

Mr.

Director of Intelligence
DOT

400 Seventh St, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

(202) 366-6528
(202) 366-7261 (fax)

Carroll

Gene

Mr.

Federal Transit Administration

1720 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30309-2439

(404) 347-3948
(404) 347-7849 (fax)

Cates

Timothy L.

Mr.

Security Project Manager
TRI-County Commuter Rail Authority/Wackenhut Corporation

305 South Andrews Avenue
Suite #200
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

(305) 771-5005
(305) 693-0450 (fax)

Chamberlin

David

Mr.

Fire and Safety Contingency Manager
Atlanta Committee for the Olympic
Games

250 Williams Street
Suite 6000
Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 548-2230 (404) 548-22 12 (fax)

Chastine

Gana

Ms.

Analyst
Georgia Bureau of Investigation

c/o FBI 2635 Century Parkway
N.E.,
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30345

(404)679-1457
(404) 679-1501 (fax)

Childers

Gil

Mr.

Special Council for the Olympics
US Department of Justice

10th and Constitution Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20530

(202) 514-1757
(202) 514-9368 (fax)

Clark

William E.

Deputy Director

Deputy Director
Office of Emergency Preparedness
US Public Health Service

5600 Fishers Lane
Room 4-81
Rockville, MD 20857

(301) 443-1167x204
(301) 443-5146 (fax)

Coleman

George

Deputy Chief

Fulton County Police Department

130 Peachtree Street, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

(770)730-5711
(770) 730-5758 (fax)

Croy

George

Commander

Domestic Plans Officer
Headquarters Forces Command

ATTN: ATOP-PLD
Fort McPherson, GA 30330-6000

(404) 669-7841
(404) 669-6399 (fax)

Currier

William

Mr.

Director of Operations
Southern California Regional Rail
Authority - Metrolink

818 West 7th Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017

(213)244-7166
(213) 244-6027 (fax)

Dacus

Samuel

Captain

LACMTA-Transit Police

One Gateway Plaza-Ninth Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213)972-3603
(213)972-3604

Dart

Robert W.

Mr.

General Manager
Chicago Transit Authority

P.O. Box 3555, Room 705
Merchandise Mart
Chicago, IL 60654

(312)664-7200 x3430
(312) 664-2997 (fax)

Depperman

Barry

Mr.

Supervisor of Security
MTA Long Island Bus

700 Commercial Avenue
Garden City, NY 11530

(516)542-0100 x4315
(516) 542- 1428 (fax)

Dinning

Michael

Chief

Safety & Security Division
U.S. DOT/Volpe Center

55 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02142

(617) 494-2242
(617) 494-2684 (fax)

Dittmeier

Tony

Mr.

Federal Transit Administration

1720 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30309-2439

(404) 347-3948
(404) 347-7849 (fax)

Donohue

Kenneth

Chief

Transit Bureau - NYPD

370 Jay Street, 2nd Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201

(718)243-3441
(713) 243-8909 (fax)

Dougherty

James M.

Mr.

Industrial Safety Specialist
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority

615 Superior Avenue, West
Cleveland, OH 44113

(216)566-5042
(216) 771-4426 (fax)

Ellis

John J.

Colonel

Director of Combatting Terrorism
Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations &
Low-Intensity Conflict
OASD(SO/LIC)CT

The Pentagon
Room 2B539
Washington, DC 20301-2500

(703) 693-2898
(703) 693-2578 (fax)

Esserman

Dean M.

Chief

Chief of Police
Metro-North Police

345 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10017

(212) 340-2720
(212) 340-2020 (fax)

Evans

Richard J.

Chief

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

1234 Market St. - 4th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 580-3640
(215) 580-3649 (fax)

Flynn

John J.

Mr.

General Superintendent of Plant
Maintenance
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority

600 5th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 962-5004
(202) 962-5 188 (fax)

Foran

Michael V.

Mr.

Manager, Logistics Division
FAA Southern Region

1701 Columbia Avenue
College Park, GA 30337

(404) 305-5700
(404) 305-5821 (fax)

Frank

Marshall

Mr.

Manager - Transit Security
Wackenhut Corporation: Miami, Ft.
Lauderdale, Milwaukee, Denver &
San Jose

1500 San Remo Avenue
Coral Gables, FL 33146

(305) 666-5656 or
(704) 926-2208
(305) 662-7448 (fax)

Frazier

Ernest R.

Chief

Chief of Police
Amtrak Police Department

2nd Floor, North Tower
30th Street Station
Philadelphia, PA 19104

(215)349-1674
(215) 349-4020 (fax)

Genovese

James A.

Chief

Chief, C/B Counterterrorism Team,
Attn: US Army ERDEC
SCBRD-RTB

Edgewood Research, Development
Engineering Center
APG, Maryland 21010-5423

(410)671-1915
(410) 671-8205 (fax)

Giblin

Kevin

Mr.

Unit Chief
Terrorist Research & Analytical
Center

FBI, Room 5431
9th and Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

(202) 324-2064
(202) 324-8297 (fax)

Glover

Michael D.

Sergeant

Transit Police Sergeant
Dallas Area Rapid Transit

P.O. Box 660163
Dallas, TX 75266-7268

(214)928-6322
(214) 928-6357 (fax)

Goad

Jennifer

Ms.

Project Manager - Disaster &
International Services
American Red Cross

1955 Monroe Drive, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30324

(404) 575-3143
(405) 575-3083

Graham

Louis

Chief

Fulton County Police Department

130 Peachtree Street, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

(404)730-5711
(404) 730-5758 (fax)

Guette

Philippe

Mr.

Chargé De Mission-
Régie Autonome Des Transports
Parisiens

54, Quai De La Rapée
Lac B916-75599
Paris Cedex 12, France

33.1 40.26.57.33
33.1 42.33.07.61 (fax)

Guiseppi

Dominique

Mr.

Commissaire de Police
Dept. of Protection and Security
of Metropolitan Transit System

Ile De la Cite
75195 Paris R-P
Paris, France 75008

53 71 35 60 or
53 46 12 01
40 48 78 93
or 53 46 12 00

Hammar

Patricia

Ms.

Security Programs Manager
U.S. DOT/Volpe

614 Winans Way
Baltimore, MD 21229

(202) 493-4006
(202) 267-3846 (fax)

Harkey

Donald R.

Captain

Charlotte Mecklenburg Police
Department

426 N. Tiron St.
Charlotte, NC 28202

(704) 336-5729
(704) 336-7307 (fax)

Harris

Art

Mr.

Correspondent, CNN Special
Assignments

One CNN Center
Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 827-4029 (404)
827- 1400 (fax)

Hartley

Michael D.

Mr.

Manager of Operations Programs
U.S. Department of Transportation,
(DET-3)

400 Seventh St., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

(202) 366-4548
(202) 366-3768 (fax)

Hathaway

William

Mr.

Senior Project Engineer
U.S. DOT/Volpe Center

55 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02142

(617) 494-2081
(617) 494-2684 (fax)

Hather

Steve

Mr.

Liaison Officer
Federal Bureau of Investigation

2635 Century Parkway N.E.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30345

(404) 679-1454
(404) 679-1501 (fax)

Hawkins

Richard

Mr.

Director
MTA New York City Transit

370 Jay Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201

(718)243-4405
(718) 243-8965 (fax)

Hill

James E.

Chief

Port Authority Transit Corporation

100 South Broadway
Camden, NJ 08103

(609) 963-7991
(609) 963-7999 (fax)

Hubonette

David

Deputy Chief

Metropolitan Transit Police Services

560 6th Avenue North
Minneapolis, MN 55411

(612) 349-7202
(612) 349-7299 (fax)

Hudson

William, Jr.

Mr.

President and General Manager
Memphis Area Transit

1370 Levee Road
Memphis, TN 38108

(901)722-7111
(901)722-7123 (fax)

Hughes

Robert T.

Chief

Chief of Protective Services
A.C. Transit District

1600 Franklin St.
Oakland, CA 94612

(510)891-4811
(510) 891-7157 (fax)

Hunter

Geoffrey

Lieutenant

Metro Transit Police/Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

600 5th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 962-2153
(202) 962-2491 (fax)

Immings

Myra

Ms.

Federal Transit Administration

1720 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30309-2439

(404) 347-3948
(404) 347-7849 (fax)

Infante

Anthony

Captain

The Port Authority of NY & NJ

One Path Plaza
Jersey City, NJ 07306

(201) 216-6081
(201) 216-6111 (fax)

Inglish

John

Mr.

Assistant General Manager
Utah Transit Authority

P.O. Box 30810
Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0810

(801) 287-4605
(801) 287-4622 (fax)

Johnson

Minnie Fells

Dr.

Executive Director
Miami Valley Regional Transit
Authority

600 Longworth Street
P.O. Box 1301
Dayton, OH 45401-1301

(513) 443-3010
(5 13) 463-5770 (fax)

Johnston

Ed

Mr.

Transit Division
DTI-80
Transportation Safety Institute

P.O. Box 25082
Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5050

(405) 954-3682
(405) 954-3682 (fax)

Joyce

John K.

Chief

Chief of Police
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority

615 Superior Avenue, N.W.
Cleveland, OH 44113-1877

(216) 566-5174
216) 771-4809 (fax)

Klick

Roger

Sergeant

Tri-Met/Portland Bureau

449 NE Emerson
Portland, OR 97211

(503) 823-2077
(503) 823-4146 (fax)

Klugman

Marc L.

Lieutenant

Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department
Southern California Regional Rail
Authority - MetroLink

818 West 7th Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017

(213)244-6877
(213) 244-6027 (fax)

Kucharchuk

Scott

Mr.

Analyst
Federal Bureau of Investigation

2635 Century Parkway N.E.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30345

(404) 679-1421
(404) 679-1501 (fax)

LaChasse

Scott R.

Commander

C/O, Uniformed Services Group
Los Angeles Police Department

150 N. Loss Angeles Street
Room 331
Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 485-3211
(213) 687-8341 (fax)

Lacy

Charles

Mr.

Transit Security Administration
Metropolitan Transit Development
Board

1255 Imperial Avenue, Suite 1000
San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 595-4947
(619) 234-3407 (fax)

Lambert

Tom

Chief

Chief of Transit Police Metropolitan Transit Authority

5700 Eastex Fwy
PO Box 61429
Houston, TX 77208-1429

(713)739-6808 (713)
652-8998 (fax)

LeCours

Jean A.

Mr.

Director, Preventive Security
Federal Government Transport Canada

330 Sparks Street
Suite 1361, Place de Ville
Ottawa, Ontario K1A-ON5

(613) 990-5516
(613) 990-2848 (fax)

Lennon

Paul J.

Mr.

Executive Director - Security & Safety
Management Programs
American Public Transit Association

1201 New York Ave, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 898-4083
(202) 898-4019 (fax)

Leonard

Frederick J.

Deputy Chief

METRA Police Department

547 West Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL 60661

(312) 322-2804
(312) 322-8905 (fax)

Linton

Gordon J.

Administrator

Federal Transit Administrator
Federal Transit Administration

Office of Program Management,
Office of Safety & Security,
TPM-30
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

(202) 366-4040
(202) 366-9854 (fax)

Lynch

Clark

Commander

S. F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Police
Department (B.A.R.T.)

800 Madison Street
Oakland, CA 94607

(510) 464-7633
(510) 464-7024 (fax)

Maier

Pat

Ms.

Principal
Boyd, Maier & Associates

Route 2
Box 242
Barboursville, VA 22923

(804) 985-1033
(804) 985- 8977 (fax)

Manigault

Fabian

Sergeant

MARTA Police

2424 Piedmont Road, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30324

(404) 848-4900
(404) 848-5005 (fax)

Martin

David J.

Chief

Chief of Transit Security
Phoenix Transit System

P.O. Box 4275
Phoenix, AR 85030-4275

(602) 495-5834
(602) 261-8869 (fax)

Martin

Elizabeth

Ms.

Federal Transit Administration

1720 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30309-2439

(404) 347-3948
(404) 347-7849 (fax)

Mastapeter

Craig

Mr.

Research Specialist FEMA

NS Room 525
500 C Street, SW
Washington, DC 20472

(202) 646-3025
(202) 646-4691 (fax)

McArdle

William T.

Chief

Port Authority of Allegheny County

2235 Beaver Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15233

(412) 255-1350 (412) 255- 1352 (fax)

McCarthy

J. A.

Major

Fulton County Police Department

130 Peachtree Street, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 730-5711
(404) 730-5758 (fax)

McDevitt

Barry J.

Deputy Chief

Metro Transit Police/Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

600 5th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 962-1550
(202) 962-2491 (fax)

McDonald

Phyllis

Ms.

Social Science Analyst
National Institute of Justice
Department of Justice

633 Indiana Ave, NW, 8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20531

(202) 616-3653
(202) 307-6394 (fax)

McGrath

Elizabeth

Ms.

Administrative Assistant
U.S. DOT/Volpe Center

55 Broadway
Kendall Square
Cambridge, MA 02142

(617) 494-2463
(617) 494-2684 (fax)

McKinney

Joe T.

Lieutenant

Lieutenant/Olympic Coordinator
MARTA Police

2424 Piedmont Road, N.E.
Atlanta, Ga 30324

(404) 848-4900
(404) 848-5005 (fax)

Meade

Judy

Ms.

Acting Director
Federal Transit Administration

Office of Program Management,
Office of Safety & Security,
TPM-30 400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

(202) 366-2896
(202) 366-7951 (fax)

Meza

Robert E.

Mr.

Vice President, Safety & Development
Chicago Transit Authority

P.O. Box 3555, Room 734
Merchandise Mart
Chicago, IL 60654

(312) 664-7200 x3140 (312) 664-0112 (fax)

Michopoulos

John

Mr.

Senior Consultant
Stone & Webster

245 Summer Street
Boston, MA 02210

(617) 589-6850
(617) 589-1372 fax

Miller

Mary Lynne

Ms.

Director, Prepared, Training, Exercise
Division
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)

1371 Peachtree Street, NE Suite
700
Atlanta, GA 30309

(404) 853-4200
(404) 853-4230 (fax)

Mishefske

Richard A.

Chief

Chief of Security/Risk Management
Administrator
TRI-County Commuter Rail Authority

305 South Andrews Avenue
Suite #200
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

(305) 693-8822
(305) 693-0450 (fax)

Moses

Samuel M.

Deputy Chief

Memphis Police Department

201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 12-16
Memphis, TN 38103

(901) 576-5706
(901) 576-3877 (fax)

Mraz, Jr.

Louis F.

Mr.

Regional Administrator
Federal Transit Administration,
Region VIII

216 16th St.
Suite 650
Denver, CO 80202

(303) 844-3242
(303) 844-4217 (fax)

Neely

Darlene M.

Major

Atlanta Police Department

175 Decatur Street, S.E.
Atlanta, GA 30335

(404) 209-5260
(404) 209-5268 (fax)

Norman

Russ

Mr.

Risk Manager
Utah Transit Authority

P.O. Box 30810
Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0816

(801) 262-5626
(801) 287-4614 (fax)

O'Connor

John J.

Chief

Chief of Police
Long Island Rail Road Police
Department

93-95 183rd Street
Hollis, NY 11423

(718)558-3322
(718) 558-3307 (fax)

O'Hare

Francis M.

Inspector

Deputy Inspector
New York City Police Department
Transit Bureau

370 Jay Street, Room 3331
Brooklyn, NY 11201

(718) 243-4160
(718) 243-7763 (fax)

Obremski

Frank L.

Deputy Chief

Deputy Chief of Police
Long Island Rail Road Police
Department

93-95 183rd Street
Hollis, NY 11423

(718) 558-3322
(718) 558-3307 (fax)

Papa

Sharon

Chief

Chief of Police
Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transit Authority
Transit Police Department

1 Gateway Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 922-3601
(213) 922-3604 (fax)

Parker

Michael A.

Major

Police Operations
MARTA Police Department

2424 Piedmont Road, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30324-3330

(404) 848-4907
(404) 848-5005 (fax)

Perry

John

Mr.

Security Specialist
Regional Transportation District

1600 Blake Street, #31
Denver, CO 80202-1399

(303) 299-2460
(303) 299-2061 (fax)

Phillips

W. H.

Deputy Chief

Fulton County Police Department

130 Peachtree Street, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

(770)730-5711
(770) 730-5758 (fax)

Pluff

Tracy D.

Chief

Chief Safety Officer
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority

2424 Piedmont Road, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30324

(404) 848-5576
(404) 848-5041 (fax)

Powell

Kathryn C.

Mrs.

Project Manager
Hernandez Engineering Inc.

7701 Greenbelt Road, Suite 204
Greenbelt, MD 20770

(301) 441-3204
(301) 441-9442 (fax)

Powers

David J.

Captain

Los Angeles Police Department

207 S. Broadway, Suite 200
Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 485-2636
(213) 485-8596 (fax)

Price

Dorthy H.

Ms.

Analyst
Drug Enforcement Administration

c/o FBI 2635 Century Parkway
N.E.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30345

(404) 679-1420
(404) 679-1501 (fax)

Rabadeau

Mary F.

Chief

Chief of Police
NJ Transit Police Department

180 Boyden Avenue
Maplewood, NJ 07040

(201) 378-6088
(201)378-6130 (fax)

Ramos

Javier

Lieutenent

LACMTA-Transit Police

One Gateway Plaza-Ninth FloorLos
Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 972-3603
(213) 972-3604 (fax)

Rancifer

Rodney M.

Mr.

Intelligence Unit Commander
DeKalb County Police

3630 Camp Circle
Decatur, GA 30032

(404) 297-3902

Roberts

Stephen T.

Mr.

Director of Operations
Virginia Railway Express

6800 Versar Center
Suite 247
 Springfield, VA 22151

(703) 642-3808
(703) 642-3820 (fax)

Rodano

Edith M.

Ms.

Transit Safety & Security Specialist
Federal Transit Administration

Office of Program Management,
Office of Safety & Security,
TPM-30 400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

(202) 366-0191
(202) 366-7951 (fax)

Roper

Charles G.

Lieutenent

OIC, Tactical Planning Section
Los Angeles Police Department

150 N. Los Angeles Street
Room 331
Los Angeles, CA 90012

(213) 485-4011
(213) 687-8341 (fax)

Saccardo

Joseph C.

Major

Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority
MBTA Police Department

275 Dorchester Avenue
South Boston, MA 02127

(617) 222-4545
617) 222-1212 (617) 222-4655 (fax)

Savage

Thomas J.

Mr.

Chief Security Officer MTA - New York City Transit

370 Jay Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201

(718) 243-3822
(718) 243-3484 (fax)

Scher

Dagobert

Mr.

Special Assistant to the VP of
International Affairs
French National Railroad

3874 Midshore Drive
Naples, FL 33999

(941) 514-2640
(941) 514-3576 fax

Schuster

Henry

Mr.

Special Reports Producer
CNN

One CNN Center
Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 827-5672
(404) 827- 1784 (fax)

Scott

Beverly A.

Ms.

Deputy General Manager of
Administration
Washing Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority

600 5th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 962-1500
(202) 962- 1133 (fax)

Shiokawa

Mikio

Mr.

Senior Superintendent
Deputy Director, Security Division
National Police Agency

2-1-2 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo, Japan 100

(81) 3-3581-0141 loc. 6376 (81) 3-3597-8004 (fax) 4412 (general affairs section message acceptable)

Silverberg

Beverly R.

Ms.

Communications Inc.

3904 Calverton Drive
Hyattsville, MD 20782

(301) 779-0861
Fax Same #

Simonetta

Richard J.

Mr.

General Manager
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority

2424 Piedmont Rd., N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30324

(404) 848-5000
(404) 848-5005 (fax)

Sirmons

J. Gary

Mr.

Associate Regional Health
Administrator for Emergency
Preparedness
US Public Health Service

101 Marietta Tower
Suite 1106
Atlanta, GA 30323

(404) 331-5879
(404) 331-2056 (fax)

Stone

Charles S.

Mr.

Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Georgia Bureau of Investigation -
Antiterrorist Unit

P.O. Box 370808
Decatur, GA 30037-0808

(404) 244-2539
(404) 244-2884 (fax)

Sullivan

John P.

Deputy Sheriff

Los Angeles Sheriffs Department

4700 Ramona Boulevard
Monterey Park, CA 91754

(213) 526-5489
(213) 267-6615 (fax)

Taylor

H.E.

Chief

S. F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Police
Department (B.A.R.T.)

800 Madison Street
Oakland, CA 94607

(510) 464-7633
(510) 464-7024 (fax)

Tillinghast

Steve

Mr.

Security Director
Tri-Met

4012 SE 17th Avenue
Portland, OR 97202

(503) 238-5835
(503) 238-4997 (fax)

Tindall

Diane

Ms.

Military Plans Specialist
Headquarters Forces Command

ATTN: ATOP-PLD
Fort McPherson, GA

(404) 669-7841
(404) 669-6399 (fax)

Tsur

David

Commander

Commander, Israeli National Police
Anti-Terrorist Unit

c/o Georgia Department of Safety
P.O. Box 1456
Atlanta, Georgia 30371-2303

 

Vappie

Jeffrey

Seargeant

Assistant Commander/Transit Police
Unit
Regional Transit Authority

216 North Gayoso Street
New Orleans, LO 70119

(504) 826-7920
(504) 826-7928 (fax)

Walker

Coleman H.

Lieutenant

DeKalb County Police Department

2484 Bruce Street
Lithonia, GA 30058

(770) 482-0350
(770) 482-0361 (fax)

Walker

Hiram J.

Mr.

Associate Administrator for Program
Management
Federal Transit Administration

Office of Program Management,
Office of Safety & Security,
TPM-30
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

(202) 366-4020
(202) 366-7951 (fax)

Weber

Robert E.

Mr.

Emergency Management Program
Specialist
FEMA Region 4

1371 Peachtree Street, NE
Suite 600
Atlanta, GA 30309

(404) 853-4452
(404) 853-4344 (fax)

Wiley

Stephen R.

Mr.

Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation

2635 Century Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30345

(404) 679-6120
(404) 679-6378 (fax)

Williams

Ted

Mr.

Assistant General Manager of Rail
Services
MARTA

2424 Piedmont Road
Atlanta, GA 30296

(404) 848-5110
(404) 848-5020 (fax)

Wilson

Gene

Chief

Director of Police Services
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority

2424 Piedmont Road, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30324

(404) 848-4900
(404) 848-5005 (fax)

Wright

Guy

Mr.

Director of System Safety
San Francisco Municipal Railway

949 Presidio Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94115

(415) 923-6212
(415) 923-6218 (fax)

Yearwood

George

Mr.

Director, Operation Support Division
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)

1371 Peachtree Street, N.E Suite
700
Atlanta, GA 30309

(404) 853-4200
(404) 853-4230 (fax)

Young

Kirwan H.

Mr.

Manager of Security & Fare
Enforcement
Bi-State Development Agency

707 North First Street
St. Louis, MI 63102

(314) 982-1507
(314) 982- 1400 x2209 (fax)

APPENDIX C

SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

Transit Security In The 90's
Speaker Biographies

February 27 - 28, 1996 - Atlanta, Georgia

Bonnie Anderson
National Correspondent
Cable News Network

Ms. Anderson is a CNN National Correspondent covering the Nation's top breaking news stories. For CNN, Ms. Anderson has covered the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Los Angeles earthquake, the Amtrak train wreck in Alabama, the Pope's visit to Denver, the Branch Davidian standoff in Waco and Hurricane Andrew in South Florida. A professional journalist for nearly twenty years, Ms. Anderson's career includes experience in both television journalism and the print media. In addition to working at WPLG-TV and WRVJ-TV in Miami, she has also been a columnist at the Miami News and reported at The Miami Herald. Prior to her work at CNN, Ms. Anderson worked for NBC News as an international correspondent covering such events as the Falklands War, the civil wars in E1 Salvador and Nicaragua (where she traveled with the Contras,) and other world events. A finalist for the 1979 Pulitzer Prize in Feature Writing, Ms. Anderson has won 5 Emmy Awards, the Wolfson Media Award and numerous AP and UPI awards. She holds a Bachelors degree in Journalism from Northwestern University and has studied Spanish, world history and art at the University of Barcelona, Spain.

Laura Buchbinder
Deputy Associate Director
Preparedness, Training and Exercises Directorate
FEMA

Ms. Buchbinder has more than 25 years experience in emergency management and has been with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) since it was created in 1979. As Deputy Associate Director of the PT&E Directorate, Ms. Buchbinder's responsibilities span a range of programs such as emergency management training for all levels of Government; assistance to State and local governments in the development of plans and capabilities required to respond to disasters; multi-level exercises to test response plans and procedures; and support to the Department of State and NATO in providing emergency management advise and assistance to other nations. During her tenure with FEMA, she has served as Division Director in FEMA's Response and Recovery Directorate where she helped revise the Federal Response Plan, and also served as Superintendent of the Emergency Management Institute. She has established a national information system on State and local emergency capabilities and managed a variety of programs within the U. S. Fire Administration. Ms. Buchbinder holds a Bachelors of Science from the University of Texas, a Master of Science degree from the University of Illinois, and is a graduate of the National War College.

Rear Admiral Paul E. Busick
Director
Office of Intelligence and Security
Office of the Secretary
Department of Transportation

Rear Admiral Busick is the Director of Intelligence and Security at the Department of Transportation. He began his service on the Coast Guard Cutter SPENCER and has since had a varied career completing flight training, aircraft maintenance officer training, and reviewing Coast Guard intelligence, security and law enforcement programs. Rear Admiral Busick has had two commands: Air Station San Francisco and the Aviation Training Center in Mobile. In 1991 he became Deputy Chief, Office of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations at Coast Guard Headquarters, where he supervised intelligence and security programs; defense initiatives; and drug, fishery, and migrant law enforcement operations. Rear Admiral Busick is the recipient of three Coast Guard Meritorious Service Medals, two Coast Guard Commendation Medals, and the Coast Guard Achievement Medal. He also wears the Coast Guard Humanitarian Service Medal, the Coast Guard Unit Commendation, two Coast Guard Meritorious Unit Commendations, a Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation, two National Defense Medals, the Vietnam Service Medal, and the Expert Rifle Medal. Rear Admiral Busick is a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and the Naval War College and holds a Masters in Industrial Administration from Purdue.

Alain Caire
Director du Départment
Environment et Sécurité
Régie Autonome Des Transports Parisiens

Mr. Caire joined the Régie Autonome Des Transports Parisiens (RAPT) in 1969, after having served seven years as a naval officer in the French Navy. As an engineer with the management service, he was responsible for commercial and security management of one third of the Paris underground rail, as well as opening nine new lines on the railway. He is known as one of the "Founding Fathers" of the management simulator SOSIE, the first of its kind in the transportation network. After acting as leader of the RAPT cadres trade union, Mr. Caire was appointed by the Prime Minister to the National Defense Higher Studies Institute as an auditor. In a later assignment he was in charge of the SOFRETU engineering operations conducted to design the equipment used for the development of the Channel Tunnel. Mr. Caire became the Deputy Manager of the Meteor project, responsible for management and security issues during the building of a very high capacity, entirely automatic Parisian metro line. He was then nominated Director of the Metro Department, responsible for the entire Parisian Metro. Currently, Mr. Caire is a special advisor to the RAPT Chairman and member of the Board, as well as Director of the Environment and Security Department.

David M. Chamberlin, Sr.
Fire and Safety Manager
Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games

Chief Chamberlin is the Fire Safety Contingency Planning Manager with the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games. Chief Chamberlin has served in the Fire Service since 1959 when he became a volunteer firefighter in New England. Since that time, Chief Chamberlin has served in the US Navy and began his career with the Atlanta Fire Department in 1966 where he started out as a firefighter. Chief Chamberlin rose from the ranks to become Assistant Fire Chief, Deputy Chief of Operations and in 1990, Fire Chief for the City of Atlanta Fire Department as appointed by Mayor Maynard Jackson. During his tenure as Fire Chief, Chamberlin received many accolades for his work in the community, establishing better relations with the media and establishing additional sources of revenue and resources from cooperative ventures with private sector interests. Chief Chamberlin has served as an adjunct instructor for the National Fire Academy and presently serves as a Presenter and Exercise Controller for the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) at the National Emergency Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. Chief Chamberlin holds a degree in Fire Science and is a member of many fire service organizations.

William E. Clark
Deputy Director
Office of Emergency Preparedness
Public Health Service

Mr. Clark is the Deputy Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness/National Disaster Medical System of the U.S. Public Health Service. In this position he serves as the principal assistant to the Director who is responsible for coordinating the Department of Health and Human Services planning and response for National security emergencies and domestic disasters. He has received national recognition for his work in coordinating and directing the U.S. Government's health and medical response to many disasters. Mr. Clark is one of the Federal Response Plan's 12 national planning leaders with functional planning responsibility for health and medical response to a disaster or major emergency following a declaration by the President. He is currently developing counterterrorism plans with emphasis on weapons of mass destruction in support of the FBI. Prior to his work at Public Health, Mr. Clark has served over 27 years in the State of Maryland with the University of Maryland, the State Police, the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, and the Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems. Mr. Clark is the U.S. civil member of the NATO Joint Medical Committee, chairs the response planning subcommittee of the Federal Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, and is a member of the Maryland Emergency management Advisory Council. He is a Navy veteran and holds a Bachelors degree from the University of Maryland and a Masters from Towson State.

Kenneth J. Donohue
Chief
NYPD Transit Bureau

Chief Donohue is the first "Chief of Transit Bureau" for the New York City Police Department. He was appointed by mayor Rudolph W. Guiliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton to this position in April of 1995. As head of the new bureau, Chief Donohue is one of the seven three star "super chiefs" responsible for most of the day-to-day management of the nation's largest law enforcement agency. Under Chief Donohue, the Transit Bureau's mission is to ensure a safe, orderly, and responsive transportation environment in order to promote the confidence of the riding public, which it has done by decreasing the level of crime and disorder on the New York City Subway for the fifth year in a row. Chief Donohue joined the New York City Transit Police Department in 1965 after serving in the US Army. He has worked in a variety of assignments in all boroughs of New York City except Staten Island. Promoted to captain in 1988, he has served in many critical management positions, including the executive offices of both the Transit Police Department's Patrol Bureau and Special Operations Unit. He has also served as the Commanding Officer of Manhattan/Bronx and Central Robbery detectives, CO of the Technical Support Division, and CO of Patrol District 30. Chief Donohue holds a Bachelor's degree from the New York Institute of Technology.

Colonel John J. Ellis
Director
Combating Terrorism
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict

Col. Ellis has served 27 years as an Army infantry officer in a wide variety of assignments. As Director, Combating Terrorism, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC, Col. Ellis is responsible for all aspects of policy overview for special operations forces, Research and Development (R&D), and the SOLIC budget. A combat veteran, Col. Ellis has served primarily in the field in command of infantry units from platoon to brigade level, including Ranger companies and battalions. His assignments have included appointment to the White House, faculty member of the US Military Academy, Division Operations Officer in Korea, and assignments in the special operations community throughout the world. Col. Ellis holds an undergraduate degree from the University of Florida, a Masters degree from the University of Utah, and is a graduate of the National War College. He has received a variety of awards including the combat infantryman's badge, master jump wings, and the Ranger Tab.

James A. Genovese
Chief
C/B Antiterrorism Team
ERDEC

Mr. Genovese is the Chief of the Chemical and Biological Counter-terrorism Team at the U.S. Army's Chemical Biological Defense Command. Mr. Genovese has served as an experimental research chemist at the U.S. Army's Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground for 14 years. His initial research and development efforts focused on the advancement of special purpose retaliatory chemical munitions, including lethal binary, antiprotective, and advanced riot control systems. Since 1990, he has refocused his efforts in the area of chemical/biological terrorism. He is a nationally and internationally recognized expert regarding chemical/biological incident response. In addition to his service on the Chemical and Biological Counterterrorsim Team, he is the chairman of the International Working Group for CD Incident Research and Development and also serves as the co-chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction subgroup of the U.S. Interagency Technical Support Working Group. Mr. Genovese holds a Bachelors degree in Chemistry from Towson State, a Masters in Analytical Chemistry from the University of Maryland, and an MBA from Central Michigan.

Kevin P. Giblin
Chief
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center
FBI

Mr. Giblin serves as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Senior Intelligence Officer for Counter-terrorism. In this capacity, he is also the Chief of the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center which publishes "Terrorism in the United States," the annual FBI report on terrorism trends and developments. He is a twenty year veteran of the FBI's analytical program. Prior to his current assignment in the FBI's Counter-terrorism Section, Mr. Giblin had supervisory and analytical tours in the FBI's counterintelligence and counterespionage programs.

Jennifer Goad
Product Manager
Disaster and International Services
Metropolitan Atlanta Chapter
American Red Cross

Ms. Goad has served in the American Red Cross for ten years. Currently Product Manager of Disaster and International Services in Atlanta, her assignments include Assistant Director for Disaster Services in Houston, Texas; Disaster Specialist for the State of Texas; National Instructor for American Red Cross Disaster Services; and International Humanitarian Law Instructor. She acts as the Secretary/Treasurer for the Georgia Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. Ms. Goad holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Social Work from the University of Texas.

Thomas C. Lambert
Assistant General Manager and Chief of Police
Houston MTA

Mr. Lambert is the Assistant General Manager and Chief of Police of the Traffic Management Department for the Metropolitan Transit Authority (METRO) in Houston, Texas. In this capacity, Mr. Lambert is responsible for directing and managing METRO'S Traffic Management Department. Prior to joining METRO, Mr. Lambert served as a senior police officer with the Austin Police Department. He is currently a board member of the Intelligent Transportation Society (ITS) of Texas and has served as either a member or chairman of several committees including the APTA Drug and Alcohol Abuse Task Force, the APTA Police/Security Committee, and the FTA Security Advisory Committee. Mr. Lambert has served as an Associate Staff Instructor for the USDOT Transportation Safety Institute. He has been recognized by the USDOT as an expert in mass transit security training. Mr. Lambert holds a Bachelors degree in Political Science from Southwest Texas State and a Masters in Public Administration from the University of Houston.

Dominique Guiseppi
Police Superintendent,
Chief of Paris Metropolitan Transit System Security
Paris Police Department

Mr. Guiseppi has based his entire career on police work. He has served as a Special Agent in Charge of the Intervention and Security Group, Captain of the Official Travels Security Department, Special Agent of the VIP's Protection Department, Police Superintendent of the 5th Security District of Paris, and Chief of the 18th Paris Police Department. As Chief, Mr. Guiseppi's responsibilities include the overall security of the Paris Metropolitan Transit System. Mr. Guiseppi holds a Master's degree in Public Law, a Certificate in Political Studies, and a Doctorate's in Security Policies and Management. His special qualifications include Shooting Trainer and Expert in Close Personal Security.

Paul J. Lennon
Executive Director of Security and Safety Management Programs
APTA

Mr. Lennon is the Executive Director of Security and Safety Management Programs for APTA. In this capacity he oversees the Associations's Rail Safety Audit Program which presently is comprised of 23 rail transit systems throughout North America and is the Staff Advisor to the Rail Safety Review Board. Mr. Lennon also serves as Staff Advisor to APTA's Rail Operations, Bus Operations, Rail Safety, Bus Safety, and the Police/Security Committees. Mr. Lennon began his transit career with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority in Boston as a bus, trackless trolley, and light rail operator. Mr. Lennon worked through the ranks to become the Chief Transportation Officer (CTO). In this capacity, he was responsible for the day-to-day operations of MBTA's bus, light rail, rail rapid-transit, and commuter boat operations as well as the Operations Control Center. He directed the activities of over 4,000 employees and was responsible for an operating budget in excess of $110 million. Mr. Lennon is a Viet Nam veteran, and a Magna Cum Laude graduate of Northeastern University with a Bachelors degree in Transportation Management. In addition he is a faculty member at Northeastern University's School of Continuing Education.

Gordon J. Linton
Administrator
Federal Transit Administration

Mr. Linton is the 13th Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). He was nominated by President Clinton, confirmed by the US Senate, and sworn in on August 20, 1993. As Chief Executive of FTA, Mr. Linton manages an annual budget of $4.6 billion and leads a staff of more than 450 employees at headquarters in Washington, D.C. and in offices located in each of the ten Federal regions throughout the United States. During his tenure as Administrator, Mr. Linton's innovations have focused on improved customer service, increased efficiency in service delivery, and making transit an integral part of the life of the community. To demonstrate FTA's commitment to maintaining the vitality of transit in America, Mr. Linton championed, and Congress enacted, a 21 % increase in the FTA FY 1995 budget over the previous Administration's Federal Transit Assistance Program budget. Mr. Linton joined FTA after serving six terms in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives where he served as Vice Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Chairman of the Transportation Committee on Public Transportation, and Chairman of the Pennsylvania legislative Black Caucus. Mr. Linton has served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the Nations's fourth largest transit system. Mr. Linton holds a Bachelors degree in Economics from Lincoln University and a Masters in Counseling Psychology from Antioch University.

Phyllis P. McDonald, Ph.D.
Social Science Analyst
National Institute of Justice
Department of Justice

Dr. McDonald is a Social Science Analyst with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. She is responsible for several research projects to evaluate the impact of Crime Bill funding. Dr. McDonald served with the New York City Transit Police Department as a Command Executive for six years prior to joining the NIJ and currently serves as Chairman of a committee for the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP), National Research Council. The purpose of the committee is to provide oversite to the first research project on transportation policing funded by the TCRP. She has worked with large police departments holding both sworn and civilian managerial positions. Throughout her career she has been responsible for law enforcement training, internal affairs, inspections, policy development, research and crime analysis. She has published a book on police/student relations, and several articles on management in law enforcement, mass transportation policing and juvenile delinquency prevention.

Judy Meade
Director
Office of Safety and Security
Federal Transit Administration

Ms. Meade is the Acting Director of the Office of Safety and Security for the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). Prior to joining the FTA as a member of the University Research and Training Program Staff in 1977, she was employed at Galludet University and MIT. Ms. Meade served as the Director of the Administrative Support Staff for FTA's R&D program She has authored the FTAs alcohol testing regulation and has authored and implemented a drug testing regulation for the transit industry. She is responsible for the Transit Safety Training Program at the Transportation Safety Institute and has become FTA's advocate for pro-active, non-traditional transit security strategies. Ms. Meade is a graduate of the George Washington University.

Sharon K. Papa
Chief of Police
LACMTA

Ms. Papa is the Chief of Transit Police for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA). She has held this position for 5 years, during which the sworn officer ranks within the Department increased from 85 positions to 425 positions. Chief Papa possesses 16 years of law enforcement experience, including 14 years with the Transit Police Department. Her experience includes line officer duties, investigative work, supervisory responsibilities, and management skills which she gained through promotions up the ranks of the Department. She also has a background in labor negotiations and served on a state-wide labor representation committee for peace officers. She served as President of the Transit Police Officers Association for four years. She is currently the Chair of APTA's Police and Security Subcommittee and was awarded the 1991 Medal of Excellence from the prestigious women's group, "Women at Work." Chief Papa possesses an Associates degree in Administration of Justice from Santa Monica College and a Bachelors degree in Management from the University of Redlands.

Federico F. Peña
US Secretary of Transportation

Mr. Peña is the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, nominated by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and sworn in on January 21, 1993. With more than 107,000 employees, the Department of Transportation has responsibility for nine administrations whose jurisdictions include highways; civil aviation; mass transit; railroads; commercial use of outer space; the merchant marine; and the safety of waterways, ports, highways, and oil and gas pipelines. The DOT also oversees the United States Coast Guard. In mass transit, Secretary Peña has sought the largest budget commitment in U.S. history and has taken the lead in pushing for the Clinton Administration's high-speed rail initiative - a $1.3 billion program that will assist states and cities in creating new high-speed rail corridors across the country. Realizing the key contributions that defense conversion can make in the transportation field, Secretary Peña has secured DOT participation in the $500 million Technology Reinvestment Project that aims at supporting "dual-use" and purely civilian research and development by defense contractors. Under his leadership, DOT is aggressively pursuing the basic goals of spurring the American economy and enhancing the U.S. global competitiveness; fostering safety, efficiency and environmental quality throughout the transportation system and improving the lives of the American people by increasing speed, convenience and safety in the movement of both people and freight.

Secretary Peña served as the Mayor of Denver, Colorado from 1983 - 1991 and also as a Colorado legislator. As Mayor, Mr. Peña led an urban and economic renaissance, reversing Denver's mid-1980's decline through a series of bold initiatives. As the mayor of a growing city, Peña mastered the task of linking many modes of transportation into a seamless system that combined highways, traditional mass transit and innovative light rail systems. Secretary Peña views investment in transportation as one of the keys to reviving America's economy, creating jobs, and enabling American companies to compete and win in the world economy.

Mikio Shiokawa
Deputy Director
Security Division
Security Bureau
Japanese National Police Agency

As Deputy Director of the Security Division of the Security Bureau for the National Police Agency, Mr. Shiokawa is responsible for national security issues, including counter-terrorism, and is in charge of the Asia Pacific Economic Conference security measures. He has also served as Assistant Director for Domestic Terrorism, NPA; Chief of the Foreign Affairs Division for Kanagawa Prefect Police; and First Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Mr. Shiokawa was educated at the University of Tokyo where he received an LL. B. degree from the Faculty of Law.

Henry Schuster
Senior Producer
CNN Special Reports
Cable News Network

Henry Schuster has been senior producer for CNN Special Reports since July 1995. In that capacity, he has produced "Baby Chase" on adoption, "Between Black and White" on race relations, "Time Man of the Year" and "1995: Year in Review." As Supervising Producer for CNN, Mr. Schuster was responsible for overseeing the network's on-air product, especially late-night and morning programming. In that capacity, he was involved in the coverage of such breaking news events as the Soviet coup, the Los Angeles riots, Hurricane Andrew, and the Oklahoma City bombing. He was also senior producer of "CNN World Report." Previously, Mr. Schuster was the executive producer of "Future Watch," and also developed and launched "Network Earth" for TBS. Mr. Schuster was a Benton Broadcast Fellow at the University of Chicago, and won the ACE Award for his CNN production of "In Search of a Drug Free America."

Beverley Silverberg
President
Beverly R. Silverberg Communications, Inc.

Ms. Silverberg is the principal of Beverley R. Silverberg Communications, Inc. Ms. Silverberg has over twenty years of communication expertise and is a consultant and lecturer on media and crisis communication issues. Ms. Silverberg began her communications career by creating and managing the public affairs programs for the Department of Transportation. During the air traffic controller's strike, she was responsible for DOT's news room activities. She also headed the DOT's Visitor and Information Center. After 13 years with DOT, Ms. Silverberg became the Director of Public Affairs and the Assistant General Manager of Public Service for Planning, Marketing and Public Affairs for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (METRO). During her years at Metro, she coordinated numerous full scale disaster drills, working with transit personnel, police, fire and rescue officials, as well as with the media and government agencies. As the spokesperson for one of the nation's largest transit systems for almost a decade she has acted swiftly, calmly and intelligently under fire by radio, TV, and print reporters. A Washington reporter called her a true "spin surgeon."

Richard J. Simonetta
General Manager
MARTA

Mr. Simonetta is the General Manger of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority "MARTA" in Atlanta, Georgia. In this capacity Mr. Simonetta is the CEO of the seventh largest public transportation system in the United States, with assets in excess of $3 billion, operating more than 50 million miles of bus and rail service annually. Mr. Simonetta has worked in the transit industry for 26 years, having served as the General Manger of transit systems in Columbus, Ohio; Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He has also held transit management positions in Denver, Colorado and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He is currently the immediate Past Chairperson of the American Public Transit Association (APTA) where he has also served as Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Secretary-Treasurer, and as a member of the Board of Directors. Mr. Simonetta holds a Masters in Regional Planning from Perm State.

Commander David Tsur
Counter-Terrorism Unit
Israel National Police

Commander Tsur was the Commander of the Counter-Terrorism Unit of the Israel National Police. During his military service, Commander Tsur was a platoon leader of a Paratroopers Unit in the Israel Defense Forces. He then joined the Counter-Terrorism Unit of the Israel National Police and has served as a Combattant and Team Commander, Platoon Commander, Training Officer, Operations Officer, and finally, Commander of the Unit. Commander Tsur is currently on loan to the Georgia Public Safety Department to assist the State, including MARTA, with Olympic preparations. He is a graduate of Tel-Aviv University with a Bachelor of Social Science degree. He is tri-lingual, speaking Hebrew, English, and Spanish.

Stephen R. Wiley
Assistant Special Agent In Charge
FBI

Mr Wiley is the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Division of the FBI. Mr. Wiley joined the FBI as a Special Agent and worked in various field offices along the Eastern seaboard. He has served as both a member and subsequently a supervisor of the Hostage Rescue Team at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. He has also served as a supervisor in Counter-terrorism Planning at the Criminal Investigative Division at FBI Headquarters. Mr. Wiley's other experience with the Bureau includes service with the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Unit at the Pentagon and the Violent Crimes/Fugitive Unit at FBI Headquarters. Prior to his service at the FBI, Mr. Wiley was a member of the US Marine Corps attaining the rank of Staff Sergeant. Mr. Wiley holds a Bachelors degree in Business Administration from Georgetown University.

APPENDIX D

RESOURCES

 

Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Offices

Addresses and Telephone Numbers
56 locations in major U.S. cities and Puerto Rico
Listed in alphabetical order BY CITY

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fifth Floor
445 Broadway
Albany, New York 12207
(518) 465-7551

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 300
415 Silver Street, Southwest
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102
(505) 224-2000

Federal Bureau of Investigation
101 East Sixth Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
(907) 276-4441

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 400
2635 Century Parkway, Northeast
Atlanta, Georgia 30345
(404) 679-9000

Federal Bureau of Investigation
7142 Ambassador Road
Baltimore, Maryland 21244
(410) 265-8080

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 1400
2121 Building
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
(205) 252-7705

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 600
One Center Plaza
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 742-5533

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 300
1801 North Lamar
Dallas, Texas 75202
(214) 720-2200

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Office Building, Suite 1823
1961 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80294
(303) 629-7171

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Office Building
477 Michigan Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 965-2323

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite C-600
700 East San Antonio Avenue
El Paso, Texas 79901
(915) 533-7451

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4307
300 Ala Moana Boulevard
Honolulu, Hawaii 96850
(808) 521-1411

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 200
2500 East TC Jester
Houston, Texas 77008
(713) 868-2266

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 679
575 North Pennsylvania Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
(317) 639-3301

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 1553
100 West Capitol Street
Jackson, Mississippi 39269
(601) 948-5000

Federal Bureau of Investigation
16320 Northwest Second Avenue
North Miami Beach, Florida 33169
(305) 944-9101

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 600
330 East Kilbourn Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
(414) 276-4684

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 1100
111 Washington Avenue, South
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401
(612) 376-3200

Federal Bureau of Investigation
St. Louis Centre
1 St. Louis Street
Mobile, Alabama 36602
(334) 438-3674

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Gateway 1
Market Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(201) 622-5613

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Office Building
150 Court Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06510
(203) 777-6311

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 2200
1250 Poydras Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70113
(504) 522-4671

Federal Bureau of Investigation
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278
(212) 384-1000

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite E1606
2800 Cottage Way
Sacramento, California 95825
(916) 481-9110

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 2704
1520 Market Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63103
(314) 589-2500

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 1200
257 East 200 Street, South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 579-1400

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 200
615 East Houston Street
San Antonio, Texas 78205
(210) 225-6741

Federal Bureau of Investigation
9797 Aero Drive
San Diego, California 92123-1800
(619) 565-1255

Federal Bureau of Investigation
One FBI Plaza
Buffalo, New York 14202-2698
(716) 856-7800

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 900
400 South Tyron Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28285
(704) 377-9200

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 905
E.M. Dirksen Federal Office Building
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 431-1333

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 9023
550 Main Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 421-4310

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 3005
Federal Office Building
1240 East 9th Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44199
(216) 522-1400

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 1357
1835 Assembly Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
(803) 254-3011

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 200
7820 Arlington Expressway
Jacksonville, Florida 32211
(904) 721-1211

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 300
U.S. Courthouse
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
(816) 221-6100

Federal Bureau of Investigation
6th Floor
710 Locust Street
Knoxville, Tennessee 37901
(423) 544-0751

Federal Bureau of Investigation
700 East Charleston Boulevard
Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
(702) 385-1281

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 200
10825 Financial Centre Parkway
Little Rock, Arkansas 72211
(501) 221-9100

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Office Building
11000 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90024
(310) 477-6565

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 500
600 Martin Luther King Place
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 583-3941

Federal Bureau of Investigation
225 North Humphreys Blvd.
Memphis, Tennessee 38120-2107
(901) 747-4300

Federal Bureau of Investigation
150 Corporate Boulevard
Norfolk, Virginia 23 502
(804) 455-0100

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 1600
50 Penn Place
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73118
(405) 842-7471

Federal Bureau of Investigation
10755 Burt Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68114
(402) 493-8688

Federal Bureau of Investigation
8th Floor
600 Arch Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
(215) 629-0800

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 400
201 East Indianola
Phoenix, Arizona 85012
(602) 279-5511

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 300
U.S. Post Office Building
700 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
(412) 471-2000

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Crown Plaza
1500 Southwest First Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97201
(503) 224-4181

Federal Bureau of Investigation
111 Greencourt Road
Richmond, Virginia 23228
(804) 261-1044

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Suite 400
400 West Monroe Street
Springfield, Illinois 62704
(217) 522-9675

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 610
500 Zack Street
Tampa, Florida 33602
(813) 273-4566

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington Metropolitan Field Office
1900 Half Street, Southwest
Washington, D.C.
20535-0001
(202) 252-7801

Federal Bureau of Investigation
450 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, California 94102
(415) 553-7400

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 526
U.S. Courthouse and Federal Office Building
Hato Rey
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918
(809) 754-6000

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 710
915 Second Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98174
(206) 622-0460

 

Federal Transit Administration Regional Offices

FTA Region

Regional Office Address

Regional Office Phone Number

I (ME, VT, NH, MA, CT, RI)

VNTSC
Kendall Square
55 Broadway, Suite 920
Cambridge, MA 02142-1093

(617) 494-2055

II (NY, NJ, Puerto Rico)

26 Federal Plaza
Suite 2940
New York, NY 10278-0194

(212) 264-8162

III (PA, WV, VA, MD, DC, DE)

1760 Market Street
Suite 500
Philadelphia, PA 19103-4124

(215) 656-6900

IV (KY, TN, NC, MS, AL, GA,

        SC, FL)

1720 Peachtree Road NW
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30309-2439

(404) 347-3948

V (MN, WI, IL, IN, OH, MI)

55 East Monroe St.
Room 1415
Chicago, IL 60603-5704

(312) 353-2789

VI (NM, TX, OK, AR, LA)

Parkview Place
Suite 175
524 East Lamat Street
Arlongton, TX 76011-3900

(817) 860-9663

VII (NE, IA, KS, MO)

6301 Rockhill Road
Suite 303
Kansas City, MO 64131-1117

(816) 523-0204

VIII (MT, ND, SD, WY, NV,

        UT, CO, AZ)

Columbine Place
216 16th Street, Suite 650
Denver, CO 80202-5120

(303) 844-3242

IX   (CA, HI, Pacific

       Commonwealths and

       Territories)

201 Mission Street
Suite 2210
San Francisco, CA 94105-1800

(415) 744-3133

X   (WA, OR, ID, AK)

Jackson Federal Building
915 Second Avenue
Suite 3142
Seattle, WA 98174-1002

(206) 220-7954

 

Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Offices

FEMA Region

Regional Office Address

I (CT, ME, VT, MA, NH, RI)

J.W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse
Building, Room 442
Boston, MA 02109-4595

II (NY, NJ, PR, VI)

26 Federal Plaza, Room 1338
New York, NY 10278-0002

III (DE, MD, VA, PA, DC, WV)

Liberty Square Building, 2nd Floor
105 South Seventh Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106-3316

IV (AL, GA, FL, MS, KY, SC, NC, TN)

Suite 700
1371 Peachtree Street, NE
Altanta, GA 30309-3108

V (IN, IL, WI, OH, MN, MI)

175 West Jackson, 4th Floor
Chicago, IL 60604-2698

VI (AR, LA, TX, NM, OK)

Federal Regional Center
800 N. Loop 288, Room 206
Denton, TX 76201-3698

VII (KS, NE, MO, IA)

911 Walnut Street, Room 200
Kansas City, MO 64106-2085

VIII (CO, MT, UT, ND, SD, WY)

Denver Federal Center
Building 710, Box 25267
Denver, CO 80225-0267

IX (CA, AZ, NV, HI, Pacific Commonwealths and Territories)

Building 105, Presidio of San Francisco
San Francisco, CA 94129-1250

X (ID, OR, WA, AK)

Federal Regional Center
130 228th Street, S.W.
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

 

Additional Numbers

American Public Transit Association

1201 New York Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 898-4037/74 Membership Department

(202) 898-4088/39 Meetings Department

DOT Hotline

(800) 424-0201

FTA Bulletin Board

(800) 231-2061

Transportation Research Information Services

National Research Council

2101 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20418

(202) 334-3250

Transportation Safety Institute

Transit Division

DTI-80

PO Box 25082

Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5050

 

 * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1997 - 500-695/40015

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